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Love and Civitas: Dante’s Ethical Journey in the Vita Nuova 
 
Alfred Robert Crudale, Ph.D. 
University of Connecticut, 2013 
 
 
 This dissertation examines Dante’s love for Beatrice, which begins as erotic 
passion accompanied by reason, and slowly develops into a well-ordered passion 
defined by the poet/lover’s interaction with the people of Florence.  My study 
investigates Dante’s Vita Nuova through the lens of ethics, specifically literary ethics as 
it is formulated by the twentieth century philosopher Emanuel Levinas.  Informed by 
Levinas’s philosophy, which defines ethics as an infinite responsibility to the other, I 
argue that Dante creates an ethical link between his poetry and the civitas.   As I 
discuss the development of Dante’s love, I frame the three phases of the Vita Nuova in 
light of St. Bonaventure’s teaching, which outlines the mind’s journey to God, in his 
Itinerarium mentis in Deum.  Here he delineates three stages through which the mind 
passes as it journeys toward God: the extra nos, with its focus on things external; the 
intra nos with the focus on things internal; and the supra nos, focused on things above.  
Dante’s libello establishes the poet’s idea of love, which is also connected to moral 
philosophy, and hence is the expression of his responsibility, as poet and lover, vis-à-vis 
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  The Vita Nuova is the work of a young poet at the inception of his career1, as he 
contemplates natural love which points to caritas.   Embedded in the tradition of 
troubadour poetry, the Vita Nuova establishes Dante’s new poetics of praise.  In the Vita 
Nuova, Dante investigates the essential link between poetry and ethics, which he further 
develops later, in the Convivio, and especially in the Commedia.   My dissertation 
examines Dante’s love for Beatrice, which begins as erotic passion accompanied by 
reason, and slowly develops into a well-ordered passion defined by the poet/lover’s 
interaction with the people of Florence, as well as with the pilgrims (strangers who come 
from afar), who cross the city.  My study investigates Dante’s Vita Nuova through the 
lens of ethics, specifically literary ethics as it is formulated by the twentieth century 
philosopher Emanuel Levinas.  Informed by Levinas’s philosophy, which understands 
ethics as an infinite responsibility to the other, I explore the prose commentary and 
poems of the Vita Nuova as they relate to the concepts of “le dit” (the said) and “le dire” 
(the saying) and how they help to interpret a new perspective on Dante’s ethics of 
poetry.  For Levinas, the Said is ontological, it is the language of being, that which 
makes the poetic word identifiable and human.  Critchley explains it as the substance of 
the poet’s words and their distinctive meaning through which truth or falseness can be 
determined: “The said is a statement, assertion or proposition of which the truth or 
falsity can be ascertained.”2 The said preexists our act of communication, for as Levinas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Dante	  had	  already	  written	  several	  poems,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  were	  included	  in	  the	  Vita	  Nuova.	  
2	  See	  Critchley’s	  discussion	  on	  the	  said	  and	  the	  saying	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  
8	  
	  
points out, “Being would… manifest itself as already invoked in silence and non-human 
language” (Otherwise than being, or, Beyond Essence 135).3   
Saying, by contrast, is ethical – our exposure and undeniable responsibility to the 
other. It is infinite and beyond our comprehension as it moves the Ego toward the Other.  
While the said may be identified as the distinctive meaning of one’s words, the saying 
may be identified as the fact that those words are addressed to an interlocutor4, and 
thus reflect the subject–object relationship; “The saying and the said in their correlation 
delineate the subject-object structure,” (OB, 46) writes Levinas. 
In this study I argue that Dante creates an ethical link between his poetry and the 
civitas.  Throughout the Vita Nuova, the protagonist is continually defined by the vital 
connection which exists between eros, ethics, and caritas.  
 The first chapter begins with an examination of the prose of Chapter III in which 
Dante describes his dream of the god of Love, who appears with Beatrice in his arms.  
This episode brings to mind Newton’s argument that the narration of a story and the 
fictionalizing of a person or persons has ethical consequences which bind the teller, 
listener, and reader.5 Dante, thus, creates an ethical relationship between the episode 
of the narration of the dream – the said – and the address to the interlocutors – the 
saying.  “Narrative, as a participatory act,” writes Newton, “is part ‘said’ and part 
‘saying,’ the latter – the level of intersubjective relation – being the site of surplus, of the 
unforeseen, of the self-exposure” (Newton 3).  Dantes’ presentation of his dream to the 
fedeli d’Amore – the elite group of his fellow poets – confirms Newton’s statement: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Hereafter	  I	  abbreviate	  Otherwise	  than	  Being	  as	  OB.	  
4	  See	  Critchley,	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  p.18.	  
5	  Adam	  Zachary	  Newton,	  Narrative	  Ethics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  
9	  
	  
“Pensando io a ciò che m’era apparuto, propuosi di farlo sentire a molti li quali erano 
famosi trovatori in quello tempo” (VN III:9).6  The subject-object structure is evident, and 
thus substantiates the ethical relationship between the said and the saying.  It 
simultaneously underscores the poetic ethos which Dante interjects in the next line:  “E 
con ciò fosse cosa che io avesse già veduto per me medesimo l’arte del dire parole per 
rime, propuosi di fare uno sonetto, ne lo quale io salutasse tutti li fedeli d’Amore; e 
pregandoli che giudicassero la mia visione, scrissi a loro ciò che io avea nel mio sonno 
veduto” (VN III:9).7  This is also manifested in Dante’s sonnet as he invokes the 
response of Love’s élite.  Such an ethos brings to mind Levinas’s understanding of the 
said as the esse ipsum, when he states, “To make the evocation of being, which makes 
a poem possible resound in a poem would be to make a said resound” (OB 135).   
Dante’s sonnet A ciascun’alma presa is the resounding said which elicits a 
reaction from both the poets and the reader, underscoring the sonnet’s 
phenomenological characteristics as, in the words of Levinas, “the language which 
poetry puts into human words” (OB 135).8  My examination of this episode and of the 
sonnet A ciascun’alma presa logically leads to an analysis of Guido Cavalcanti’s 
corresponding sonnet Vedeste al mio parere onne valore, in which he responds to 
Dante’s request in an attempt to interpret the dream, which ultimately fails.  The focus of 
my analysis is the ethical relationship between Dante’s said and Cavalcanti’s saying, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6All	  the	  citations	  and	  translations	  from	  the	  Vita	  Nuova	  in	  this	  dissertation	  come	  from	  D.	  Cervigni	  and	  E.	  Vasta’s	  
edtion,(Notre	  Dame,	  IN:	  The	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1995).	  	  “Thinking	  upon	  that	  which	  had	  appeared	  to	  
me,	  I	  resolved	  to	  make	  it	  known	  to	  many	  who	  were	  famous	  troubadours	  at	  that	  time.”	  	  
7	  “And	  since	  I	  myself	  had	  already	  seen	  to	  the	  art	  of	  saying	  words	  in	  rhyme,	  I	  resolved	  to	  compose	  a	  sonnet,	  in	  
which	  I	  would	  greet	  all	  the	  faithful	  of	  Love;	  and	  requesting	  them	  to	  judge	  my	  vision.”	  
8	  See	  Otherwise	  than	  Being,	  p.	  135	  
10	  
	  
namely the said “called to account in the saying”9  In the first two lines of his sonnet 
Cavalcanti addresses Dante’s request, thereby imprinting the traces of his saying on 
Dante’s said:10 “Vedeste, al mio parere, omne valore / e tutto gioco e quanto bene om 
sente”(Vedeste al mio parere, vv. 1–2).11 While Dante initiates the subject-object 
relationship – in petitioning the fedeli d’Amore – Cavalcanti’s response acknowledges 
his irrefutable responsibility as interlocutor, in which, in Levinasian terms, the concept of 
universality is apparent.  Ciaramelli emphasizes Levinas’s claim of universality when he 
states: “the claim made upon me by another, insofar as it is addressed not only to me 
but to everyone, is the basis of the universality of ethics” (Ciaramelli 92).12  I treat these 
two sonnets more extensively in my first chapter as they are fundamental to my 
discussion of the ethics of poetry. 
   In the second chapter of my study, as I discuss the development of Dante’s 
love, I frame the three phases of the Vita Nuova in light of St. Bonaventure’s teaching, 
which outlines the mind’s journey to God.  In his Itinerarium mentis in Deum, 
Bonaventure delineates three stages through which the mind passes as it journeys 
toward God: the extra nos, with its focus on things external; the intra nos with the focus 
on things internal; and the supra nos, focused on things above.  The first phase of the 
Vita Nuova resembles the extra nos stage as the lover focuses on things external, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  In	  his	  book	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  Adam	  Zachary	  Newton	  discusses	  Samuel	  Taylor	  Coleridge’s	  poem	  “The	  Rime	  of	  the	  
Ancient	  Mariner”	  of	  which	  he	  claims	  is	  constructed	  around	  a	  framework	  of	  “intersubjective	  relation	  accompanied	  
through	  story,”	  which	  he	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  identify	  as	  ethics.	  	  “That	  armature	  is	  what	  I	  call	  ethics:	  narrative	  as	  
relationship	  and	  human	  connectivity,	  as	  Saying	  over	  and	  above	  Said,	  or	  as	  Said	  called	  to	  account	  in	  Saying;	  
narrative	  as	  claim,	  as	  risk,	  as	  responsibility,	  as	  gift,	  as	  price.”	  Narrative	  Ethics	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  1995)	  
10	  Here	  I	  paraphrase	  Wyschogrod.	  
11	  All	  citations	  and	  translations	  of	  Cavalcanti’s	  poetry	  in	  this	  dissertation	  come	  from	  M.	  Cirigliano’s	  Guido	  
Cavalcanti:	  The	  Complete	  Poems,	  (New	  York:	  Italica	  Press,	  1992).	  	  “If	  it	  were	  mine,	  you’d	  see	  every	  value	  /	  and	  joy	  
and	  good	  feeling.”	  
12	  See	  Fabio	  Caramelli’s	  “Levinas’s	  Ethical	  Discourse	  between	  Individuation	  and	  Universality”	  in	  Re-­‐reading	  Levinas	  
(Indiana	  Press,	  1991),	  p.92	  
11	  
	  
as the greeting of his beloved as well as on other events or experiences which cause 
him to focus on external reality.  My examination centers on the significance of 
Beatrice’s greeting, and its role in the development of Dante’s love, especially how he 
moves from the extra nos stage to the intra nos.   
 With the canzone Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore (Ladies who have 
intelligence of love), the lover progresses from the stage of extra nos to that of intra nos, 
the second level in Bonaventure’s progression in which love manifests itself within the 
lover.  This progression is essential to the total economy of the work as the poet/lover 
realizes that his beatitude does not come solely from the greeting of his beloved, but 
from his own words which praise her.  Dante’s realization reinforces the role of Beatrice 
as the essential link between the power of eros and divine grace:   
 E quando trova alcun che degno sia 
di veder lei, quei prova sua vertute, 
 ché li avvien, ciò che li dona, in salute, 
 e sì l’umilia, ch’ogni offesa oblia. (VN XIX:10, vv.37-40)13 
This link, I argue, is the catalyst through which ethics is perfected into the Christian 
theological virtue of caritas. The phrase alcun che refers to the stranger, the other, 
whom Beatrice deems worthy of her greeting (saluto), through which this “other” 
receives salvation (salute).   
My examination of the canzone Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore, which initiates 
Dante’s new poetics of praise, leads to a discussion of the concept of morum probitas, 
as articulated in the De Amore by Andreas Capellanus.  While love may begin as erotic 
passion, it must be tempered by the guiding light of reason as it refines the virtue and 
moral character of the lover.  Inherent in the concept of morum probitas is the idea that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “And	  when	  she	  finds	  someone	  worthy	  /	  to	  behold	  her,	  he	  experiences	  her	  power,	  /	  for	  what	  she	  gives	  him	  turns	  
to	  salvation,	  and	  so	  humbles	  him	  that	  he	  forgets	  every	  offense.”	  
12	  
	  
love is the source of all goodness, and that a lady will accept a lover only after he has 
proven that he is sufficiently probus.  Capellanus emphasizes that strong moral 
character is essential to the lover’s proper advancement in the ways of love.  Based on 
Capellanus’s concept Dante creates an association between Beatrice and the coro delle 
donne.14 As the ladies question the lover about his love for his lady, he comes to realize 
that he has focused too much on Beatrice’s greeting, and has ignored “quello che non 
[mi] puote venire meno” (VN XVIII:5).15 In his realization that his true beatitude comes 
from the praise of his lady, the lover advances from the extra nos to the intra nos stage.  
More importantly, however, Beatrice becomes a fundamental link between the natural 
power of eros and divine grace, and thus ethics is perfected into the Christian 
theological virtue of caritas,16  as exemplified by his dialogue with the coro delle donne, 
which is emblematic of the civitas. 
Finally, in this chapter, I examine the last sonnet of the Vita Nuova, in which 
Dante proclaims that his heart is drawn upward by an “intelligenza nova” (VN XLI:10).17  
His focus on things above, in conjunction with this new intelligence, demonstrates to the 
reader that the lover has achieved the final stage of love – supra nos – and thus comes 
to understand that eros, accompanied by virtue and reason, has the potential to develop 
into caritas. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  his	  essay	  “Dante:	  Within	  Courtly	  Love	  and	  Beyond,”	  Singleton	  argues	  that	  Beatrice	  guides	  Dante	  “toward	  that	  
Good	  beyond	  which	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  aspire	  to”.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “the	  reader	  too	  has	  his	  will	  
directed	  by	  this	  miracle	  named	  Beatrice”.	  	  C.	  Singleton,	  “Dante:	  Within	  Courtly	  Love	  and	  Beyond”	  in	  The	  Meaning	  
of	  Courtly	  Love,	  (Albany,	  NY:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1967).	  
15	  “that	  which	  cannot	  fail	  [me].”	  
16	  See	  Thomas	  Aquinas’s	  Summa	  Theologica	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  grace	  does	  not	  destroy	  nature,	  but	  perfects	  it:	  
“gratia	  non	  tollit	  	  naturam,	  sed	  perficit”	  (Summa	  I:1,	  8).	  
17	  “a	  new	  intelligence.”	  
13	  
	  
 The third chapter focuses on the function of the god of Love and the donne 
schermo (screen ladies), as poetic elements, within the parameters of the ethics of 
poetry.  In the first part of the chapter, I examine how Dante’s representation of the god 
of Love, as the “said,” within the Vita Nuova, functions as an echo of the troubadour 
tradition.  At times speaking in the vernacular and at others in Latin, the god’s words 
emphasize the connection between the ethics of poetry and the civitas.  This 
examination opens a discussion of the importance of the vernacular, which is informed 
by my reading of Picone, Gorni, and DeRobertis.  The vernacular is the medium through 
which the human experience is expressed.  Imitating the Creator, the poet – on behalf 
of humanity – employs the vernacular to generate beauty and symmetry through 
language, while establishing a connection with the divine.  As Picone notes, “La 
creatura si avvicina così al Creatore, e lo strumento di approsimazione le è dato dal 
linguaggio” (Picone 6).18  Dante establishes, at the very beginning of the work, the god 
of Love as master and guide to the protagonist, while in a dream the lover hears the god 
utter the words “Ego dominus tuus.”   
The donne schermo, two ladies whom Dante chooses to serve as a “schermo de 
la veritade,” (VN V: 3)19 are an essential element of Dante’s ethics of poetry.  These 
women point to the ethics of love as expressed in Cappellanus’s concept of morum 
probitas; they hide Dante’s love for Beatrice from the people of Florence who would 
gossip and mock their love.  Thus they function as a fundamental example of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  Picone’s	  Vita	  Nuova	  e	  tradzione	  romanza,	  (Padova:	  Liviana,	  1979)	  in	  which	  he	  discusses	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  vernacular.	  	  “The	  creature	  becomes	  like	  the	  Creator,	  and	  the	  instrument	  of	  approximation	  is	  
given	  to	  him	  through	  language”	  (My	  translation).	  
19	  “screen	  to	  the	  truth.”	  
14	  
	  
representational ethics, as described by Newton.20  He argues that at some point the 
power of fiction to represent submits to the absolute power of ethical responsibility.  The 
idea of the “doubling of reality”21 connects the very act of representation to the poet’s 
responsibility to the entire civitas, as well as to his reader.  In light of Newton’s 
statement, I examine the function of the donne schermo as a representation of the 
beloved, and thus as an essential element of Dante’s ethics of poetry.   
 Following the death of Beatrice two themes emerge in the Vita Nuova which are 
the focus of my fourth chapter.  The first is the theme of loss which emphasizes the link 
between love and the civitas, as the poet urges the city to share in his grief.  The poet 
expands his audience from his previous interlocutors to the entire civitas, as he calls 
upon his fellow citizens to join in his loss.  My examination of the theme of loss brings 
about a discussion on Levinas’s philosophy of responsibility to the other, and how the 
face of the other demands a response.  While my discussion focuses on the reciprocal 
responsibility between Dante and the members of the civitas, I also explore the poet’s 
responsibility to his reader as explained by Newton. 
The second theme which I explore in Chapter Four is the theme of pilgrimage 
(peregrinatio) with its deep link to the theme of civitas.    Following Beatrice’s death, 
Dante encounters a group of pilgrims who pass through Florence on their way to Rome.  
These pilgrims become part of Dante’s larger audience and they bring the ethics of his 
poetry to the civitas and beyond. As pilgrims they are exiles away from their homes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Newton’s	  definition	  of	  Representational	  Ethics	  is	  “the	  cost	  incurred	  in	  fictionalizing	  oneself	  or	  others	  by	  
exchanging	  	  ‘person’	  for	  ‘character’”	  	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  pp.	  17-­‐18.	  
21	  After	  a	  lengthy	  quote	  from	  Levinas,	  Newton	  discusses	  the	  “idea	  of	  essential	  doubling	  of	  reality”	  which	  he	  states,	  
“ties	  acts	  of	  representation	  to	  responsibilities	  in	  a	  way	  which	  parallels…	  the	  underlying	  conditions	  of	  actually	  
telling	  a	  story…	  fiction’s	  modus	  vivendi	  –	  its	  power	  to	  represent	  –	  at	  some	  level	  gives	  way	  before	  the	  more	  severe	  
and	  plenary	  power	  of	  ethical	  responsibility”	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  p.	  19.	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in search of a final destination or spiritual home.  The poet/lover identifies with them for 
since the loss of his beloved he, also, is an exile on a journey, in search of the source of 
his happiness.  My examination of the sonnet “Deh peregrini” leads to a discussion of 
how Dante’s use of language (his said) becomes a link between him and the pilgrims, 
and that the reciprocal responsibility between the pilgrims and the lover (the saying) is 
revealed through the sonnet.  I argue that the saying transcends the said, which through 
Dante’s responsibility creates the fundamental link between love and civitas.  Equally 
significant is the reader’s responsibility of interpretation which is comprised of both the 
private act of reading the text, and the public act of discussing it.22 
 Dante’s libello establishes the poet’s ethics regarding the lover and the civitas, 
which he later develops and emphasizes in his Commedia.  My analysis of the Vita 
Nuova demonstrates the essential link between eros, ethics, and caritas defined by the 
poet/lover’s interaction with the people of the civitas.23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  See	  Newton’s	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  p.	  19.	  
23	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  throughout	  the	  Vita	  Nuova	  Dante	  never	  mentions	  Florence	  by	  name,	  thus	  giving	  	  a	  





The Link between Love and Civitas 
 
 With its roots in the tradition of troubadour poetry, the Vita Nuova distinguishes 
itself as it introduces Dante’s new poetics of praise.  It also functions as a 
foreshadowing or a first stage in Dante’s exploration of the importance of linking ethics 
to poetry, as seen later, in the Convivio, and especially in the Commedia.  In this 
chapter I examine the vital link between eros, ethics and caritas, offering a fresh 
interpretation of Dante’s philosophy of love.  I argue that as his love becomes more 
virtuous, that is to say more disinterested, there is a fundamental shift from the ethos 
that links Dante to the courtly love tradition and the fedeli d’Amore (his fellow poets and 
stilnovisti) to the ethos that links him to the “coro delle donne” (chorus of ladies) who 
have “intelligence of Love,” whom Dante addresses as his new audience and 
interlocutors.  As I examine Dante’s ethics of poetry, I use Levinas’s philosophy of the 
“said” and the “saying” as a lens through which one is able to gain a distinct perspective 
and appreciation for Dante’s ethical treatment of the people with whom he interacts.  
For Emanuel Levinas, the concept of the said and the saying is the basis of the ethical 
relationship between the self and the Other.  He emphasizes that the said – a statement 
or the identifiable word – is ontological, while the saying – an infinite response to the 
Other – is ethical.24  The concept of the saying and the said is essential to my study, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Regarding	  the	  Saying	  and	  the	  Said	  see	  	  Levinas’s	  Otherwise	  than	  Being	  (Pittsburgh:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press,	  
1981)pp.	  9-­‐10,	  37-­‐38,	  45-­‐48,	  48-­‐49,	  153,	  157-­‐160;	  in	  the	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  	  Critchley	  and	  
Bernasconi,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  see	  pp.	  17-­‐18,	  74,	  133-­‐134,	  200-­‐202;	  and	  in	  Newton’s	  
Narrative	  Ethics	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995)	  see	  pp.	  7,	  18-­‐19.	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I examine Dante’s ethical interaction with the civitas.  Below I discuss, in greater detail, 
the elements of the said and the saying, and how they are reflected in Dante’s ethics of 
poetry.  I find the correlation between the said and the saying, to be fundamental to 
Dante’s Vita Nuova, for it is through this relationship that Dante establishes an ethical 
connection between his poetry and the civitas. 
The domain of ethics, as Edith Wyschogrod states, is not a symmetrical plane on 
which everyone is equal.  Instead, she argues, the “self and the other are absolutely 
asymmetrical”.25  This asymmetrical structure is visible in the relationship in which the 
self (subject) – in extreme passivity – accepts unlimited responsibility for the other 
(object).  This relationship is reflected in the correlation between the said and the 
saying, which, as Levinas articulates, “delineates the subject-object structure” (OB 46).  
For Levinas, the saying thematizes the said, while signifying it to the other.  Such a 
signification, however, is defined by the words in the said, and occurs, as he indicates, 
in proximity26 of the self to the Other.  What, then, is the significance of one’s ethical 
relationship with the other, and how is it to be understood?  How is the ethical link 
between love and civitas manifested in Dante’s Vita Nuova? 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Edith	  Wyschgrod,	  “Language	  and	  alterity	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Levinas,”	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  
Simon	  Critchley	  and	  Robert	  Bernasconi,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  p.	  191.	  
26	  Levinas	  understands	  proximity	  to	  be	  a	  relationship	  of	  responsibility	  to	  the	  Other,	  and	  I	  shall	  discuss	  this	  concept	  
in	  greater	  depth	  later	  in	  thos	  chapter.	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La maravigliosa visione – part said, part saying   
    
Beginning with his first dream, the poet/lover, through the recounting of the 
“maravigliosa visione,” (VN III:3)27 creates a bond which joins him ethically to his 
listeners and readers.  It is helpful to recall the discussion of Adam Zachary Newton, 
who distinguishes three categories within narrative ethics.  The first of these is 
narrational ethics, which he understands as the structure of exchanges which exists 
between the storyteller, listeners and readers, and the responsibilities that result from 
the act of narration.   The other two are representational ethics and hermeneutic ethics, 
which I discuss in depth in the third and forth chapters of this study. 
 Applying Levinas’s philosophy, Newton equates narrational ethics with the 
saying, as it is the “intersubjective responsibility” (Newton 18) which is borne out of the 
act of storytelling.  Narrator and interlocutor are joined in a discursive relationship 
prompted by the text – the narrative – which results in exposure to both the storyteller 
and the reader.  Newton’s claim that narrative is “part said and part saying” (Newton 3) 
underscores my thesis that there exists in Dante’s poetry an ethical dimension through 
which his love for Beatrice is manifested and which binds him to the people of Florence.   
How does Newton’s statement relate to the Vita Nuova?  The combination of prose and 
verse, which constitute the Vita Nuova, establishes Dante’s said in his narration of the 
events and encounters of the work.  His saying is established in his relationship and 
approach to the many characters and groups of people with whom he comes into 
contact, which he relays through his said.  It is evident that both the ontological said and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  “Marvelous	  vision”.	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the ethical saying are united to create a literary work whose narrative is ethical in its 
essence.   
 As Dante narrates the story of his meeting Beatrice, he reveals himself, in an 
ethical manner, to both the people of Florence, and his readers.  From the very 
beginning when Beatrice first appears to him, Dante assigns her several attributes 
which immediately establish her nobility:  “Apparve vestita di nobilissimo colore, umile e 
onesto, sanguigno, cinta e ornata a la guisa che a la sua giovanissima etade si 
convenia” (VN II:3-4).28  The terms nobilissimo, umile, and onesto, emphasize the virtue 
of Beatrice, while simultaneously underscoring her ontological qualities.  Honesty, 
humility and nobility create the foundation upon which the character of Beatrice is built, 
and which is described by De Robertis as “quell’ideale di vita e di umanità perfetta che 
in essa è esaltata” (De Robertis 14).29  The virtue of nobility is reinforced in the color of 
her clothing.  As the color red represents nobility, could Dante give his lady anything but 
a shade of this noble color?  Gorni points out that, “se il colore rosso per eccellenza è il 
rosso, sanguigno, che ne tempera il cromatismo con tinte più cupe e violette, tendenti al 
nero, sarebbe perciò detto nobilissimo” (Gorni 7).30  While the color of Beatrice’s 
vestments reinforce her virtue, it also points to her role as figura Christi, as Graziano 
indicates in her association of the blood-red clothing and the blood of Christ’s passion.31   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  “She	  appeared	  humbly	  and	  properly	  dressed	  in	  a	  most	  noble	  color,	  crimson,	  girded	  and	  adorned	  in	  the	  manner	  
that	  befitted	  her	  so	  youthful	  age.”	  
29	  D.	  De	  Robertis,	  Il	  libro	  della	  “Vita	  Nuova”,	  Firenze:	  Sansoni,	  1970.	  	  “…that	  ideal	  of	  life	  and	  of	  perfect	  humanity	  
which	  in	  her	  is	  exalted.”	  (My	  translation)	  
30	  See	  G.	  Gorni’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Vita	  Nova,	  Torino:	  Giulio	  Einaudi	  Editore,	  1996,	  	  “…if	  the	  color	  par	  excellance	  is	  red,	  
blood-­‐red,	  which	  tempers	  the	  chromatic	  with	  somber	  and	  violet	  tints	  ,	  stretching	  toward	  black,	  would	  	  be	  as	  stated	  
most	  noble.”	  	  (My	  translation)	  
31	  “L’associazione	  del	  sanguigno	  al	  sanque	  e	  alla	  passione	  di	  Cristo	  è	  certamente	  legittimata	  maggiormente	  da	  
queste	  precedente	  scelte	  platonica	  di	  togliere	  al	  colore	  ross	  oil	  riferimento	  sanguigno.”	  	  See	  Maria	  Luisa	  Graziano’s	  
essay,	  “Sul	  colore	  rosso	  di	  Beatrice:	  L’epifania	  poetica	  sella	  lingua	  del	  sì”	  in	  Critica	  Letteraria,	  2,	  2009.	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 While I have made a case for the virtuous significance of the color of Beatrice 
garment, I would suggest that the eroticism is also represented in this color. Dante tells 
us that upon seeing Beatrice for the first time his senses were awakened: “In quello 
punto lo spirito animale, lo quale dimora ne l’alta camera ne la quale tutti li spiriti 
sensitivi portano le loro percezioni, si cominciò a maravigliare molto” (VN II:5).32 In this 
episode we recognize eros as the life force which draws two lovers toward each other.  
Dante, however, is quick to inform the reader that this is not a selfish, self-serving eros, 
but one guided by reason:  
E avvegna che la sua imagine, la quale continuatamente meco stava, 
fosse baldanza d’Amore a segnoreggiare me, tuttavia era di sì nobilissima 
vertù, che nulla volta sofferse che Amore mi reggesse sanza lo fedele 
consiglio de la ragione in quelle cose là ove cotale consiglio fosse utile a 
udire (VN II:9-10).33  
 
A love guided by reason, while it may have a passionate element, is ethical, as is 
evident later in the work when the poet explains that the mere greeting of his beloved 
filled him with charity, and caused him to forgive anyone who may have offended him.  
The narration of this episode underscores the ethical aspect of Dante’s poetry. Beatrice 
becomes the connection between Dante and the civitas, and thus indirectly the conduit 
which carries Dante’s poetic ethics to both his city and the reader.  Focusing on 
Beatrice’s ineffabile cortesia, Dante strengthens the enigmatic link between love and 
ethics:  
e passando per una via, volse li occhi verso quella parte ov’io era molto 
pauroso, e per la sua ineffabile cortesia, la quale è oggi meritata nel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  “At	  that	  point	  the	  animal	  spirit,	  which	  dwells	  in	  the	  upper	  chamber	  to	  which	  all	  the	  spirits	  of	  the	  senses	  carry	  
their	  perceptions,	  began	  to	  marvel	  greatly.”	  
33	  “And	  although	  her	  image,	  which	  constantly	  stayed	  with	  me,	  gave	  Love	  its	  strength	  to	  rule	  over	  me,	  it	  was	  
nevertheless	  of	  such	  noble	  power	  that	  at	  no	  time	  did	  it	  allow	  Love	  to	  rule	  me	  without	  the	  faithful	  counsel	  of	  
reason,	  in	  those	  things	  where	  such	  counsel	  was	  useful	  to	  heed.”	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grande secolo, mi salutoe molto virtuosamente, tanto che me parve allora 
vedere tutti li termini de la beatitudine (VN III:1).34  
 
The words ineffabile cortesia, virtuosamente, and beatitudine reflect the narrative ethics 
of Dante’s libello, in light of Newton’s statement that prose fiction has the ability to 
produce “its own transactional procedures within the text” (Newton 59).  The lover’s 
fear, which he feels in the presence of his lady, is replaced with understanding of her 
virtue and ineffable courtesy.  The character of Beatrice is ethical in that she extends	  
her courtesy, not only to the poet/lover, but to all with whom she comes into contact.  
Thus the circumstance, borne out of the act of narration, accentuates an ethical 
relationship between the poet and his lady.  The “transactional procedures,” lead to the 
formation of power relations, which are created both in and by the text.  Beatrice’s 
greeting is one example, for it serves as a strong connection between her and the 
protagonist, as well as the basis for their relationship.  The greeting of the beloved 
demands a response from the lover, ultimately binding the author and the character.35 
When Dante tells the reader that Beatrice’s greeting leads him to forgiveness, he 
creates a link between poet and protagonist which underscores the ethical element of 
the narrative act. I shall revisit this concept below in my discussion of Dante’s 
relationship with the fedeli d’Amore. 
 The meeting of his beloved leads the poet/lover to retreat to his room, where he 
falls asleep, only to dream of her being embraced by the god of Love:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  “…and	  passing	  along	  a	  street,	  she	  turned	  her	  eyes	  to	  that	  place	  where	  I	  stood	  in	  great	  fear,	  and	  in	  her	  ineffable	  
courtesy,	  which	  today	  is	  rewarded	  in	  life	  everlasting,	  she	  greeted	  me	  with	  exceeding	  virtue,	  such	  that	  I	  then	  
seemed	  to	  see	  all	  the	  terms	  of	  beatitude.”	  
35	  See	  Newton	  p.	  13.	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e ricorsi a lo solingo luogo d’una mia camera, e puosimi a pensare di questa 
cortesissima.  E pensando di lei, mi sopragiunse uno soave sonno, ne lo quale 
m’apparve una maravigliosa visione” (VN III:2-3).36   
 
The dream becomes the catalyst for the first sonnet of the Vita Nuova which he offers to 
the fedeli d’Amore for interpretation.  The prose, which precedes the poetry, establishes 
the structure of the Vita Nuova as it interprets the lyrics which follow.  De Robertis writes 
that the “prosa ripropone le immaginazioni della poesia con mezzi e in termini nuovi, 
sotto un’altra luce,” (De Robertis 5)37 thereby reinforcing the hermeneutic quality of the 
prose.  
 Apart from its hermeneutic function, the prose of Chapter III of the Vita Nuova 
establishes the subject-object relationship between Dante and Beatrice, as the 
poet/lover recounts the dream – the manifestation of his desire.  In the dream the god of 
Love appears to the protagonist, holding in his arms “una persona dormire nuda” (VN 
III:4)38 emphasizing the natural power of eros.  As I have mentioned above, Dante has 
already stated that his love was always accompanied by the guiding light of reason (VN 
II:9), and he quickly mitigates the erotic image of the sleeping Beatrice by qualifying that 
she was “involta…in un drappo sanguigno” (VN III:4),39 thus emphasizing her virtue, 
which for Dante is part passion and part nobility, as he clarifies later in the Convivio: 
E rende esemplo ne li colori, dicendo: sì come lo perso dal nero discende, 
così questa, cioè vertude, discende da nobilitade.  Lo perso è uno colore 
misto di purpureo e di nero, ma vince lo nero, e da lui si dinomina; e così 
la vertù è una cosa mista di nobilitade e di passion; ma perché la 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  “and	  resorted	  to	  the	  solitary	  place	  of	  my	  room,	  and	  set	  about	  thinking	  	  upon	  this	  most	  courteous	  one.	  	  And	  
thinking	  of	  her,	  I	  was	  overcome	  by	  a	  sweet	  sleep,	  in	  which	  there	  appeared	  to	  me	  a	  marvelous	  vision.”	  	  
37	  De	  Robertis:	  “the	  prose	  suggests	  anew	  the	  immaginations	  of	  the	  poetry	  with	  new	  means	  and	  in	  new	  terms,	  
under	  a	  different	  light.”	  (My	  translation).	  	  	  See	  also	  Raffaele	  Pinto,	  who	  elaborates	  on	  the	  hermeneutic	  importance	  
of	  the	  prose	  in	  his	  essay	  “Il	  sogno	  del	  cuore	  mangiato	  (VN	  III)	  e	  i	  due	  tempi	  di	  Beatrice”,	  in	  Quaderns	  d’Italià	  13,	  
2008.	  
38	  “a	  person	  asleep,	  naked”.	  
39	  “wrapped	  in	  a	  crimson	  cloth”.	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nobilitade vince quella, è la vertù dinominata da essa e appellata bontade 
(Convivio IV, xx:2).40 
 
 In the dream, Dante notices an object engulfed in flame, explained by the god of 
Love as the poet/lover’s heart, “Vide cor tuum,” (VN III:6)41 which the god then feeds to 
the lady.  Having fed the heart to the lady, the god of Love bursts into tears as he, with 
the lady wrapped in his arms, seems to ascend to heaven.  The scene so disturbs the 
poet/lover that he wakes from sleep.  In the very act of narrating the dream Dante 
establishes an ethical relationship with his readers.  The narration – his said – is his 
statement or declaration, his words and their identifiable meaning.42  This is the essence 
of the said, an assertion through which the truth can be determined, which Levinas 
claims is the “intersubjective representation of being” (OB 135).  Thus we understand 
the said to be ontological in its articulation of being, or better stated, the said is the 
language of ontology.   The I who narrates the events, “che essendo una esperienza 
tutta interna,” as Pinto writes, is the Da-Sein –  that being which looks at its 
surroundings, its “place” –  and comes to interpret itself in that locus (Da).43   Dante’s 
narration of his dream, therefore, the interpretation of his world, renders his said 
ontological.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  “It	  provides	  an	  analogy	  based	  on	  colors,	  saying	  that	  just	  as	  perse	  derives	  from	  black,	  so	  does	  this,	  namely	  virtue	  ,	  
derive	  from	  nobililty.	  	  Perseis	  a	  color	  composed	  of	  purple	  and	  black,	  but	  black	  predominates,	  so	  it	  takes	  its	  name	  
form	  black.	  Likewise	  virtue	  is	  a	  thing	  composed	  of	  nobility	  and	  passion,	  but	  because	  nobility	  predominates	  in	  it,	  
virtue	  takes	  its	  name	  from	  it	  and	  is	  called	  goodness.”	  	  	  All	  quotes	  from	  the	  Convivio,	  throughout	  this	  study,	  come	  
from	  the	  Edizione	  critica	  a	  cura	  di	  Maria	  Simonelli,	  (Bologna:	  Casa	  Editrice	  prof.	  Riccardo	  Pàtron,	  1966);	  the	  English	  
translations	  come	  from	  the	  translation	  by	  Richard	  H.	  Lansing,(New	  York:Garland,	  1990).	  Graziano	  echoes	  Dante	  
when	  she	  writes,	  “Il	  sanguigno	  è	  un	  colore	  nobilissimo	  perché	  semplice	  nelle	  sue	  proporzioni	  calcolabili,”	  
reinforcing	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  color	  red	  and	  virtue.	  See	  Graziano,	  “Sul	  colore	  rosso	  di	  Beatrice:	  L’epifania	  
poetica	  sella	  lingua	  del	  sì”	  in	  Critica	  Letteraria,	  2,	  2009.	  
41	  “Behold	  your	  heart.”	  
42	  See	  Simon	  Critchley’s	  introduction	  to	  the	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2008)	  p.	  18.	  
43	  In	  the	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  John	  Llewelyn	  gives	  a	  very	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  Da-­‐
Sein,	  comparing	  Levinas’s	  understanding	  to	  those	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  Structuralists.	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The said, however, makes up only one portion of the relationship.  For this 
relationship to be ethical the poet/lover must reveal himself to an interlocutor, for it is  
through this self-disclosure that the saying is brought to light.  Ontology, as Levinas 
argues, is interrupted by the saying, which is “the very enactment of the movement from 
the same to the other” (Critchley 18).  The saying which is “over and above” (Newton 7) 
the said, underscores the ethical relationship as one of human connectivity.  The 
narration allows the storyteller to interact with the listener or the reader, while 
simultaneously revealing the author’s responsibility.  What does this mean for Dante’s 
readers?  There is a dialectic between the poet and his readers, as Dante’s words, 
whether his prose, or his verse, emphasize the reciprocity of the said and the saying.  It 
is useful to recall Newton’s position that there exist ethical consequences which 
accompany the narration of a story.44  The story teller must be cognizant of the 
reciprocity which binds him to the listener or the reader, as well as the consequences 
which are borne out of the act of narration.  These consequences or “exigent 
conditions,” as Newton identifies them, are the essential elements to narrative ethics.45   
What then are the consequences of Dante fictionalizing his lady, and what “reciprocal 
claims” bind Dante to his reader? 
In his understanding of narrative ethics, Newton maintains that due to the 
transactional nature of narration, the literary text produces solid relationships, which he 
refers to as “power relations” (Newton 58).  These relations serve to emphasize the 
influence of representation as they underscore the performative function of narration.   
Evidence of this can be seen in Dante’s relationship, not only to Beatrice, but to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Adam	  Zachary	  Newton,	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  p.	  11	  
45	  Ibid.,	  p.	  17	  -­‐	  18	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entire civitas.  The ethical nature of Dante’s poetry is framed by the protagonist’s 
relationship with the fedeli d’Amore, to whom he reveals himself when he elicits their 
response to his sonnet in which he explains his dream of the god of Love.  This elite 
group of poets is an essential link which connects Dante to the school of stilnovismo.   
In contrast to his fellow stilnovisti, Dante expands his audience to include those who are 
not learned – li più semplici (the common folk or the unschooled, VN IV:1) – clearly 
demonstrating his poetic ethics.  Newton’s claim that power relations ultimately give way 
to ethical relations46 comes to mind.  Through the act of narration the ontological 
qualities of the said opens a space filled with the ethical saying.  Dante reaches out and 
engages the entire civitas which is evident in the gloss following the first sonnet of the 
Vita Nuova. The poet explains that the true significance of his dream escapes the elite, 
but is instead understood by the common people, “Lo verace giudicio del detto sogno 
non fu veduto allora per alcuno ma ora è manifestissimo a li più semplici.”(VN III:15)47  
While this statement is fundamental in understanding Dante’s ethos within his poetics, it 
clearly demonstrates his ability to expand his audience to include not only the learned 
elite, but the unschooled, li più simplici of the civitas, analogous to the episode of the 
Gospel, in which, the Jewish leaders fail to comprehend the message of Christ, while 
the poor and common people often understand His words.  As the Sanhedrin questions 
Jesus after arresting Him, Jesus responds that they should ask the people to whom he 
preached: “Quid me interrogas? Interroga eos qui audierunt quid locutus sum ipsis. 
Ecce hii sciunt quae dixerim ego” (John 18:21).48    Even Jesus’ disciples are often 
confused by his words and their meaning, and are unable to fully understand His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  See	  Newton,	  p.	  60.	  
47	  “The	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  said	  dream	  was	  not	  seen	  by	  anyone	  then,	  but	  now	  it	  is	  perfectly	  clear	  to	  the	  simplest.”	  
48	  “Why	  do	  you	  question	  me?	  	  Question	  those	  who	  have	  heard	  what	  I	  said	  to	  them.	  	  They	  know	  what	  I	  said.”	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message until after His resurrection.  It is necessary for time to pass, and for the 
disciples to ponder and contemplate the mysteries which they had experienced, before 
they are able to comprehend the words of Christ.  Dante mirrors this time lapse in the 
Vita Nuova, juxtaposing the terms allora and ora to make it clear to the reader that our 
first experiences can often be ambiguous, but after the passing of some time we can 
gain understanding.  
 
I fedeli d’Amore and responsibility 
In addressing his sonnet to the fedeli d’Amore, Dante creates a bond between 
himself and his fellow poets: 
 A ciascun’alma presa e gentil core 
 nel cui cospetto ven lo dir presente, 
 in ciò che mi rescrivan suo parvente 
salute in lor segnor, cioè Amore (VN 3:10 vv. 1-3)49 
   This bond, uniting the said and the saying, establishes a reciprocal relationship, at the 
center of which is responsibility.  The first quatrain of the sonnet assigns this 
responsibility to both Dante and the fedeli d’Amore in their proximity to one another.50 
Perperzak’s statement that “the saying and the said are united” (Peperzak 65) comes to 
mind.  He holds that every said is presented by a saying and that there can be no 
saying without a said, which leads him to conclude that “their interwovenness must be 
constitutive for the modes of being characteristic of both of them” (Peperzak 65).  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  “To	  every	  captive	  soul	  and	  gentle	  heart	  /	  into	  whose	  regard	  shall	  come	  the	  present	  words,	  /	  so	  that	  they	  intern	  
may	  inscribe	  their	  views,	  /	  greeting	  in	  their	  lord	  who	  is	  love”.	  
50	  Levinas	  describes	  his	  concept	  of	  proximity	  as	  responsibility	  to	  the	  other	  regardless	  of	  location	  or	  time.	  It	  is	  a	  
relationship	  understood	  as	  reciprocal.	  	  “Proximity,”	  writes	  Levinas,	  “…is	  responsibility.	  	  It	  is	  a	  response	  without	  a	  
question,…It	  is	  the	  humanity	  of	  a	  man	  not	  understood	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  transcendental	  subjectivity…Proximity	  is	  
fraternity	  before	  essence	  and	  before	  death,	  having	  a	  meaning	  despite	  being	  and	  nothingness”	  (OB,	  139).	  See	  also	  
Ethics	  and	  Infinity,	  pp.	  97-­‐98.	  	  On	  Levinias’s	  concept	  of	  proximity	  see	  also	  Ciaramelli,	  Re-­‐reading	  Levinas,	  pp.	  90-­‐91;	  




Otherwise than Being Levinas states, “The veracity of a subject would be the virtue of a 
saying in which the emission of signs, insignificant in their own figures, would be 
subordinate to the signified, the said, which in turn would be conformed to the being that 
shows itself” (OB 134).  When applied to Dante’s sonnet, this means that the poem 
which he offers to his fellow poets as “said” is dependent upon their reading and 
interpretation, which will in turn produce a response from them, or what Ciaramelli refers 
to as “an endless thinking back from the Said to the Saying” (Ciaramelli 97), thus 
highlighting the cyclical relationship characteristic of the saying and the said.  
Peperzak’s description, which he calls “the alternation of dire-dédire-redire” (Peperzak 
65) is based on Levinas’s proposal, and describes the movement from the dimension of 
logos to the dimension of saying (saying, exposure, responsibility) and then back to that 
of logos.  This “jumping back and forth an infinite number of times” (Peperzak 65) 
suggests that we are aware of the “secret passage” (Peperzak 65) which joins the two 
dimensions.  The first quatrain of Dante’s sonnet uncovers this “secret passage” as the 
he invites his fellow poets to “rescrivan suo parvente” in response to the words of his 
said.  The saying of the fedeli d’Amore blossoms in the light of “lo dir presente,” which 
Dante offers to the elite group of poets, as well as to his readers.  In so doing, Dante 
encourages the “jumping back and forth” from his words, to their response, and then 
back to their words, thus revealing the ethics of, not merely his own poetry, but the 
ethics of poetry in a universal sense. 
 In the two final tercets of the sonnet Dante gives details of the dream, describing 
the actions and the demeanor of the god of love: 
  Allegro mi sembrava Amor tenendo  
  meo core in mano, e ne le braccia avea 
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  madonna involta in un drappo dormendo. 
 
  Poi la svegliava, e d’esto core ardendo 
  lei paventosa umilmente pascea: 
  appresso gir lo ne vedea piangendo. (VN III:12 vv.9-14)51 
In the beginning of the first tercet, the god of Love is happy, as he holds Dante’s heart in 
his hand.  At the end of the final tercet, however, the god turns away in tears.  As we 
examine these two stanzas it is very important to remember Newton’s description of 
narrative ethics as part saying and part said.  What can be characterized as ethical in 
these two tercets?   
 On the surface it seems that the saying has been overshadowed by the said, and 
that ontological characteristics of the sonnet have trumped the ethical nature of the 
poem.  Levinas warns that the saying “runs the risk of being absorbed as soon as the 
said is formulated” (OB 46), however, it is the intersubjectivity of the poem, it’s 
examples of human connectivity, which displays the saying above the said, or in 
Newton’s words, “the said called into account in the saying” (Newton 7).  This is what 
Levinas means when he writes: “In correlation with the said…the saying itself is indeed 
thematized, exposes in essence even what is in the hither side of ontology, and flows 
into the temporalization of essence” (OB 46).  When this concept is applied to Dante’s 
sonnet, the connection between the poet and reader is highlighted through key terms 
which underscore the ontological elements of the said.  The terms allegro 52 and 
piangendo produce a tension within the sonnet, communicating to the reader an 
emotional conflict, which is reinforced in the juxtaposition of dormendo and svegliava, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  “Joyous	  to	  me	  seemed	  Love,	  holding	  /	  my	  heart	  in	  his	  hand,	  and	  in	  his	  arms	  he	  had	  /	  my	  lady	  wrapped	  in	  a	  cloth	  
asleep.	  /	  Then	  he	  awakened	  her,	  and	  this	  burning	  heart	  /	  to	  the	  frightened	  one	  he	  humbly	  fed:	  /	  afterward	  I	  saw	  
him	  turn	  away	  weeping”.	  
52	  See	  also	  Foster	  and	  Boyd’s	  note	  in	  Dante’s	  Lyric	  Poetry,	  Vol.	  II,	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1967),	  pp.	  24-­‐25.	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and culminating with the term paventosa.  These terms create an emotional link 
between the reader and the narrative which bring to light the thematization of the saying 
through the said. 
 Dante informs us that many poets responded to his sonnet with very different 
interpretations.  This reaching out by Dante, and the poets’ responses, underscore the 
human connectivity which defines the saying:  “A questo sonetto fue risposto da molti e 
di diverse sentenzie” (VN III:14).53  Newton recognizes the importance of such a 
relationship as fundamental to narrative ethics.  It is the human connectivity that causes 
the narrative to be ethical, which emphasizes the link between the text, the poet and the 
reader, calling the said to account in the saying.  Newton understands the narrative “as 
claim, as risk, as responsibility, as gift, as price” (Newton 7), and as such, ethical.  The 
fedeli d’Amore are bound together by the enigmatic force of poetry, as a community of 
poets and readers, whose discourse is directed toward the other.  The bond – Dante’s 
sonnet – between author and interlocutor encumbers this community with the burden of 
intersubjective responsibility which manifests itself through poetry.   
 
Cavalcanti’s “saying” and “said”   
 For Dante, the most important response to his sonnet comes from Guido 
Cavalcanti, which Dante regards as the catalyst to their friendship.  Cavalcanti’s 
response to Dante’s said, creates an ethical relationship between the two poets which is 
based on their mutual responsibility to each other, and causes Dante to proclaim Guido 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  “This	  sonnet	  was	  answered	  by	  many	  and	  by	  diverse	  interpretations.”	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as his best and closest friend: “tra li quali fue risponditore quelli cui io chiamo primo de li 
miei amici” (VN III:14).54 
 Cavalcanti discloses his obligation to Dante through his said, which becomes the 
basis of his saying: 
  Vedeste, al mio parere, omne valore 
  e tutto gioco e quanto bene om sente, 
  se foste in prova del segnor valente 
  che segnoreggia il mondo de l’onore (Vedeste al mio parere vv. 1-4).55   
Moved by the younger poet’s interest in his friend’s opinion, Cavalcanti begins his 
sonnet with an appreciative tone, which sets the stage for an ethical exchange – the 
saying – between the two poets.  “Every joy and every good a man can feel” is  
expressed in the saying, however, it is important to note that Cavalcanti’s sonnet 
focuses on the phenomenological, hindering the saying’s transcendence of the said, as 
we shall see in the remaining stanzas.   
 In the second quatrain Cavalcanti’s said reveals his philosophy of love which is 
based on a naturalistic philosophy: 
  Poi vive in parte dove noia more, 
  e tien ragion nel cassar de la mente; 
  sì va soave per sonno a la gente, 
  che ‘l cor ne porta senza dolore (Vedeste al mio parere, vv. 5-8).56   
In response to Dante, Cavalcanti employs physical images well rooted in the dolce stil 
nuovo.  Images such as cassar de la mente, sonno a la gente, and ‘I cor, highlight the 
physical elements of the sonnet, while underscoring the distance between the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  “among	  the	  respondents	  was	  one	  whom	  I	  call	  first	  among	  my	  friends”.	  
55	  All	  citations	  and	  translations	  of	  Cavalcanti’s	  poetry	  in	  this	  dissertation	  come	  from	  M.	  Cirigliano’s	  Guido	  
Cavalcanti:	  The	  Complete	  Poems,	  (New	  York:	  Italica	  Press,	  1992).	  	  “If	  it	  were	  mine,	  you’d	  see	  every	  value	  /	  and	  joy	  
and	  good	  feeling	  /	  if	  you	  knew	  of	  the	  worthy	  lord	  /	  who	  rules	  the	  world	  of	  honor.”	  




poets.  While Dante provides his friend the opportunity to interpret the dream, 
Cavalcanti’s commentary remains attached to a phenomenological approach.  It is 
important to remember that for the elder poet, love was a passionate force which 
manifested itself in a violent and destructive manner, which Cavalcanti associated with 
the chaos of Mars, and which Maria Corti refers to as the “stupende metafore 
cavalcantiane della battaglia d’amore” (Corti 21).57   In the subsequent tercet, the 
images Cavalcanti employs suggest his philosophy on the pathologies of death, which 
he sees as connected to the passions and instincts of desire: 
  Di voi lo core ne portò, veggendo 
che vostra donna la morte chedea: 
nodriala dello cor, di ciò temendo. (Vedeste al mio parere, vv. 9-11)58   
In his response, Cavalcanti quite possibly is the first to suggest the death of Beatrice, 
and in so doing portrays her more as a victim of love, rather than its catalyst.   For 
Cavalcanti, passionate desire can lead to the end of rational and contemplative life.  
The word death is associated with the demise of the “ideal form,” and comes to signify 
deformation through inordinate passion.  This notion is essential to Cavalcanti’s 
philosophy, and as Corti indicates, “questo significato del vocabolo <<morte>> è 
fondamentale per intendere…tutta l’opera del Cavalcanti” (Corti 28).59 
 The extremely erotic image of the beloved ingesting the flaming heart of the lover 
reinforces Cavalcanti’s notion of destructive passion.  Both Dante and Cavalcanti allude 
to Beatrice’s demeanor as the heart was fed to her; Dante tells us she was “paventosa”, 
while Cavalcanti uses the term “temendo”.   Pinto confirms that “la morte di Beatrice è 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See	  M.	  Corti,	  La	  felicità	  mentale:	  nuove	  perspettive	  per	  Cavalcanti	  e	  Dante,	  (Torino:	  G.	  Einaudi,	  1983).	  	  “the	  
stupendous	  Cavalcantian	  metaphors	  of	  the	  battle	  of	  love”	  (My	  translation).	  
58	  “he	  took	  your	  heart	  away	  seeing	  /	  your	  Lady	  ask	  for	  your	  death	  /	  nourishing	  her	  with	  your	  trembling	  heart.”	  




quindi, in un primo momento, solo estensione analogica, sulla donna, della pulsione di 
morte che accompagna la patologia del desiderio, come Guido insegna” (Pinto 52).60 
Beatrice’s death, in Cavalcanti’s interpretation of the dream, allows her to escape her 
lover’s overbearing desire, and in so doing, denies Love his triumph: 
   
Quando v’apparve che se ‘n gia dolendo, 
  fu ‘l dolce sonno ch’allor si compiea, 
  chè ‘l su’ contraro lo venìa vincendo (Vedeste al mio parere, vv.12-14).61   
 Ultimaltely Dante tells us that Cavalcanti missed the mark, for he fails to 
understand the significance of the dream.  Cavalcanti’s saying is formulated within the 
sphere of a conventional ethos of love that is enoblening (the cor gentile) on one hand, 
while on the other it remains bound to the perspectives of naturalistic philosophy or 
phenomenology.  Cavalcanti’s saying never transcends the said, in contrast, as Dante 
states, to the ability of the unschooled (li più semplici) to be recepive to the saying 
when, later, the mystery of Dante’s dream will be unveiled. I would add that this 
unveiling announced by the poet-narrator, hence the saying implicit in the dream, is also 
not revealed to Dante-the-character, who in fact addressed his friend Guido, and other 
fedeli d’Amore seeking their interpretation of his dream.   
 Based on the troubadour and courtly love traditions, Dante’s love poetry is 
extended to the whole civitas, as he expands his audience to include all the citizens of 
Florence from the poetic elite – i fedeli d’Amore – to common folk – li più semplici.     
Dante’s said – his lyrics – addressed to his interlocutors, serve as the basis of his ethics 
of poetry, and his saying is borne out in the words of his said.  Paradoxically, for li più 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  “The	  death	  of	  Beatrice	  is	  therefor,	  in	  a	  first	  instance,	  only	  an	  analogical	  extension,	  of	  woman,	  of	  the	  catalyst	  of	  
death	  which	  accompanies	  the	  pathology	  of	  desire,	  as	  Guido	  teaches”.	  
61	  “When	  you	  see	  him	  leave	  sorrowing	  /	  the	  sweet	  trance	  ends	  /	  defeated	  by	  its	  enemy”.	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semplici, unhindered by lofty thoughts and complex intellectualism, the words of Dante’s 
said are able to penetrate and reveal the ethical saying, which ultimately escapes the 
poetic elite.  This becomes more evident as we see Dante interact with others, as he 
extends his poetic ethics to the entire civitas, as in his exchange with the coro delle 
donne, the noble ladies who question Dante about his love for Beatrice, and who 





St. Bonaventure, the “Chorus of Ladies,” and  
the Ethics of Poetry 
  
 In his Confessions, St. Augustine speaks of a series of degrees through which 
the heart ascends to God.  There is a general consensus that, within the mystic tradition 
of the Middle Ages, the number of these degrees was three.  Singleton discusses these 
degrees in his seminal study on the Vita Nuova, in which he writes, “This itinerary of the 
mind to God, as Augustine had conceived it, began at its first level, outside of man.  It 
turned inward at its second level or degree.  And in its third and last stage, it rose above 
man” (Singleton 105-106).   
Following Augustine’s teaching regarding the ascent of the heart and mind 
towards God, St. Bonaventure delineates the degrees with the names extra nos, intra 
nos and supra nos in his Itinerarium mentis in Deum.  Bonaventure teaches that while 
our ultimate goal is the Summum Bonum, in order to arrive at this goal, we must first 
“transire per vestigium, quod est corporale et temporale, et extra nos, et hoc est deduci 
in via Dei”( Itinerarium I:2).62  Thus, that which is outside of us, that with which we 
interact, becomes the vestige which constitutes the initial stage of our journey to what 
Bonaventure calls the Primum Principium.   
 During the second stage of our journey, as it is described by Bonaventure, we 
must turn inward, entering our mind, and focus on that which is inside of us.  The mind, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  “we	  must	  pass	  through	  vestiges	  which	  are	  corporeal	  and	  temporal	  and	  outside	  us.	  	  This	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  
being	  led	  in	  the	  way	  of	  God.”	  	  	  All	  citations	  in	  Latin	  come	  from	  St.	  Bonaventure’s	  Itinerarium	  mentis	  in	  Deum,	  (Saint	  
Bonaventure,	  N.Y.	  :	  Franciscan	  Institute,	  Saint	  Bonaventure	  University,	  1956).	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Bonaventure tells us, is the image of God; therefore, we must, “intrare ad mentem 
nostram, quae est imago Dei aeviterna, spiritualis, et intra nos, et hoc est ingredi in 
veritate Dei” (Itinerarium I:2).63 
 The third and final step of our journey to God requires that we go beyond the 
animalitas and the sensibilitas, and reach toward that which is eternal, that which is 
most spiritual, that which is above us. Doing so allows us to revel in the great majesty of 
the Almighty, or as Bonaventure writes, “oportet, nos transcendere ad aeternum, 
spiritualissimum, et supra nos aspiciendo ad primum principium, et hoc est laetari in Dei 
notitia et reverentia maiestatis” (Itinerarium 1:2).64 
 In this chapter, I examine Bonaventure’s three stages of the mind’s journey to 
God, and apply them to what I see as the three phases of Dante’s Vita Nuova, as I 
argue that the poet/lover’s love for Beatrice is marked by three distinct phases, which 
have their origin in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium.   I contend that the first stage of Dante’s 
love is marked by the poet/lover’s focus on the greeting of his beloved, as well as other 
externals, which correspond to Bonaventure’s sensibilitas stage.  I then suggest that the 
first canzone of Dante’s libello – Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore – demonstrates the 
poet/lover’s progress to the next phase.  His poetry of praise, represented by the 
concept of morum probitas (the moral development of a lover, through the perfection of 
his character and virtue, as described by Andreas Capellanus in his treatise De Amore),  
is evidence that he is searching within himself in his contemplation of his beloved.  
Finally, Beatrice’s death in conjunction with the poet/lover’s previous experiences – 
including dreams and visions, and his journey from extra nos to supra nos – culminating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  “we	  must	  enter	  into	  our	  mind,	  which	  is	  the	  image	  of	  God,	  an	  image	  which	  is	  everlasting,	  spiritual,	  and	  within	  us.”	  
64	  “we	  must	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  eternal,	  most	  spiritual,	  and	  above	  us.	  	  This	  is	  to	  rejoice	  in	  the	  knowledge	  and	  
reverence	  of	  the	  majesty	  of	  God.”	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in the final sonnet, “Oltre la spera,” define the third phase of the Vita Nuova as Dante 
focuses on that which is eternal and most spiritual.  As the poet moves through these 
three phases, I will demonstrate how the beloved – Beatrice – is the essential link 
between the power of eros and divine grace, and thus the means through which ethics 
is perfected into the Christian theological virtue of caritas. 
 Singleton acknowledges the three phases of the Vita Nuova and their similarity to 
the stages of the mystic tradition when he writes, “The three stages of Love in the New 
Life, even though they are not explicitly named, bear such an unmistakable 
resemblance to the mystic stages that they might also bear their names” (Singleton 
107).  In order to fully understand these parallels, it is necessary to first examine 
Bonaventure’s three stages. 
 St. Bonaventure begins his Itinerarium with a simple statement regarding man’s 
pursuit of the Summum Bonum, in which true happiness is found.  Given the fact that 
the Summum Bonum is above us, in order to obtain true happiness, we must then rise 
above ourselves, not in a physical manner, but through an ascent of the heart.65  Such 
an ascent, well founded in the Christian mystic tradition, is a process which is defined 
by self-awareness, prayer, and contemplation, and Bonaventure bases his three stages 
– or what he calls the “triplicem progressum” – on these three essential elements.  He 
teaches that the stages are analogous to the threefold enlightenment of each day, in 
which the extra nos stage represents evening, the intra nos represents morning, and the 
supra nos represents noon.  Finally, as he seeks to arouse the pilgrim, Bonaventure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Et	  summum	  bonum	  sit	  supra	  nos:	  nullus	  potest	  effici	  beatus,	  nisi	  supra	  semetipsum	  ascendat,	  non	  ascensu	  
corporali,	  sed	  cordiali.	  St.Bonventure,	  Itinerarium,	  I.1.	  (And	  the	  Supreme	  Good	  is	  above	  us,	  no	  one	  can	  enjoy	  
happiness	  unless	  he	  rise	  above	  himself,	  not	  ,	  indeed,	  by	  a	  bodily	  ascent,	  but	  by	  an	  ascent	  of	  the	  heart.)	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argues that these three stages are reflective of the threefold substance in Christ,66 
whom he refers to as “scala nostra” – our ladder, who helps us reach the true Object of 
our desire. 
 In order to understand how the three stages of Bonaventure’s Itinerarium guide 
the mind and heart toward the Summum Bonum, it is essential to understand his 
teaching on sinfulness and the inner powers we possess, whereby sinfulness may be 
overcome.  Bonaventure perceives man as bent over beneath his heavy burden of sin, 
which we incurred after Adam’s fall from grace, and which “infecit humanam naturam” 
(Itinerarium I:7)67 in the mind through ignorance and in the flesh through lust, which 
Bonaventure refers to as concupiscence.  It is this burden of sin which deprives man of 
God’s light. 
 All is not hopeless, however; through the assistance of divine grace and with the 
aid of justice and wisdom, we can combat concupiscence and oppose ignorance freeing 
us to escape the darkness and ascend toward the light.68  Bonaventure’s three stages 
help us to shed this burden of sin and stand erect in the knowledge and majesty of the 
Primum Principium, for it is through prayer that we are able to discern the steps which 
mark the soul’s path to God.  With this newfound clarity, we must pass through the extra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  haec	  etiam	  respicit	  triplicem	  substantiam	  in	  Christo,	  qui	  est	  scala	  nostra,	  St.Bonventure,	  Itinerarium,	  I.3.	  (it	  
reflects	  the	  threefold	  substance	  in	  Christ,	  Who	  is	  our	  ladder.)	  
67	  “infected	  human	  nature”.	  
68	  Ita	  quod	  excaecatus	  homo	  et	  incurvatus	  in	  tenebris	  sedet	  et	  caeli	  lumen	  non	  videt	  nisi	  succurrat	  gratia	  cum	  
iustitia	  contra	  concupiscentiam,	  et	  scientia	  cum	  sapientia	  contra	  ignorantiam.	  	  St.Bonventure,	  Itinerarium,	  I.7.	  (The	  
result	  is	  that	  man,	  blinded	  and	  bent	  over,	  sits	  in	  darkness	  and	  does	  not	  see	  the	  light	  of	  heaven,	  unless	  grace	  comes	  
to	  his	  aid	  –	  with	  justice	  to	  fight	  concupiscence,	  and	  with	  knowledge	  and	  wisdom	  to	  oppose	  ignorance.)	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nos stage, where our journey begins, and in which we recognize “ipsa rerum 
universitas” (Itinerarium I:2)69 as the stairway by which we make our ascent. 
 The extra nos stage is fundamental to our journey, for through it we come to see 
the likeness of God in visible things.  God’s creatures, as vestiges of Him, allow the soul 
to see God in them, for he is present in all his creation, per essentiam, potentiam et 
praesentiam (Itinerarium II:1).70  Through our senses, we interact with those things that 
are outside of us, and gain knowledge of the physical world; in turn, we see God as 
through a mirror, our senses serving as doors to the soul,71 allowing it to comprehend 
these visible and external things.  It is this comprehension which causes us to derive 
pleasure from what Bonaventure refers to as “suitable objects”.72  Pleasure allows 
external delights to enter the soul through likeness, whether through sight (beauty), 
smell and hearing (sweetness), or taste and touch (wholesomeness).  Thus pleasure is 
central to our comprehension of the physical world. 
 When we understand that pleasure is the unification of two suitable objects, and 
that the essence of God is comprised of that which is most beautiful, sweet, and 
wholesome,73 it is clear to see that God is the fontalis et vera delectatio (Itinerarium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  In	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  Itinerarium,	  Philotheus	  Boehner	  translates	  this	  phrase	  as	  “the	  material	  universe	  itself.”	  	  
See	  The	  Journey	  of	  the	  Mind	  to	  God,	  Translation	  by	  Philotheus	  Boehner,	  Edited,	  with	  Introduction	  and	  Notes,	  by	  
Stephen	  F.	  Brown,	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing	  Co.,	  1993).	  
70	  “His	  essence,	  His	  power,	  and	  His	  presence”.	  
71	  Homo	  igitur,	  qui	  dicitur	  minor	  mundus,	  habet	  quinque	  sensus	  quasi	  quinque	  portas,	  per	  quas	  intrat	  cognitio	  
omnium,	  quae	  sunt	  in	  mundo	  sensibili,	  in	  animam	  ipsius.(	  Itinerarium	  II:3).	  	  (Man,	  therefore,	  who	  is	  called	  a	  
microcosm,	  has	  five	  senses	  that	  serve	  as	  five	  portals	  through	  which	  the	  knowledge	  of	  all	  things	  existing	  in	  the	  
visible	  world	  enters	  his	  soul.)	  	  
72	  See	  Philotheus	  Boehner’s	  translation,	  p.	  12.	  
73	  Si	  ergo	  «	  delectatio	  est	  coniunctio	  convenientis	  cum	  convenienti	  »;	  et	  solius	  Dei	  similitudo	  tenet	  rationem	  
summe	  speciosi,	  suavis	  et	  salubris…,	  (Itinerarium	  II:8).	  	  (Therefore,	  if	  delight	  is	  the	  union	  of	  the	  suitable	  with	  the	  




II:8)74 whom we seek through all other delights.  Thus, the extra nos stage, through 
which we are led to see God in vestiges, enables the contemplative soul to advance 
toward its Object of Desire, for as Bonaventure reminds us, “omnes creaturae istius 
sensibilis mundi animum contemplantis et sapientis ducunt in Deum aeternum” 
(Itinerarium II:11).75   
 As the extra nos stage marks the beginning of the soul’s journey, the intra nos 
stage marks the central portion of the journey, where we reenter ourselves and become 
more reflective.  Just as the vestiges of God allow us to see Him through His creations, 
as we reenter our minds, we perceive the divine image in all its brightness.  “Ubi ad 
modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis,” writes Bonaventure, “in 
qua scilicet resplendet imago beatissimae Trinitatis” (Itinerarium III:1).76  Thus, the very 
act of reentering ourselves enables us to see that the soul truly loves itself; however this 
love is only possible when the soul knows itself, which can only happen through 
memory.  Bonaventure urges his reader to consider the “three powers” of the soul, 
which he explains permit us to “videre Deum per te tanquam per imaginem,” (Itinerarium 
III:1)77 and thus are fundamental to our introspection.  Memory is the first of these 
powers, and is followed by intellect and will.   
According to Bonaventure, the function of our memory is the retention of 
information.  He teaches that through remembrance, our memory retains the past; 
through grasping,78 it retains the present; and through foresight, it retains the future.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  “fountain	  of	  true	  delight”.	  
75	  “all	  creatures	  in	  this	  visible	  world	  lead	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  contemplative	  and	  wise	  man	  to	  the	  eternal	  God”.	  
76	  “in	  which	  the	  image	  of	  the	  most	  blessed	  Trinity	  appears	  in	  splendor”.	  
77	  “to	  see	  God	  through	  yourself	  as	  through	  an	  image”.	  
78	  In	  his	  text,	  Bonaventure	  uses	  the	  term	  susceptionem,	  which	  translates	  as	  “capture”.	  	  I	  have	  taken	  the	  liberty	  of	  
translating	  it	  as	  “grasping”.	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the retention of the past, present, and future, our memory thereby bears a likeness to 
eternity, which through the memory’s indivisible present, has the ability to extend itself 
into all times.79 Following memory is the power of the intellect, whose function assists in 
our understanding of the meaning of terms, the meaning of propositions, and the 
meaning of inference.  The intellect, therefore, allows the soul to see the truth within 
itself, as long as that truth does not become obfuscated by images and desire.  Finally, 
the function of the will is to draw the soul toward the Summum Bonum, which it does 
through counsel, judgment, and desire.  Working in conjunction, these three elements –
counsel, judgment, and desire – lead the soul to seek the true Object of its desire, or a 
likeness to It.  
The intra nos stage of the journey guides the soul to eternity through memory, to 
Truth through intellect, and to the Summum Bonum through the will, a process which 
Bonaventure likens to the Holy Trinity, stating that they – memory, intelligence, and will 
– are consubstantial, coequal, and coeternal.80  Thus, through introspection, the mind 
“consurgit ad speculandam Trinitatem beatam,” (Itinerarium III:5)81 and so enlightened 
can be led, through looking at itself, to God.82 
The final stage of the journey is the supra nos, in which we come to see God not 
through vestiges, nor through an image, but as the true essence of being.  In the supra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Ex	  prima	  igitur	  retentione	  actuali	  omnium	  temporalium,	  praeteritorum	  scilicet,	  praesentium	  et	  futurorum,	  habet	  
effigiem	  aeternitatis,	  cuius	  praesens	  indivisibile	  ad	  omnia	  tempora	  se	  extendit.	  	  (Itinerarium	  III:2).	  	  (In	  its	  first	  
activity,	  the	  actual	  retention	  of	  all	  things	  in	  time	  –	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  –	  the	  memory	  is	  an	  image	  of	  eternity,	  
whose	  indivisible	  present	  extends	  itself	  to	  all	  times.)	  
80	  Haec	  tria	  scilicet	  mens	  generans,	  verbum	  et	  amor,	  sunt	  in	  anima	  quoad	  memoriam,	  intelligentiam	  et	  voluntatem,	  
quae	  sunt	  consubstantiales,	  coaequales	  et	  coaevae,	  se	  invicem	  circumincedentes.	  (Itinerarium	  III:5).	  	  (These	  three	  
–	  the	  generating	  mind,	  the	  word	  and	  love	  –	  exist	  in	  the	  soul	  as	  memory,	  intelligence,	  and	  will,	  which	  are	  
consubstantial,	  coequal,	  equally	  everlasting	  and	  mutually	  inclusive).	  
81	  “rise	  to	  the	  speculation	  of	  the	  Blessed	  Trinity”.	  
82	  Et	  ideo	  mens	  nostra	  tantis	  splendoribus	  irradiata	  et	  superfusa,	  nisi	  sit	  caeca,	  manuduci	  potest	  per	  semetipsam	  
ad	  contemplandam	  illam	  lucem	  aeternam	  (Itinerarium	  	  III:7).	  	  (And	  thus	  our	  mind,	  enlightened	  and	  overflooded	  by	  
so	  much	  brightness,	  unless	  it	  is	  blind,	  can	  be	  guided	  through	  looking	  at	  itself	  to	  contemplate	  the	  eternal	  Light).	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nos stage, the soul, illuminated by the light shining upon the mind, turns its focus on 
Being Itself (ipsum esse), as it contemplates the “invisible things of God.”83  
Bonaventure emphasizes the eternal quality of this “ipsum purissimum esse” by virtue of 
the fact that it has no beginning and no end.  Among its qualities, Bonaventure names 
simple and absolute, primary and eternal, most actual and most perfect, and thus, 
supremely one.  He then hypothesizes that if the name of the being which is defined by 
the aforementioned qualities is “God”, it is illogical that He could not exist, nor exist as 
anything other than one Being.   
Bonaventure concludes his treatise by explaining that having completed the three 
stages, and arrived at the end of its journey, the final step which the soul must execute 
is to pass over and transcend itself. “After our mind has beheld God,” writes 
Bonaventure, “outside itself through and in vestiges of Him, and within itself through and 
in an image of Him, and above itself through the similitude of the Divine Light shining 
above us and in the Divine Light itself…when the mind has done all this, it must still, in 
beholding these things, transcend and pass over, not only this visible world, but even 
itself” (Itinerarium VII:1). 
Having discussed St. Bonaventure’s Itinerarium, an examination of Dante’s Vita 
Nuova will reveal that the structure of the libello is based, as Singleton suggests, on the 
medieval mystic tradition of the three stages, and specifically on St. Bonaventure’s 
model.  I suggest, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that as the poet/lover 
advances through the three phases of the Vita Nuova, there is a shift away from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Volens	  igitur	  contemplari	  Dei	  invisibilia	  quoad	  essentiae	  unitatem	  primo	  defigat	  aspectum	  in	  ipsum	  esse	  
(Itinerarium	  V:3).	  	  (He,	  therefore,	  who	  wishes	  to	  contemplate	  the	  invisible	  things	  of	  God	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  
His	  essence	  should	  fix	  the	  attention	  of	  his	  soul	  on	  Being	  Itself).	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courtly love tradition and toward a new audience, represented by the coro delle donne, 
interlocutors with whom Dante shares his ethics of poetry.  In contrast to his first 
audience – his fellow poets – his interaction with the coro delle donne produces a 
dialectic which ultimately leads to a new poetic style, lo stilo de la loda. 
At the beginning of the Vita Nuova, Dante experiences passion when Beatrice 
appears to him.  Not an inordinate carnal passion, (as I mentioned in Chapter One) his 
is an eros tempered by the guiding light of reason.  Especially significant is Dante’s 
linking eros to the larger ethical concerns which bind him to other men, including his 
enemies, and which constitute the natural love that is elevated into caritas.   In chapter 
XI of the Vita Nuova, Dante writes: “Dico che ella apparia da parte alcuna, per la 
speranza de la mirabile salute nullo nemico mi rimanea, anzi mi giugnea una fiamma di 
caritade, la quale mi facea perdonare a chiunque m’avesse offeso” (VN XI:1).84  
Beatrice’s greeting functions, much like God’s creatures in Bonaventure’s extra nos 
stage, as a vestige which creates a connection between the poet/lover and the object of 
his desire, and causes him to extend this caritas to all with whom he comes into contact, 
including those who may have offended him.  The greeting is something outside of the 
lover, which draws him toward the beloved, analogous to Bonaventure’s “suitable 
objects”, allowing delight to enter through the senses, in Dante’s case, through the sight 
of his lady and her miraculous greeting.   
The poet/lover is at the sensibilitas phase, in which, Bonaventure suggests, our 
perception is influenced by corporeal things outside of us.  Beatrice’s greeting so 
influences the poet/lover, it causes him to act ethically toward the people of the civitas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  “I	  say	  that	  when	  she	  appeared	  from	  any	  direction,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  her	  miraculous	  greeting	  I	  was	  left	  with	  no	  
enemy,	  but	  rather	  there	  arose	  in	  me	  a	  flame	  of	  charity	  that	  made	  me	  forgive	  whoever	  might	  have	  offended	  me”.	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as a replication of the love which he feels for the beloved.  Dante acknowledges the 
importance of Beatrice’s greeting when he writes, “ne le sue salute abitava la mia 
beatitudine,” (VN XI:4)85 reinforcing the concept that our first way of seeing is through 
objects outside of us. 
As important as the greeting is, the denial of Beatrice’s greeting is equally 
important as it helps the poet/lover realize that his true beatitude is not found merely in 
the greeting of the beloved, but that there must be something more, something deeper 
which will lead him to the object of his desire. The denial of the greeting, as Singleton 
confirms, is a “step in the upward way of love,” (Singleton 88)86 as it forces the 
protagonist to understand the limitations of the extra nos stage.  His focus must not 
remain on things outside of him, but he must transition to the next phase in which he 
becomes more reflective.   
This reflection and introspection is brought about by the coro delle donne in their 
questioning Dante regarding his love for Beatrice. As these noble ladies challenge the 
protagonist, they cause him to realize that he has focused too much on his lady’s 
greeting, while neglecting to express the praise of which she is so worthy.  In 
questioning the poet/lover, these ladies, who have knowledge of love, usher Dante into 
the next phase of his journey, which corresponds to Bonaventure’s intra nos stage.  
Dante’s interaction with these ladies is essential to his advancement to the intra 
nos stage.  He acknowledges his meeting with them as	  fortuitous: “io passando 
appresso di loro, sì come da la fortuna menato” (VN XVIII:1).87  The link between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  “in	  her	  greetings	  lay	  my	  beatitude”.	  
86	  See	  also	  M.	  Picone,	  Vita	  Nuova	  e	  tradizione	  romanza,	  pp.	  150-­‐151	  
87	  “and	  passing	  near	  them,	  as	  if	  guided	  by	  fortune”.	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civitas and the protagonist underscores Dante’s ethics of poetry in that these noble 
ladies seek a deeper understanding not only of Dante’s love for Beatrice, but of love in 
the general sense.  Through his interaction with the ladies, Dante becomes more 
contemplative and introspective.  We, as readers, know that these women are often in 
Beatrice’s company, and they are intent on what Dante has to say.  Their question is an 
appeal to the lover to help them comprehend the extraordinary nature of his love.  What 
causes a man to love a woman so deeply the he is unable to “sostenere la sua 
presenza?”88  For Dante, however, the question is a challenge through which he comes 
to a realization that the focus of his love must change.  After acknowledging that his 
lady’s greeting was the pinnacle of his love, he now apprehends that his true happiness 
lies in the praise of Beatrice, which he considers as “quello che non mi puote venire 
meno” (VN XVIII:5).89 
This realization is critical to the Vita Nuova.   “This is a complete reversal,” writes 
Singleton.  “Happiness now comes from within and flows from the inside out” (Singleton 
90).  This epiphany introduces the second phase of the Vita Nuova, and with the first 
canzone of his libello, Dante’s poetry takes on a fresh focus, with Beatrice at the center.  
Equally important, is Dante’s shift, as mentioned above, from the poetics of his 
contemporaries to his new poetics of praise. 
As I demonstrate how the structure of the Vita Nuova mirrors that of 
Bonventure’s Itineriarium, it is essential to examine the canzone Donne ch’avete 
intelletto d’amore with which Dante initiates his stilo de la loda.  Characterized by the 
concept of morum probitas, of which Andreas Capellanus writes, “O, quam mira res est 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  “cannot	  bear	  her	  presence?”	  
89	  “In	  that	  which	  cannot	  fail	  me”.	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amor, qui tantis facit hominem fulgere virtutibus, tantisque docet quemlibet bonis 
moribus abundare!,” (De amore, I:4)90 Dante’s canzone underscores the importance of 
the ethics of poetry in relation to the civitas.  While love is an amalgamation of eros and 
reason, it must advance the moral development of the lover, toward a refinement of 
virtue and character.   
Love, according to Andreas, is the source of all good and thus the catalyst for 
moral development; only a virtuous man may call on a lady, who will determine if he is 
sufficiently probus.  “Sapiens igitur mulier,” writes Andreas, “talem sibi comparare 
perquirat amandum qui morum sit probitate laudandus” (De amore I:6).91  A person’s 
character is essential in attracting the proper type of lover, as only an ethical and 
prudent lover is able to maneuver the ways of love: “Morum probitas acquirit amorem in 
morum probitate fulgentem.  Doctus enim amans vel docta deformen non reiicit 
amantem, si moribus intus abundet.  Qui enim probus inventiur et prudens nunquam 
facile posset in amoris semita deviare vel suum coamantem afficere turbatione” (De 
amore I:6).92  Andreas emphasizes the strong moral character of the lover who is less 
interested in beauty, and more interested in character.  
Foster explains that there exist two essential elements of love, one moral, the 
other sensual.93   While love may begin as a sexual attraction, it is the moral character 
of the lover which guides him in the proper ways of love, and with which ultimately he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  All	  quotes	  from	  the	  De	  amore	  come	  from	  Andreae	  capellani	  regii	  Francorum	  De	  amore	  libri	  tres.	  	  (Castellon	  de	  la	  
Plana:	  Sociedad	  castellonense	  de	  cultura,	  1929).	  	  The	  translations	  come	  from	  The	  Art	  of	  Courtly	  Love,	  translation	  
and	  notes	  by	  John	  Jay	  Parry.	  (New	  York:	  Colombia	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  	  	  “O	  what	  a	  wonderful	  thing	  is	  love,	  
which	  makes	  a	  man	  shine	  with	  so	  many	  virtues	  and	  teaches	  everyone,	  no	  matter	  who	  he	  is,	  so	  many	  good	  traits	  of	  
character.”	  
91	  “A	  wise	  woman	  will	  therefore	  seek	  as	  a	  lover	  a	  man	  of	  praiseworthy	  character.”	  
92	  “A	  person	  of	  good	  character	  draws	  the	  love	  of	  another	  person	  of	  the	  same	  kind,	  for	  a	  well-­‐instructed	  lover,	  man	  
or	  woman,	  does	  not	  reject	  an	  ugly	  lover	  if	  the	  character	  within	  is	  good.	  	  A	  man	  who	  proves	  to	  be	  honorable	  and	  
prudent	  cannot	  easily	  go	  astray	  in	  love’s	  path	  or	  cause	  distress	  to	  his	  beloved.”	  
93	  See	  Kenelm	  Foster’s	  The	  Two	  Dantes,	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1977),	  p.	  27.	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will achieve his goal.94  As Andreas writes, “Sola ergo probitas amoris est digna corona” 
(De amore I:6).95  This crown of love, which is physical in nature, is the reward 
presented to the lover who has ethically developed his character and proven himself to 
be of high moral standard, which Foster argues “connotes a final probitas” (Foster 27). 
Within Andreas’s system of love based on strong moral character, one sees a 
progression analogous to that of the medieval mystics, in which love begins at the base 
level of sensuality and moves through stages toward an apex of high morals.  In one of 
the dialogues of the De amore, Andreas speaks of the four stages of love which 
culminate with sexual fulfillment96, only, however, for the man whose good deeds 
substantiate his strong moral character, deeds which are extended to the entire civitas.  
“Ab antiquo,” writes Andreas, “quatuor sunt gradus in amore constituti distincti.  Primus 
in spei datione consisit, secundus in osculi exhibitione, tertius in amplexus fruitione, 
quartus in totius personae concessione finitur.”97  Like Augustine’s series of degrees, 
and Bonaventure’s (albeit much later) Itineriarium, Andreas establishes a progression 
through which the lover obtains the acceptance of the beloved through his ethical 
development.98  While in the Augustinian and Bonaventurian models the pilgrim’s 
ultimate goal is the Divine, Andreas’s stages focus on the moral character of the lover, 
for if the beloved determines that he is unworthy of her love, she may terminate the 
relationship: “Debet enim primo spei uti largitione mulier, et si cognoverit amantem spei 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Ibid.,	  p.	  27.	  
95	  “Character	  alone	  ,	  then,	  is	  worthy	  of	  the	  crown	  of	  love.”	  
96	  Singer	  emphasizes	  this	  point	  in	  the	  second	  volume	  of	  his	  book	  The	  Nature	  of	  Love,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  1984),	  in	  which	  he	  states,	  “The	  goal	  of	  love	  is	  no	  longer	  calculated	  frustration,	  but	  rather	  sexual	  
fulfillment	  within	  an	  ethical	  system”	  p.69.	  
97	  “From	  ancient	  times	  four	  distinct	  stages	  have	  been	  established	  in	  love:	  the	  first	  consists	  in	  the	  giving	  of	  hope,	  
the	  second	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  a	  kiss,	  the	  third	  in	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  an	  embrace,	  and	  the	  fourth	  culminates	  in	  the	  
yielding	  of	  the	  whole	  person.”	  
98	  Singer	  emphasizes	  that	  both	  systems	  –	  Andreas’s	  stages	  of	  love	  and	  the	  medieval	  theologian’s	  degrees	  of	  
salvation	  –	  relate	  to	  “love	  as	  a	  striving	  for	  goodness”.	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largitione accepta in bonis moribus augmentari, ad gradum mulier non vereatur 
devenire secundum.  Et sic gradatim usque ad quartum deveniat gradum, si ipsum hac 
re invenerit per omnia dignum” (De amore, 1st Dialogue).99  Foster reminds us that “a 
man may only respond to this or a woman allow him to respond, if he is probus” (Foster, 
27).  
 How, then, does the concept of morum probitas manifest itself in Dante’s 
canzone, and how does it influence his ethics of poetry?  With his apostrophe, “Donne 
ch’avete intelletto d’amore,” he gathers the elite of the civitas around him, and 
commands their attention, as they come together to hear the poet/lover praise his lady.  
He separates these select few from those who are unfamiliar with courtly ways.  This 
has binary significance; the poet establishes the coro delle donne as his new 
interlocutors, whom he finds worthy to discuss the praise of his beloved.  They, 
therefore, are the recipients of his saying through the words in his said:100 “tratterò del 
suo stato gentile a respetto di lei leggeramente, donne e donzzelle amorose, con vui, 
ché non è cosa da parlarne altrui” (VN XIX:6, vv. 11-14).101  They are the first to 
experience Dante’s new poetic style, and they, as courtly ladies, are the most worthy 
members of the civitas to whom the marvels of Beatrice are made known.  There is an 
ethos in Dante’s poetry not simply because he praises his lady, but because he invites 
the entire community to join him in praising her.  While the said of the canzone lavishes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  “First	  a	  woman	  should	  make	  use	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  hope,	  and	  then	  if	  she	  sees	  that	  her	  lover	  ,	  after	  receiving	  this,	  
improves	  	  in	  conduct,	  she	  need	  not	  fear	  to	  go	  on	  to	  the	  second	  stage.	  	  And	  so	  step	  by	  step	  she	  may	  come	  to	  the	  
fourth	  stage,	  if	  she	  finds	  that	  he	  is	  in	  every	  respect	  worthy	  of	  it.”	  
100	  See	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  this	  study	  in	  which	  I	  discuss	  Levinas’s	  philosophy	  regarding	  	  the	  saying	  and	  the	  said.	  
101	  “but	  I	  will	  speak	  of	  her	  gentle	  estate	  /	  with	  respect	  for	  her	  discretely,	  /	  ladies	  and	  amorous	  maidens,	  with	  you,	  /	  
for	  it	  is	  not	  a	  subject	  to	  address	  to	  others”.	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praise upon Beatrice, the saying of Dante’s poem is extended to the civitas, as they are 
represented in the coro delle donne. 
Equally important is the essential link which Dante creates between the noble 
ladies and Beatrice.  While they act as a catalyst for Dante’s stilo de la loda, causing 
him to realize that his true happiness is found in praising his lady, Beatrice is the focus 
of his praise, and therefore the source of his beatitude.  The noble ladies’ curiosity 
about the type of love Dante experiences compels him to acknowledge that he has 
placed too much emphasis on the greeting of his beloved – an external vestige – when 
he should be more focused on his praise of her.  As he realizes that his true beatitude 
emanates from praise of Beatrice, he turns away from the external and toward that 
which “est imago Dei aeviterna, spiritualis” (Itinerarium I:2).  Beatrice thus serves as the 
fundamental link between the natural power of eros and divine grace.  She is the 
junction between what Ginsberg sees as “the activities of the sensible and intellectual 
souls” (Ginsberg 9), as she is simultaneously a living being and the essence of 
beatitude.102  This is borne out in the canzone Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore, in 
which she is loved both on earth and in heaven, by mortals and the angels, and thus 
bridges the corporeal world to the spiritual realm.   
In the first stanza of the canzone, Dante acknowledges that he must focus less 
  
on her greeting and more on praising his lady: 
 
 Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore, 
 I’vo’ con voi de la mia donna dire, 
Non perch’io creda sua laudare finire, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  See	  W.	  Ginsberg’s	  Dante’s	  Aesthetics	  of	  Being,	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  9.	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Ma ragionar per isfogar la mente (VN XIX:6, vv. 1-4).103 
As he speaks to these ladies who have intelligence of love, he does so to clear his 
mind, which by his own admission, has been clouded by external vestiges, vestiges 
which led him in the wrong direction, vestiges which caused him to lose focus, rather 
than to identify his genuine beatrix.  By speaking to the ladies, however, his words pour 
out (isfogar) allowing his mind to refocus on that which cannot fail him --“quello che non 
mi puote venire meno” (VN XVIII:5) –  namely, the praise of his lady. 
 In turning from the external, Dante encounters a new poetic direction through 
which he moves away from the traditional mechanics of medieval love poetry, and 
initiates a new poetic style.  Now that il saluto is no longer the focus of his desire, his 
poetry, rather than being self-focused, is centered on the beloved, through whom 
happiness is generated.  This happiness – the foundation of the lover’s praise – is 
based on “quelle parole che lodano la donna mia,” (VN XVIII:7)104 and leads the poet to 
instituting his stilo de la loda,105rendering his poetry ethical, as he engages the civitas, 
and focuses on the Other.  
 It is interesting to note that in the prose which introduces the canzone, Dante 
speaks of walking along “uno rivo molto chiaro” (VN XIX:1).106  The image of the clear 
stream reflects the poet/lover’s realization that his true path lies in praising his lady, and 
the fount of these words comes from deep within himself.  Just as in Bonaventure’s intra 
nos stage in which the pilgrim perceives the Divine in all its brightness, Dante, having 
entered the second phase of his journey, clearly sees his way forward, and thus he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  “Ladies	  who	  have	  understanding	  of	  love,	  /	  I	  wish	  to	  speak	  to	  you	  of	  my	  lady,	  /	  not	  that	  I	  believe	  	  I	  may	  exhaust	  
her	  praise,	  /	  but	  to	  converse	  to	  ease	  my	  mind”.	  
104	  “those	  words	  that	  praise	  my	  lady”.	  
105	  See	  Barolini,	  Dante’s	  Poets,	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1984)	  pp.	  43-­‐44.	  
106	  “a	  very	  clear	  stream”.	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proclaims, “a me giunse tanta voluntade di dire, che io cominciai a pensare lo modo 
ch’io tenesse” (VN XIX:1).107  As he now has a clear understanding of how he must 
proceed, his will to write in praise of Beatrice becomes instinctive, his words coming 
forth almost on their own accord: “Allora dico che la mia lingua parlò quasi come per se 
stessa mossa” (VN XIX:2).108  In the first phase of the work, as the poet adheres to the 
“dualistic mechanics” (Barolini 44) of traditional love poetry, his words are egocentric; 
conversely, having established his praise style, his words are focused on the Other, and 
are therefore more ardently expressed.109  
 Later in the first stanza of Donne ch’avete, Dante makes a distinction between 
himself and his fellow stilnovisti.  While I believe this may have been unintentional, one 
cannot deny that in establishing his praise style, Dante does, in fact, break with his 
contemporaries and initiates a new poetic style.  As he states in the canzone, he wishes 
to speak not in a lofty style, but in a manner that all can appreciate, and in doing so, 
Dante extends his poetic ethics to the entire civitas, unlike his fellow poets: 
 Io dico che pensando il suo valore, 
 Amor sì dolce si fa sentire, 
 che s’io allora non perdessi ardire, 
 farei parlando innamorar la gente. 
 E io non vo’ parlar sì altamente, 
 ch’io divenisse per temenza vile (VN XIX:5-6, vv. 5-10).110 
Dante’s claim that his praise of Beatrice’s virtue could make all people love, is reflective 
of Andreas Capellanus’s concept that love is the source of all goodness, and that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  “I	  felt	  such	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  write	  that	  I	  began	  to	  conceive	  the	  mode	  I	  might	  follow”.	  
108	  “Then	  I	  say	  that	  my	  tongue	  spoke	  as	  if	  it	  moved	  by	  itself”.	  
109	  Barolini	  indicates	  a	  paradox	  between	  Bonagiunta	  in	  Purgatorio	  XXIV,	  who,	  she	  observes,	  “failed	  to	  ‘open	  his	  
mouth’	  in	  praise	  and	  Dante,	  whose	  “Donne	  ch’avete”	  initiates	  his	  praise-­‐style.	  	  See	  Dante’s	  Poets,	  p.	  52.	  
110	  “I	  say	  that	  as	  I	  think	  of	  her	  worth,	  /	  Love	  so	  sweet	  in	  me	  makes	  himself	  felt,	  /	  such	  that	  if	  I	  then	  	  were	  not	  to	  lose	  
heart,	  /	  I	  would	  through	  speaking	  enamor	  the	  people.	  /	  And	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  speak	  so	  loftily	  /	  as	  to	  become	  
through	  daring	  inept”.	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woman enjoys a status through which she embodies the qualities of nobility and 
happiness, within what Foster refers to as “the complex of values” (Foster 28) – the 
courtly love system.   Dante takes the ideals of this system and greatly expands upon 
it111 in his poetry of praise.   The ethics of Dante’s stilo de la loda indicate that while 
Beatrice is the source of all goodness, she also compels others to love on a much 
higher order; as in Andreas’s De amore, the woman is the source of transformation for 
the man toward improvement and growth in virtue. As Dante explains, the mere 
presence of Beatrice leads men to forgiveness and ultimately salvation:   
 E quando trova alcun che degno sia 
 di veder lei, quei prova sua vertute, 
 ché li avvien, ciò che li dona, in salute,  
 e sì l’umilia, ch’ogni offesa oblia (VN XIX:10, vv. 37-40).112 
This stanza underscores the courtly love ethos, but also its being transcended or 
perfected by Dante’s new poetics, for through the virtue of the beloved, man not only 
experiences humility, but also grows in morality, and is ultimately brought to salvation.  
Thus, as Dante states in the first stanza, in speaking of Beatrice’s virtue, he is able to 
bring all men to caritas.  Her virtue, however, as Dante avers, is recognized both in 
heaven and on earth: 
Angelo clama in divino intelletto 
e dice: “Sire, nel mondo si vede 
maraviglia ne l’atto che procede 
d’un’anima che ‘nfin qua su risplende (VN XIX:7, vv.15-18).113  
As Auerbach explains, “She is transfigured and transformed while preserving her earthly 
form” (Auerbach 62).  Therefore, as a mortal woman, una maraviglia, she bridges the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  See	  Foster’s	  Two	  Dantes,	  p.	  28,	  note	  30.	  
112	  “And	  when	  she	  finds	  someone	  worthy	  /	  to	  behold	  her,	  he	  experiences	  her	  power,	  /	  for	  what	  she	  gives	  him	  turns	  
into	  salvation,	  /	  and	  so	  humbles	  him	  that	  he	  forgets	  every	  offense”.	  
113	  “An	  angel	  entreats	  within	  the	  divine	  mind,	  /	  and	  says:	  Lord,	  in	  the	  world	  is	  seen	  /	  a	  marvel	  in	  the	  act	  that	  comes	  
forth	  /	  from	  a	  soul	  that	  to	  this	  very	  height	  shines”.	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gap between erotic passion and divine grace, bringing men to the Christian virtue of 
caritas.  By more deeply contemplating his beloved, and employing words of praise to 
honor her, the poet/lover comes to a more profound understanding of his lady, just as in 
Bonaventure’s intra nos stage, the soul perceives the divine image in all its brightness.  
  In the fourth book of his Convivio Dante reemphasizes the importance of moral 
character as he philosophically expresses the ethics of his poetry.  Disputing the claim 
that a person is noble only through birth, Dante holds that one acquires nobility 
according to their moral character, as opposed to their financial status or birth right.  As 
in Andreas’s De amore, the link between virtue and nobility is ethics, not wealth, and the 
person who develops his moral character becomes truly noble.  According to Dante, 
while a wealthy person who is self-serving and unethical would not be noble, an 
altruistic person of lesser means would be worthy of true nobility.  This concept is 
manifested in, what Lansing refers to as “the pinnacle of artistic refinement” (Lansing 
228), the third canzone of the Convivio, “Le dolci rime d’amor,” while simultaneously 
highlighting Dante’s ethics of poetry.  In the canzone Dante first presents an emperor’s 
view that fine manners and ancestral wealth constitute nobility, only to later dispute this 
claim, and argue that all people are capable of attaining nobility.   
 Tale imperò che gentilezza volse, 
 secondo ‘l suo parere, 
 che fosse antica possession d’aver 
con reggimenti belli (Convivio IV, vv.21-24).114  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  All	  the	  citations	  from	  the	  Convivio	  in	  this	  dissertation	  come	  from	  M.	  Simonelli’s	  edition,	  (Bologna:	  Casa	  Editrice	  
Prof.	  Riccardo	  Pàtron,	  1966).	  	  The	  English	  translations	  come	  from	  R.	  Lansing’s	  Dante’s	  Il	  Convivio:	  	  
The	  Banquet,	  (New	  York:	  Garland,	  1990).	  “One	  ruler	  held	  that	  nobility,	  /	  according	  to	  his	  view	  /	  consisted	  of	  
ancestral	  wealth	  /	  together	  with	  fine	  manners”.	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Dante offers the anonymous ruler’s view as an ancient standard against which he – 
Dante – may compare his broader understanding of nobility.  In line 22 he specifies that 
this is merely the king’s opinion, although others of lesser wit, or even less mannered 
may be inclined to agree with him: 
 E altri fu di più lieve savere, 
 che tal detto rivolse, 
 e l’ultima particula ne tolse, 
 ché non l’avea fors’elli! (Convivio IV, vv. 25-28).115  
Dante casts aspersions on those who would agree with the king, suggesting that their 
lack of knowledge and refinement renders them base.  As he continues, he mocks 
those who hold that a man’s son or grandson is noble “benchè,” as Dante states, “sia da 
nïente,” that is to say while he may be from a wealthy family, if he is not probus, he is 
not noble.  This is repeated later in the canzone when Dante asserts that nobility exists 
wherever there is virtue, conversely however, this may not be the case: 
È gentilezza dovunqu’è vertute, 
Ma non vertute ov’ella (Convvio IV, vv. 101-102).116 
Dante juxtaposes the qualities of one who is noble against one who is not, making very 
clear that nobility always implies good, which is manifested in virtue.   
Dico che nobiltate in sua ragione 
importa sempre ben del suo subietto, 
come viltate importa sempre male; 
e vertute cotale 
dà sempre altrui di sé buono intelletto (Convivio IV, 89-93).117 
 Thus the person who develops a strong moral character is worthy to be called noble, 
echoing Andreas’s statement, “Sed si me morum probitatis cultura perlustrat, intra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  “And	  someone	  else	  of	  lesser	  wit,	  /	  recast	  this	  saying,	  /	  dispensing	  with	  the	  second	  half,	  /	  since	  he	  himself	  was	  
likely	  lacking”.	  
116	  “Nobility	  resides	  wherever	  virtue	  is,	  /	  but	  virtue	  not	  wherever	  there	  is	  nobility”.	  
117	  “Nobility,	  I	  say,	  by	  definition,	  /	  always	  implies	  a	  good	  in	  one	  who	  is	  noble,	  /	  as	  baseness	  always	  implies	  what’s	  
bad;	  /	  and	  virtue	  so	  defined	  /	  will	  always	  manifest	  itself	  as	  good”.	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nobilitatis me credo moenia constitutum et vera generis coruscare virtute, et sic me 
morum probitas intra nobilitatis ordinem facit esse repositum” (De Amore, 2nd 
Dialogue).118 
 The fourth stanza of Le dolci rime d’amore reiterates what Dante writes in the 
third stanza of the Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore, in which he speaks of Beatrice’s 
virtue, through which one can attain nobility: 
 Madonna è disiata in ommo cielo: 
 or voi di sua virtù farvi savere. 
 dico, qual vuol gentil donna parere 
 vada con lei, che quando va per via, 
 gitta nei cor villani Amore un gelo, 
 per che omne lor pensero agghiaccia e pere; 
 e qual soffrisse di starla vedere 
 diverria nobil119 cosa, o si morria (VN XIX:9, vv. 29-36).120  
In this earlier canzone, Dante establishes the link between virtue and nobility.  Beatrice 
is the destroyer121 of all vices, and through her virtue, those in her company cannot help 
but to attain nobility.  There is an ethos in Dante’s two canzoni as the poet’s words invite 
the reader to contemplate true nobility, while keeping in mind the essential role of virtue. 
 The Vita Nuova is the work of a young poet at the inception of his career, as he 
contemplates natural love which points to the divine, while in the Convivio Dante 
philosophically expresses the ethics of poetry against the backdrop of Aristotelian 
thought.  While the two works are certainly distinct,122 through his ethics of poetry Dante 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  “But	  if	  I	  have	  cultivated	  a	  character	  excellent	  through	  and	  through,	  I	  think	  that	  puts	  me	  inside	  the	  walls	  of	  
nobility,	  and	  gives	  me	  the	  true	  virtue	  of	  rank,	  and	  so	  my	  character	  puts	  me	  among	  the	  nobles.”	  
119	  The	  italics	  are	  mine	  for	  emphasis.	  
120	  “The	  lady	  is	  desired	  in	  highest	  heaven:	  /	  now	  I	  wish	  to	  have	  	  you	  know	  of	  her	  virtue.	  /	  I	  say,	  let	  who	  wishes	  to	  
appear	  a	  gentle	  lady	  /	  go	  with	  her,	  for	  when	  she	  goes	  along	  the	  way,	  /	  into	  villainous	  hearts	  Love	  casts	  a	  chill,	  /	  
whereby	  all	  thoughts	  freeze	  and	  perish;	  /	  and	  who	  might	  suffer	  to	  stay	  and	  behold	  her	  /	  would	  change	  into	  a	  noble	  
thing,	  or	  die”.	  
121	  See	  Gorni’s	  Vita	  Nova,	  (Torino:	  Giulio	  Einaudi	  Editore,	  1996)	  p.	  98,	  note	  34.	  
122	  Maria	  Corti	  writes,	  “Ogni	  opera	  di	  Dante	  è	  un	  mondo	  a	  sé,	  un	  microcosmo,	  una	  stella	  che	  ruota	  sulla	  propria	  
traiettoria	  entro	  il	  macrocosmo	  dantesco.”	  	  La	  felicità	  mentale,	  (Torino:	  Giulio	  Einaudi	  Editore,	  1983)	  p.	  154.	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creates a connection between them.  Beatrice, in the Vita Nuova, is the reflection of 
divine love.  In the Convivio, la donna gentile, whom we meet in the Vita Nuova 
becomes Lady Philosophy.  Paradoxically, these women represent tension between the 
two works, while simultaneously linking them.  
 The donna gentile first appears after Beatrice’s death as Dante notices her 
looking down on him from her window:  “Allora vidi una gentile donna giovane e bella 
molto, la quale da una finestra mi riguardava sì pietosamente, quanto alla vista, che 
tutta la pieta parea in lei accolta” (VN XXXV:2-3).123  The ethos in the donna gentile’s 
compassion moves Dante, causing him to temporarily turn his focus from Beatrice.    
The donna gentile functions to rouse Dante’s love124.   It is important to remember that 
the poet/lover has already crossed over to the intra nos stage.  Now, upon seeing the 
“gentile donna giovane e bella molto,” the lover returns to the extra nos stage.  This 
digression is necessary, for the function of the extra nos stage is to awaken the lover to 
a deeper inner awareness, thus enabling him to cross back to the intra nos stage, as he 
realizes that the lady’s beauty and the love she embodies are an integral part of her 
compassion.  As Dante notes in the Convivio, “...quando quella gentile donna, cui feci 
menzione ne la fine de la Vita Nuova, parve primamente accompagnata d’Amore a li 
occhi miei e prese luogo alcuno de la mia mente” (Convivio II, II, 1).125  These folds in 
the text126 indicate a mysterious connection between the extra nos and the intra nos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  “I	  then	  saw	  a	  gentle	  lady,	  young	  and	  very	  beautiful,	  who	  from	  a	  window	  watched	  me	  so	  compassionately,	  to	  
judge	  by	  her	  look,	  that	  all	  pity	  seemed	  to	  gather	  in	  her”.	  
124	  See	  Corti,	  p.	  148	  
125	  “when	  that	  gentle	  lady,	  of	  whom	  I	  made	  mention	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  New	  Life,	  first	  appeared	  before	  my	  eyes	  ,	  
accompanied	  by	  Love,	  and	  took	  a	  place	  within	  my	  mind”.	  
126	  The	  folds	  also	  underscore	  the	  circularity	  of	  the	  saying	  and	  the	  said.	  	  As	  Critchley	  asserts,	  the	  saying	  interrupts	  
the	  said,	  but	  simultaneously	  is	  conceptualized	  in	  the	  said.	  	  	  Evidence	  of	  this	  is	  Dante’s	  sonnet	  to	  the	  donna	  gentile	  
in	  which	  he	  acknowledges	  her	  compassion.	  	  The	  poetry	  then	  is	  ethical	  as	  the	  poet	  conceptualizes	  the	  lady’s	  pity,	  
and	  as	  we	  –	  the	  readers	  –	  read	  the	  poem	  in	  silence,	  it	  in	  turn	  causes	  us	  to	  feel	  pity	  for	  the	  poet/lover.	  	  This	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stages, a connection which is essential to the lover’s progress, as they mirror the link 
between passion and virtue.     
 The final sonnet of the Vita Nuova indicates that the poet/lover has reached the 
final phase of his “book of memory”, which corresponds to Bonaventure’s supra nos 
stage.  Having experienced the death of his beloved, the “temptation” of the donna 
gentile, and the interaction with the pilgrims who pass through Florence, Dante brings 
his libello  to a close having attained an “intelligenza nova” (VN XLI:10, v. 3), which he 
claims draws his heart ever upward: 
 Oltre la spera che più larga gira 
 passa ‘l sospiro ch’esce del mio core: 
 intelligenza nova, che l’Amore 
 piangendo mette in lui, pur su lo tira (VN XLI:10, vv.1-4).127  
Dante’s apostrophe frames the sonnet, placing the action beyond the Primum Mobile, 
the ninth sphere which Dante declares is contiguous with the Empyrean.128  Dante’s 
sigh reaches God, and, guided by his new intelligence, he is able to – as Bonaventure 
states – revel in the great majesty of the Almighty.129 Beyond the Primum Mobile, the 
soul contemplates God as the true essence of being, and basks in the pure and eternal 
Light.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
circularity	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  link	  between	  poetry	  and	  ethics,	  for	  as	  Newton	  states,	  “the	  very	  act	  of	  reading,	  in	  
other	  words,	  like	  prayer	  or	  casual	  looking,	  permits	  things	  to	  happen”	  (Newton	  23).	  
127	  “Beyond	  the	  sphere	  that	  circles	  widest	  /	  penetrates	  the	  sigh	  that	  issues	  from	  my	  heart:	  /	  a	  new	  intelligence,	  
which	  Love,	  /	  weeping,	  places	  in	  him,	  draws	  him	  ever	  upward”.	  
128	  In	  his	  Convivio,	  Dante	  explains	  the	  order	  of	  the	  heavens,	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  ninth	  heaven	  is	  the	  swiftest	  due	  
to	  the	  profound	  desire	  of	  the	  souls	  within,	  and	  thus	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  Empyrean,	  in	  which	  God	  dwells.	  	  “E	  questo	  è	  
cagione	  al	  Primo	  Mobile	  per	  avere	  velocissimo	  movimento;	  ché,	  per	  lo	  ferventissimo	  appetito	  ch’è	  	  ‘n	  	  ciascuna	  
parte	  di	  quello	  nono	  cielo,	  che	  è	  immediato	  a	  quello,	  d’essere	  congiunta	  con	  ciascuna	  parte	  di	  quello	  divinissimo	  	  
ciel	  quieto,	  in	  quello	  si	  resolve	  con	  tanto	  desiderio,	  che	  la	  sua	  velocitade	  è	  quasi	  incomprensibile”	  (Convivio	  II:3,	  9-­‐
10).	  	  (This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  Primum	  Mobile	  has	  the	  swiftest	  movement;	  for	  because	  of	  the	  most	  fervent	  desire	  
that	  each	  part	  of	  the	  ninth	  heaven	  has	  to	  be	  conjoined	  with	  every	  part	  of	  that	  divinest,	  tranquil	  heaven,	  to	  which	  it	  
is	  contiguous,	  it	  revolves	  beneath	  it	  with	  such	  desire	  that	  its	  velocity	  is	  almost	  incomprehensibl).	  
129“	  …et	  hoc	  est	  laetari	  in	  Dei	  notitia	  et	  reverential	  maiestatis”	  (Itinerarium	  I:2).	  
57	  
	  
 In the second quatrain of his sonnet, Dante speaks of his contemplation of his 
lady: 
  Quand’elli è giunto là dove disira, 
  vede una donna, che riceve onore, 
  e luce sì, che per lo suo splendore 
  lo peregrino spirito lo mira (VN XLI:11, vv. 5-8).130  
Analogous to Bonaventure’s theory of how the soul contemplates God, the lover 
beholds the beloved bathed in light and splendor, and cannot help but to gaze upon her, 
thereby contemplating her essence, which he is unable to truly comprehend.  Thus for 
Dante, the collaboration between love and intelligence enables him to complete his 
journey, and ultimately contemplate his lady who is the poetic symbol of a new “intelletto 
d’amore” (VN XIX:4).131  The contemplation of his lady, however, brings about a 
miraculous vision which causes the poet to stop writing about her, until he is able to do 
so more worthily.   
  In Bonaventure’s third stage of ascent, the soul’s focus is on the most pure Being 
Itself, as it contemplates the invisible things of God.  Dante, too, in the final phase of the 
Vita Nuova, directs his attention to “la qualitade di costei in grado che lo mio intelletto 
non puote comprendere” (VN XLI:6), and as he contemplates his lady, who now is 
counted among the blessed, his thoughts are of her, even though he is unable to 
understand her true essence. 
As Holmes confirms, we see a “gradual passage from lower to higher objects of 
love” (Holmes 35)132, as Dante passes from the extra nos stage of Beatrice’s greeting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  “When	  he	  arrives	  where	  he	  desires,	  /	  he	  sees	  a	  lady,	  who	  receives	  honor,	  /	  and	  so	  shines	  that,	  because	  of	  her	  
splendor,	  /	  the	  pilgrim	  spirit	  gazes	  upon	  her”.	  
131	  See	  Sarteschi’s	  essay	  “Donna	  me	  prega	  –	  Vita	  Nuova:	  La	  direzione	  di	  una	  polemica”	  in	  Rassegna	  Europa	  di	  
Letteratura	  Italiana	  (2000):	  #15,	  p.	  30.	  
132	  See	  Olivia	  Holmes’s	  essay	  “Dante’s	  Two	  Beloveds:	  Ethics	  as	  Erotic	  Choice”	  in	  Annali	  d’Italianistica	  19	  (2001).	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to the intra nos stage of his poetry of praise, to the supra nos stage as he contemplates 
her essence.  Ultimately, this mortal woman, this maraviglia, whom the god of Love calls 
Amore, is the ladder upon which Dante climbs from the natural power of erotic passion 




Representations of the Ethics of Poetry: 
The God of Love and the Donne Schermo133 
 
 From the very beginning of the Vita Nuova, Dante employs images which find 
their origins in the troubadour traditions, the most prominent being the god of Love who 
echoes the tradition of the langue d’oc.  In his first appearance, the god of Love is 
quickly established as the lover’s master.  He appears as a fearsome deity coming on a 
cloud of fire and speaking in Latin, rendering an image of power and authority; later, in a 
paradoxical image, he appears as a timid beggar who walks with his head down.  
Finally, at mid-point of the Vita Nuova, the god of Love disappears, giving way to 
Beatrice’s	  authority, and Dante’s realization that she alone is the image of true love.134   
 While the god of Love echoes the tradition of the troubadours, the two donne 
schermo point to the ethics of love as expressed in Capellanus’s concept of morum 
probitas.  Acting as screens to protect Dante’s love for Beatrice, these two ladies assist 
the poet/lover (albeit unwittingly) in developing his worthiness of the beloved.  The 
development of the lover’s moral character is an essential element – which I discussed 
in the previous chapter – to the link between Dante’s ethics of poetry and the entire 
civitas.  In this chapter, I examine the importance of these three characters in relation to 
Dante’s ethics of poetry.  I demonstrate that the god of Love functions as the said within 
the Vita Nuova, as knowledge handed down from the troubadour tradition.  Dante’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  As	  noted	  earlier	  in	  this	  study	  the	  donne	  schermo	  are	  two	  women	  who	  act	  as,	  in	  Dante’s	  words,	  uno	  schermo	  de	  
la	  veritade	  (a	  screen	  to	  the	  truth),	  protecting	  Dante’s	  love	  for	  Beatrice	  from	  those	  in	  Florence	  who	  are	  apt	  to	  mock	  
him.	  	  The	  function	  of	  the	  donne	  schermo	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
134	  See	  Singleton’s	  Essay	  on	  the	  Vita	  Nuova,	  p.	  74.	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responsibility (the saying) to enlighten his generation and those of the future through the 
ethics of poetry, is linked to the said in the tradition of the god of Love.   The donne 
schermo, on the other hand, point to the beloved, and thus prepare the lover for future 
events, especially the death of his lady.  Within the concept of morum probitas, the 
donne schermo serve to protect the secret of Dante‘s love for Beatrice from the 
lauzengiers, or the people of Florence who would gossip and mock their love.  I reveal 
how, as a function of representational ethics – as described by Newton – the loss of the 
first screen lady prepares the protagonist, as well as the reader, for the death of 
Beatrice. 
 
The god of Love   
 Singleton describes the god of Love as a “sign of a tradition,” and as such his 
existence is public.135  Love, thus depicted, is part of an established custom familiar not 
only to Dante, but to his fellow poets and their ladies.  Their verse and their prose 
confirm their participation in the rites of this tradition, which is reserved for a select elite, 
but presented to the entire civitas.   The “public existence” of the god manifests his 
function as the poets’ words and their identifiable meaning.  The god of Love as tradition 
and identifiable meaning, reveals the said, and thus constitutes Love’s ethical role within 
the poetry of the stilnovisti.   
 In examining Love’s function as the said, it is instructive to recall Newton’s claim 
that “narrative situations create an immediacy and a force, framing relations of 
provocation, call, and response that bind narrator and listener, author and character, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Ibid.,	  p.	  58.	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reader and text” (Newton 22).  Newton’s statement, when applied to Dante’s encounters 
with the god of Love, reveals the poet’s link between himself and his reader.  The god of 
Love, as the said and hence a conventional message of the poet, represents love as an 
essential element of Dante’s ethics of poetry.  The god’s fist words to the lover, “Ego 
dominus tuus,” establish love as lord and master, revealing an ethical relationship 
between the author and reader, for while the poet’s said is proclaimed in Latin, it reveals 
the saying which transcends the said, proclaiming love as	  a universal force for all 
humans.  The god of Love proclaims himself lord and master of Dante, the lover; 
however, Dante, the poet, shares this love with his readers.  The act of narrating is then 
ethical and the character created by the author (the said) is essential to forming a bond 
between the poet and his readers.136  
 This link between the author and his readers is reinforced and extended to the 
fedeli d’Amore, the first readers of the first sonnet of the Vita Nuova.  As I argue in the 
first chapter of this study, this bond between Dante and the elite of Love, is the basis of 
an ethical relationship which forms out of the said and the saying.  The dialogical aspect 
of this relationship reveals the reciprocal nature of responsibility, which centers on 
Dante’s offering the sonnet to the fedeli d’Amore.   The relationship is ethical in that 
Dante’s words elicit a response from his fellow poets, causing them to recognize their 
responsibility.  It is helpful to recall Ciaramelli’s words: “Moral obligation binds us 
because it takes hold immediately, before understanding or decision on the part of the 
subject” (Ciaramelli 85).  Applying this statement to Dante’s first sonnet which he sent to 
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  See	  Newton,	  Narrational	  Ethics,	  p.	  18	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the fedeli d’Amore, it is easy to see the reciprocal responsibility between the poet and 
his first readers. 
As I continue to examine the role of the god of Love in Dante’s ethics of poetry, it 
is essential to investigate the interaction of this ethical said with the poet lover.  The 
next time the lover meets the god, Dante has left Florence, and is traveling to another 
city.  He is exceedingly disheartened, for in leaving Florence, he has left behind the 
source of his true happiness – Beatrice.  The god of Love, appearing to him in his 
imagination, reflects the lover’s sadness: 
“…l’andare mi dispiacea sì, che quasi li sospiri non poteano disfogare l’angoscia 
che lo cuore sentia, però ch’io mi dilungava de la mia beatitudine.  E però lo 
dolcissimo segnore…ne la mia imaginazione apparve come peregrino 
leggeramente vestito e di vili drappi.  Elli mi parea disbigottito, e guardava la 
terra…” (VN IX: 2-4).137 
 
Here Dante depicts a stark difference between the authoritative figure which appeared 
in his dream, and this image of a pilgrim, dressed in humble garb.  The poet juxtaposes 
the adjective dolcissimo with disbigottito, referring to the same being, but describing 
conflicting demeanors.  The god’s diminished status is apparent in his clothing, which 
Dante emphasizes in his sonnet: 
 Cavalcando l’altr’ier per un cammino 
 pensoso de l’andar che mi sgradia, 
 trovai Amore in mezzo de la via 
 in abito leggier di peregrino. 
 Ne la sembianza mi parea meschino, 
 Come avesse perduto segnoria (VN IX:9, vv.1-6).138 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  “…the	  journey	  so	  displeased	  me	  that	  my	  sighs	  could	  hardly	  relieve	  the	  anguish	  that	  my	  heart	  felt,	  because	  I	  was	  
distancing	  myself	  from	  my	  beatitude.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  sweetest	  Lord…appeared	  in	  my	  imagination	  as	  a	  pilgrim	  
dressed	  meagerly	  and	  in	  simple	  vestments.	  	  He	  seemed	  to	  be	  frightened,	  and	  he	  stared	  at	  the	  ground…”	  
138	  Riding	  the	  other	  day	  along	  a	  road	  /	  musing	  upon	  the	  journey	  I	  disliked,	  /	  I	  met	  Love	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  way	  /	  in	  
the	  meager	  dress	  of	  a	  pilgrim.	  /	  In	  his	  aspect	  he	  seemed	  to	  me	  poor,	  /	  as	  if	  he	  had	  lost	  his	  lordship;	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The poet links peregrino, meschino, and avesse perduto segnoria, underscoring Love’s 
humbled state, analogous to the lover’s condition.  Now leggeramente vestito e di villi 
drappi,139 the god of Love appears in stark contrast to the figure who appeared in 
Dante’s bedroom as uno segnore di pauroso aspetto,140 his changed appearance 
reflecting the shifting mood of the lover, now himself a pilgrim, as he journeys outside of 
his city.  His departure from the city causes the lover great pain, for as he explains: 
“…l’andare mi dispiacea sì, che quasi li sospiri non poteano disfogar l’angoscia che lo 
cuore sentia, però ch’io mi dilungava de la mia beatitudine” (VN IX:2).141 The ethics of 
Dante’s poetry emphasizes the link between love and the civitas, for Beatrice’s 
presence in the city, causes Dante to share his love with all the members of the civitas.   
Therefore, while his journey takes him away from the city and the people that he loves, 
more importantly it creates a distance, a space, a disconnect between himself and the 
woman who defines his happiness.   This distance, reflected in the image of the lover as 
pilgrim, evokes the concept of the faithful separated from God, the believer outside of 
paradise, his true home, wherein dwells his true happiness.  “Essere, o essere stati, 
peregrini,” writes Picone, “significa, o ha significato, essere lontani da Dio.   
L’opposizione lontananza/vicinanza ne richiama subito un’altra:  quella di 
presenza/assenza” (Picone 136).142  The relation of opposites in the presence/absence 
model refers directly to Dante’s unhappy state while away from Beatrice.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  	  “meagerly	  and	  in	  simple	  vestments”	  
140	  “a	  lord	  of	  frightening	  aspect”	  (My	  translation)	  
141	  “…the	  journey	  so	  displeased	  me	  that	  my	  sighs	  could	  hardly	  relieve	  the	  anguish	  that	  my	  heart	  felt,	  because	  I	  was	  
distancing	  myself	  from	  my	  beatitude.”	  
142	  See	  Michelangelo	  Picone’s	  Vita	  Nuova	  e	  tradizione	  romanza.	  	  “To	  be,	  or	  to	  have	  been,	  pilgrims	  means,	  or	  has	  




 At times the god of Love speaks to the lover in Latin and at other times in the 
vernacular, which prompts one to question the significance of the vernacular.  Why does 
Dante have his character speak in both Latin and the vernacular, and how is this 
significant to the civitas? 
The most notable episode in which Love uses both the vernacular and Latin is 
found in Chapter XII, when Dante is once again in his room, this time weeping because 
Beatrice has withheld her greeting from him.  Appearing to the lover in a dream, Love 
begins his conversation in Latin:  “Fili mi, tempus est ut pretermictantur simulacra 
nostra” (VN XII:4).143  When the lover notices that the god is also weeping, he asks him 
(in Italian) why.  The god answers in Latin: “Ego tanquam centrum circuli, cui simili 
modo se habent circumferentie partes; tu autem non sic” (VN XII:4).144  The lover, 
however, does not understand the answer, and asks for an explanation, but this time 
Love answers in the vernacular: “Non dimandare più che utile ti sia” (VN XII:6).145   
 Singleton proposes that Love’s use of Latin emphasizes a dignity in the language 
of oracle, and sets it on a higher plane, while the use of Italian signifies the god 
descending to the poet’s level.146 I propose that when Love addresses the lover in the 
vernacular, Dante, the poet, is emphasizing the importance of this language in his work, 
and not the language of the learned few, Latin.  There is an ethics in the use of the 
vernacular, as the poet communicates to the reader.  The ethics of narrative demands 
responsibility on the part of the author.  These responsibilities are intersubjective and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  “My	  son,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  end	  our	  fabrications.”	  
144	  “I	  am	  like	  the	  center	  of	  a	  circle,	  to	  which	  all	  the	  points	  of	  the	  circumference	  bear	  the	  same	  relation;	  you,	  
however,	  are	  not.”	  
145	  “Ask	  no	  more	  than	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  you.”	  
146	  See	  Singleton’s	  Essay,	  p.	  17.	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emphasize the human connectivity which is fundamental to the act of storytelling.147  
Likewise, reading and interpreting carry their own set of responsibilities, for as Newton 
points out, the act of reading followed by the discussion or teaching of a piece of fiction 
constitute respectively the private and public responsibilities of textual interpretation.148 
Picone indicates, “L’incarico di scoprire e di indicare agli altri, ai profani, la lingua 
originaria è affidato unicamente alla poesia e ai suoi cultori” (Picone 11).149  The poet 
becomes the disseminator of knowledge expressed through the vernacular.   He 
imitates the Creator, for just as God created the universe, the poet also molds and 
fashions his creation with his words and poetic language.  For Dante, the vernacular is 
equated with natural language, the language we speak with our parents.  Conversely, 
Latin is associated with artificial language, and is reserved for formal situations.  Is the 
god coming down to the lover’s level in a condescending move, or does he decide to 
speak lovingly as a parent to a child? It is important to remember that the god begins his 
first statement with “Fili mi” (VN XII:4).  I suggest, realizing that the lover is unable to 
understand the imagery of the center of the circle, and the reference to all the points on 
the circumference, which he expresses in Latin, the god finds it more useful to speak in 
the natural language.  The Latin phrase “Ego tanquam centrum circuli, cui simili modo 
se habent circumferentie partes; tu autem non sic,” (VN XII:4)150 emphasizes the 
distance between the god and the lover, analogous to the distance which separates the 
fedeli d’Amore from li più semplici. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  See	  Newton,	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  p.	  18	  
148	  Ibid.	  p.	  18	  
149	  “The	  charge	  of	  uncovering	  and	  indicating	  to	  others,	  the	  profane,	  the	  original	  language	  is	  entrusted	  to	  poetry	  
and	  her	  followers”	  (My	  translation).	  
150	  “I	  am	  like	  the	  center	  of	  a	  circle,	  to	  which	  all	  the	  points	  of	  the	  circumference	  bear	  the	  same	  relation;	  you,	  
however,	  are	  not.”	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 Picone notes that one of the fundamental characteristics of the vernacular is its 
association with nature; “è un dono della Natura, che è figlia di Dio”151 writes Picone, 
echoing Dante.   In his Convivio, Dante links the vernacular with nature when he 
identifies it as the language of his parents, as well as the language through which he 
gained knowledge: “Questo mio volgare,” writes Dante, “fu congiugnitore de li miei 
generanti, che con esso parlavano; …questo mio volgare fu introduttore di me ne la via 
di scienza, che è ultima perfezione…E così è palese, e per me conosciuto, esso essere 
stato a me grandissimo benefattore” (Convivio I, xiii, 4-5).152  Its natural aspect renders 
the vernacular ethical, as it is more accessible to the entire civitas.  Only the learned 
were able to understand Latin, as it was the language of the elite and intellectuals.   The 
vernacular, however, was the language of the common people, and therefore 
understood by the entire community.  Given that he writes in the vernacular, Dante’s 
poetry is ethical in that he offers it to both the learned and the lay readers.  “Italian, not 
Latin,” notes Lansing, “is to be the language of communication because that is the 
language of the many” (Lansing 29).153  Dante’s use of the vernacular serves to expand 
his audience to include all members of the civitas. 
Writing in the vernacular, the poet acknowledges his responsibility to the Other.  
When Emanuel Levinas addresses the issue of language, he stresses our responsibility 
for the other human being, and in his treatment of language, he places responsibility for 
the Other absolutely first.154  “Language as the presence of the face does not invite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  “it	  is	  a	  gift	  of	  Nature,	  who	  is	  the	  daughter	  of	  God”	  (My	  translation).	  See	  	  Vita	  Nuova	  e	  tradizione	  romanza,	  p.8.	  
152	  “This	  vernacular	  of	  mine	  was	  what	  brought	  my	  parents	  together,	  for	  they	  conversed	  in	  it;	  …this	  vernacular	  of	  
mine	  is	  what	  leads	  me	  into	  the	  path	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  is	  our	  ultimate	  perfection…So	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  it	  has	  
been	  a	  great	  benefactor	  to	  me,	  and	  this	  I	  acknowledge.”	  
153	  Richard	  Lansing,	  Dante:	  The	  Critical	  Complex,	  Vol.	  3,	  (N.Y.:	  Routledge,2003).	  
154	  See	  	  Llewelyn,	  p.122.	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complicity with the preferred being, the self-sufficient ‘I-Thou’ forgetful of the universe,” 
writes Levinas.  I am obliged to serve the Other, who then assigns me responsibility to a 
third party.  Levinas articulates this in his statement, “The third party looks at me in the 
eyes of the Other – language is justice” (TI 213).  Our understanding of Levinas’s 
philosophy, enables us to comprehend that Dante’s use of the vernacular (albeit many 
centuries prior to Levinas) fulfilled his responsibility to the Other.  The importance of the 
vernacular – the natural language – is that it expanded Dante’s audience to include 
intellectuals and lay people, creating a link to all citizens of the civitas.  As I have 
previously mentioned, the understanding of li più semplici as opposed to that of the 
learned poets, provides us with an example of the importance of language to the 
community; two essential elements to the civitas. 
 In Love’s final appearance as a god to the lover, he explains the significance of 
the relationship between monna Vanna and Beatrice.  The god tells Dante that just as 
John the Baptist preceded Christ, Lady Giovanna precedes Beatrice.  While this 
explanation is important to the chapter on a superficial level, on a more profound level it 
can be understood that Giovanna represents Guido Cavalcanti who preceded Dante – 
represented by Beatrice – in the poetics of stilnovismo.  More importantly are the final 
words the god of Love speaks in the Vita Nuova, which immediately follow his previous 
assertion: 
Ed anche mi parve che mi dicesse, dopo queste parole: “E chi volesse 
sottilmente considerare, quella Beatrice chiamerebbe Amore per molta 
simiglianza che ha meco” (VN XXIV:5-6).155   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  “And	  after	  these	  words,	  Love	  seemed	  to	  say:	  ‘And	  who	  wishes	  subtly	  to	  consider	  would	  call	  Beatrice	  Love	  for	  
the	  great	  likeness	  she	  bears	  to	  me’”.	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Thus bestowing upon Beatrice the name Love, the god relinquishes his authority over 
the lover and confers it upon Beatrice.  No longer is the sign of troubadour love capable 
of expressing the love which Beatrice represents, for that love is caritas, which has no 
part in the troubadour tradition.  As Singleton notes, “The revelation is this: that love of 
Beatrice is something too large to be contained within the ideology of troubadour love.  
Love of Beatrice reaches far beyond the powers of a God of Love” (Singleton 75).   
 Such a realization on Dante’s part stirs a dormant spirit in his heart which he 
articulates in his sonnet: “Io mi senti’ svegliar dentro a lo core / uno spirito amoroso che 
dormia” (VN XXIV:7, vv. 1-2).156  Dante is thus awakened to the truth that Beatrice is a 
miracle, and the miracle is love.  This point is evident in the last part of his sonnet: 
 io vidi monna Vanna e monna Bice 
 venire inver lo loco là ´v’io era, 
 l’una appresso de l’altra maraviglia; 
 e sì come la mente mi ridice, 
 Amor mi disse: “Quell’è Primavera, 
 e quell’ha nome Amor, sì mi somiglia” (VN XXIV:8-9, vv. 9-14).157   
In linking Beatrice to Love, Dante dismisses the troubadour god, and declares his lady 
the image of the love of the true God.  This Christian love, this caritas, is too great to be 
restricted by the troubadour god of love.  “One after the other,” confirms Singleton, “the 
glosses of the Book of Memory disclose that Beatrice is a miracle, that love of her is a 
love whose other name is charity, being also love of God.  For it is charity that bursts 
the narrow confines of troubadour love” (Singleton 75). 
As the said, the god of love is a sign of Dante’s ethics of poetry; however, 
ultimately that sign gives way to another ethical element within the ‘little book’, and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  “I	  felt	  awakening	  in	  my	  heart	  /	  an	  amorous	  spirit	  that	  slept:”	  
157	  “I	  saw	  Lady	  Vanna	  and	  Lady	  Bice	  /	  coming	  toward	  the	  place	  where	  I	  was,	  /	  one	  after	  the	  other	  wonder;	  /	  and	  as	  
memory	  retells	  me,	  /	  Love	  said	  to	  me	  :	  “This	  one	  is	  Primavera,	  /	  and	  that	  other	  is	  named	  Love,	  so	  like	  me	  is	  she.”	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element is caritas, offered through the virtue of Beatrice, the saying.  Thus the reader 
experiences the movement from said to saying as the god of Love gives way to 
Beatrice,158 who is love.   
 
Le donne de lo schermo  
 In his Libro della “Vita Nuova”, De Robertis contends that the donne schermo 
serve to underscore the ideal of human dignity and nobility, while simultaneously 
emphasizing the “intersociality”159 of love.  It is precisely this aspect of love, within the 
text of the Vita Nuova, which causes the work to be ethical.  The donne schermo are an 
essential element of Dante’s poetic ethics which is manifested in three ways:  first, they 
point to the ethics of love as expressed in Capellanus’s concept of morum probitas; 
second, they hide Dante’s love for Beatrice from the lauzengiers, or the people of 
Florence who would gossip and mock their love; and third, they function as a 
fundamental example of representational ethics, as described by Newton.  
 Dante introduces the reader to the first donna schermo with the words, “pensai di 
fare di questa gentile donna schermo de la veritade,” (VN VI:3)160 and of the second his 
writes, “…in poco tempo la feci mia difesa tanto, che troppa gente ne ragionava oltre li 
termini de la cortesia” (VN X:1).161  The terms gentile and cortesia, inform the reader 
that these two ladies were noble ladies, and therefore worthy to stand in for the beloved 
within the precepts of the courtly love tradition.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  See	  Singleton,	  Essay,	  p.	  60.	  
159	  De	  Robertis	  employs	  this	  term	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  question	  of	  nobility,	  in	  which	  he	  states,	  “il	  problema	  della	  
<<nobiltà>>,	  come	  <<morum	  probitas>>,	  come	  <<prodezza>>,	  non	  è	  forse	  centrale	  nel	  trattato,	  e	  sia	  pure	  come	  
rivendicazione	  di	  un’uguaglianza	  originaria	  degli	  uomini	  e	  quindi	  dell’intersocialità	  dell’amore”	  p.49.	  
160	  “I	  thought	  of	  making	  this	  gentle	  lady	  a	  screen	  to	  the	  truth.”	  




 Capellanus’s concept of morum probitas – love as the source and catalyst for 
moral development – is the basis for the episodes of the donne schermo, for these 
noble ladies serve to slowly develop the lover’s moral character, an essential process 
emphasized by Capellanus: “O quam mira res est amor qui tantis facit hominen fulgere 
virtutibus, tantisque docit quemlibet bonis moribus abundare” (De amore IV).162 Foster’s 
description of “love as the principle of ethical perfection, of a growth into the full round of 
natural virtues” (Foster 22-23) reinforces the concept of morum probitas.   The process 
through which the lover’s moral character is perfected requires time and experiences, 
and to this end, the donne schermo play a vital role, for these ladies help to mold the 
lover’s character as they prepare him for future events.   
 The sudden departure of the first donna schermo prepares the lover – and the 
reader – for the death of Beatrice.  While in the sonnet of Chapter VII, Dante details the 
sadness he feels in the lady’s departure, he tells us in the preceding prose, that 
Beatrice is the true target of the words in the poem.  Dante’s words in the prosimetrum 
underscore the link between the function of the donna schermo and the preparation of 
the lover.  He describes himself as sbigottito at her sudden departure: “La donna co la 
quale io avea tanto tempo celata la mia volontade, convenne che si partisse de la 
sopradetta cittade…per che io quasi sbigotitto…” (VN VII:1)163  The fearfulness which 
the lover experiences is a foreshadowing of his fear and sorrow regarding his beloved. 
 The term sbigotitto becomes a link connecting Dante’s sorrow to the loss of 
Beatrice, first, through her mocking him, and secondly, through her actual death.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  “O	  what	  a	  wonderful	  thing	  is	  love,	  which	  makes	  a	  man	  shine	  with	  so	  many	  virtues,	  and	  teaches	  everyone,	  no	  
matter	  who	  he	  is,	  so	  many	  good	  traits	  of	  character.”	  
163	  “The	  lady	  through	  whom	  I	  had	  for	  so	  long	  concealed	  my	  will	  was	  obliged	  to	  leave	  the	  aforementioned	  city…so	  
that	  I,	  rather	  fearful…”	  
71	  
	  
Dante’s ethics of poetry is demonstrated in the sonnet following the episode in which 
Beatrice, along with several other ladies, mock Dante for his trasfigurazione 
(transfiguration) in her presence: “Peccato face chi allora mi vede / se l’alma sbigottita 
non conforta” (VN XV:6, vv. 9-10).164  The poet makes an appeal to the other – chi mi 
vede – for comfort, for understanding, for human connectivity.  His appeal is ethical in 
that it invokes an obligation, which as Ciaramelli states “arises not from the logical and 
ontological universality of reason…but rather immediately from the uniqueness of the 
moral situation” (Ciaramelli 85).165 
 Reinforcing the theme of loss, and linking the departure of the donna schermo to 
the death of the beloved, Dante uses the words of the prophet Jeremiah, through which 
both the poet and the prophet lament their sorrow.  Following the prose, which tells of 
the departure of the first donna schermo, Dante writes a sonnet, upon which the incipit 
is based on Jeremiah’s words in the Book of Lamentations166: 
  O voi che per la via d’Amore passate, 
  Attendete e guardate 
  S’elli è dolore alcun, quanto mio grave (VN VII:3, vv. 1-3).167   
The apostrophe “O voi” is another ethical appeal to the stranger (the other) upon whom 
the poet calls to join him in his sorrow.  While these lyrics are composed in an effort to 
continue to use the donna schermo as a mask, they simultaneously prefigure the sorrow 
the lover will feel at the death of his beloved.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  “One	  sins	  who	  then	  sees	  me	  /	  and	  does	  not	  comfort	  my	  affrighted	  soul.”	  
165	  See	  also	  	  Levinas,	  Ethics	  and	  Infinity,	  pp.	  95-­‐96,	  and	  Otherwise	  than	  Being,	  p.	  15.	  
166	  The	  following	  is	  the	  verse	  from	  the	  book	  of	  Lamentations	  I:12.	  	  I	  have	  provided	  both	  the	  Latin	  Vulgate,	  and	  the	  
English:	  	  “O	  vos	  omnes	  qui	  transitis	  per	  viam	  adtendite	  et	  videte	  si	  est	  dolor	  sicut	  dolor	  meus	  quoniam	  vindemiavit	  
me.”	  	  /	  “All	  you	  who	  pass	  by	  the	  way,	  look	  and	  see	  if	  there	  is	  any	  sorrow	  as	  the	  sorrow	  inflicted	  on	  me.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  “O	  you	  who	  along	  the	  way	  of	  Love	  pass	  by,	  /	  attend	  and	  see	  /	  if	  there	  be	  any	  grief	  as	  heavy	  as	  mine.”	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 In describing the donne schermo as screens to the truth (schermo de la 
veritade), Dante signals to the reader that he intends to protect the secret of his love for 
Beatrice from the lauzengiers.  Why does Dante feel the need to hide his love for 
Beatrice, and what does this reveal about his ethics of poetry in relation to the civitas?  
A common figure in medieval poetry, finding their origins in fin’ amors of the 
troubadours, the lauzengiers are a third party who, as Cholakian describes, “hover over 
the scene, watching disapprovingly” (Cholakian 2).  The troubadours were always 
cognizant of the omnipresence of these antagonists, who sought to taunt the poet/lover.  
“I suoi nemici più terribili,” writes Köhler, “sono i lauzengiers, cioè gli invidiosi, i 
calunniatori, gli osservatori malevoli, gli spioni, gli adulatori, i diffammatori, i falsi amanti 
gelosi di chi ama sinceramente, gente loquace e ingannevole, una schiera maledetta 
che si insinua nella confidenza della dama” (Köhler 24).168  The lauzengier becomes the 
symbol of every obstacle around which the lover must maneuver in his pursuit of the 
beloved.   These gossipers represent the negative other, and are in direct opposition 
with the authentic relationship which exits between the I and the other.  Thus they 
negate the power to link, creatively, the said coinciding with the donne schermo to the 
saying coinciding with Beatrice.  Never identified by name, the lauzengier – most often 
more than one person – lurks overtly in the background, making his presence felt.  
In the following excerpt from Arnaut Daniel’s sestina, the lauzengier  is identified 
as a slanderer who jeopardizes his soul through his mal dir – evil talk: 
Lo ferm voler q’el cor m’intra 
no·m pot becs jes escoissendre ni ongla 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  “His	  most	  terrible	  enemies	  are	  the	  lauzengiers,	  that	  is	  the	  envious,	  the	  slanderers,	  the	  malevolent	  observers,	  
the	  spies,	  the	  adulators,	  the	  defamers,	  the	  false	  lovers	  jealous	  of	  he	  who	  loves	  sincerely,	  eloquent	  and	  
underhanded	  people,	  an	  evil	  crowd	  that	  worms	  its	  way	  into	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  lady.”	  (My	  translation).	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de lausengier qui pert, per mal dir, s’arma (Lo ferm voler, vv. 1-3).169  
  
In the second half of the cobla, 170 the persona declares that he will enjoy himself “a 
frau” – “on the sly” – away from the menacing onlookers: 
 E car no·ls aus batr’am ram ni ab verga, 
 Sivals a frau, lai on non aurai oncle, 
 Jauzirai joi en vergier o dinz cambra (Lo ferm voler, vv.4-6).171   
Cholakian points out that the term oncle is a disguise which refers to the lauzengier.  In 
order for the persona to be able to attain his joy, he must do so out of sight of the 
gossipers and slanderers.  “If the discursive persona of this poem is to realize his sexual 
enterprise,” writes Cholakian, “he must, as he puts it, do it ‘a frau lai on non aurai oncle’” 
(Cholakian 141). 
Dante, in imitation of the courtly love tradition, employs the topos of the 
lauzengier, and uses the donne schermo to block the gaze of these malevolent 
observers, thereby creating a tension within the civitas, between those who blame and 
those who praise.  This tension, for which the donne schermo become a remedy, 
mitigates the effects of the lauzengiers on the love between the poet and his lady.  In 
this capacity, the donne schermo function as a vital element of Dante’s ethics of poetry.   
      While these donne schermo – the said – function to protect Dante’s love, they 
simultaneously dimly reflect love as one might see a reflection in a mirror.  The 
antithesis of a simulacrum is the exemplum, which is Beatrice – the saying.  Therefore 
while love is imperfectly reflected in the donne schermo, through Beatrice, who is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  I	  take	  the	  citations	  and	  translations	  of	  Arnaut’s	  poetry	  from	  The	  Poetry	  of	  Arnaut	  Daniel,	  edited	  and	  translated	  
by	  James	  J.	  Wilhel,	  (New	  York	  /	  London:	  Garland	  Publishing,	  Inc.,	  1981).	  	  “The	  firm	  will	  that	  enters	  my	  heart	  /	  With	  
no	  beak	  or	  nail	  can	  ever	  be	  torn	  away	  from	  me	  /	  By	  a	  false	  flatterer	  who,	  through	  evil	  talk,	  loses	  his	  soul.”	  	  
170	  A	  cobla	  is	  a	  stanza	  in	  the	  poetry	  of	  the	  langue	  d’Oc.	  
171	  “And	  since	  I	  don’t	  dare	  to	  bat	  them	  with	  branch	  or	  rod,	  /	  At	  least	  on	  the	  sly,	  where	  I	  won’t	  have	  any	  uncle,	  /	  I’ll	  
enjoy	  my	  joy	  in	  an	  orchard	  or	  in	  a	  chamber.”	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caritas – the love of God – is perfectly reflected.  Only a facsimile of the beloved, the 
donne schermo are ultimately identified as the simulacrum,172 a representation 
manifested through the act of narration.  It is important to recall Newton’s words: “the 
performative function of storytelling frequently serves to demonstrate the power of 
representation” (Newton 58).  Dante’s narration, then, demonstrates the representative 
power of the donne schermo, not only as a simulacrum of the beloved, but also as 
evidence of Dante’s ethics of poetry.   
 To understand how Dante’s ethics of poetry are revealed through the 
simulacrum, it is important to review what Newton defines as the “triad structure of 
narrative ethics” (Newton 17) to which narrational, representational, and hermeneutic 
ethics are the contributing factors.  In describing narrational ethics, Newton emphasizes 
the exchange which takes place between the narrator and listener, as well as the 
responsibilities which come with the act of narrating and interpreting.  The gains and 
risks involved in the fictionalization of oneself or another is Newton’s definition of 
representational ethics.  Finally, Newton sees the responsibilities incurred in the act of 
reading and interpreting fiction as the necessary element of hermeneutic ethics.  
 One example of the benefits of this method of characterization is Dante’s 
servantese in which he includes the names of sixty of the most beautiful ladies of 
Florence, including the first donna schermo and Beatrice.  There is an ethos in Dante’s 
poem in praise of the women of the city, and Dante tells the reader that it was the donna 
schermo who serves as his motivation:  “Dico che in questo tempo che questa donna 
era schermo di tanto amore, quanto de la mia parte, sì mi venne una voluntade di 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  As	  I	  have	  indicated	  above,	  the	  god	  of	  Loves	  appears	  to	  Dante,	  and	  tells	  the	  poet	  it	  is	  time	  to	  do	  away	  with	  their	  
fabrications:	  “Fili	  mi,	  tempus	  est	  ut	  pretermictantur	  simulacra	  nostra.”	  (VN	  XII:3).	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volere ricordare lo nome di quella gentilissima ed accompagnarlo di molti nomi di 
donne” (VN VI:1).173 Through his poetry in praise of the sixty ladies, who are 
emblematic of the entire civitas, Dante’s communicates his ethics to the reader. 
 In the episode of the second donna schermo, Dante’s gamble becomes evident 
to the reader.  As the poet presents this second difesa (defense) to both the reader and 
the civitas, he finds that he goes too far, as his representation of her causes members 
of the civitas to act negatively.  “Dico che in poco tempo la feci mia difesa tanto,” writes 
Dante, “che troppa gente ne ragionava oltre li termini de la cortesia” (VN X:1).174  
Especially interesting are Gorni’s notes on this passage.  He points out that “oltre li 
termini de la cortesia” (beyond the bounds of courtesy) means a love which is not at all 
secret, and thus negates the idea of a “screen” or “defense,” and is therefore relegated 
to literature.175  Gorni’s point underscores the risks of representational ethics.  Dante 
has gone too far in his representation of this donna schermo, and the duality of the 
person/character is torn asunder.  When we apply Newton’s idea that the doubling of 
reality unites the act of representation to responsibility, we find that in this episode the 
author’s representation is disjunctive relative to the necessary responsibilities inherent 
in representational ethics.  His only way of bridging this disjuncture is through his 
poetry, which as I have previously established, extends his ethics to the civitas.  
 Therefore,	  at the behest of the god of Love, Dante writes a ballata whose main purpose 
is to inform Beatrice of his love for her.  It also serves, however, to reconcile the act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  “I	  say	  that	  during	  that	  time	  when	  that	  lady	  was	  a	  screen	  to	  so	  much	  loveas	  came	  from	  my	  part,	  the	  desire	  arose	  
in	  me	  to	  recollect	  the	  name	  of	  this	  most	  gentle	  one	  and	  to	  accompany	  it	  with	  names	  of	  many	  ladies.”	  
174	  “I	  say	  that	  in	  a	  brief	  time	  I	  made	  her	  my	  defense	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  too	  many	  people	  spoke	  about	  it	  beyond	  
the	  bounds	  of	  courtesy.”	  
175	  See	  Gorni,	  p.	  50,	  “oltre	  li	  termini	  della	  cortesia:	  <<oltre	  le	  convenienze	  imposte	  dal	  galateo	  cortese>>,	  di	  un	  




representation with the responsibilities which it carries.  The key term in his ballata is 
cortesemente, which counter balances the phrase oltre li termini de la cortesia, and thus 
bridges the gap he had created:  
 Ballata, I’ voi che tu ritrovi Amore, 
 e con lui vade a madonna davante, 
 sì che la scusa mia, la qual tu cante, 
 ragioni poi con lei lo mio segnore. 
 Tu vai, ballata, sì cortesemente,  
 che sanza compagnia 
 dovresti avere in tutte parti ardire (VN XII:10, vv.1-7).176   
Having reestablished the concept of courtesy, and therefore propriety, within the work, 
Dante’s poetry is once more the ethical device which he offers to the civitas.  This ethos 
is evident in his statement that to go forth without love is imprudent:   
  ma se tu vuoli andar securamente, 
  retrova l’Amor pria, 
  ché forse non è bon sanza lui gire; 
  però che quell anche ti dee audire, 
  sì com’io credo, è ver di me adirata: 
  se tu di lui non fossi accompagnata, 
  leggeramente ti faria disnore (VN XII:11, vv. 8-14).177   
Finally, the ballata is ethical in that the lover is intent on addressing the anger of his 
beloved.  Her anger was caused by actions outside the bounds of courtesy, which 
(according to the courtly love tradition) renders him unworthy of her.  Only through his 
poetry – renewed within the limits of courtesy – is he able to present himself as probus.   
 The ontological said, the expression of the poet’s desire to mend his relationship 
with his lady, brings about the necessary healing between the lover and the beloved.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  “Ballade,	  I	  want	  you	  to	  seek	  out	  Love	  /	  and	  with	  him	  go	  before	  my	  lady	  /	  so	  that	  my	  excuse,	  which	  you	  must	  
sing	  /	  my	  Lord	  may	  then	  recount	  to	  her.	  /	  You	  must	  go,	  ballade,	  courteously	  /	  so	  that	  without	  accompaniment	  /	  
you	  may	  be	  bold	  in	  every	  place;”	  	  I	  have	  italicized	  the	  words	  cortesemente	  and	  courteously	  for	  emphasis.	  
177	  “but	  if	  you	  want	  to	  go	  securely	  /	  find	  Love	  first	  /	  for	  perhaps	  it	  is	  not	  good	  to	  go	  without	  him;	  /	  because	  she	  who	  




The said then gives way to the saying, through which the poet offers himself to the other 
(in this case his lady), whose approach he is unable to resist.  It is in this exposure, this 
offering of self to the other, this saying through the said, that Dante’s poetry is ethical, 
and just as he offers the ballata to the beloved, he extends the saying to the entire 
civitas through his poetry, that all may benefit from the words of his said.178 
 The act of writing poetry, as well as the act of narration, offered to the other, 
whether that other may be the donne schermo, Beatrice, or the entire civitas, 
underscore Dante’s ethical responsibilities.   Recalling Ciaramelli’s words, we 
understand that the ethical subject is obliged “to morality by the appeal of the other” 
(Ciaramelli 85)179  which unites us in moral obligation, in a manifestation of the subject- 
object structure.  In his discussion of the correlation between the said and the saying, 
Levinas assures us that the saying imprints its trace upon the said, rather than being 
exhausted in the said.  How does this assist in our understanding of Dante’s ethics of 
poetry?180  Wyschogrod’s statement regarding Levinas that “the saying must find its way 
into the language that is uttered and written, and that identifies entities, the language of 
the said, in order to make thought  and justice in the social order possible” (Wyschogrod 
201), helps us to understand how Dante’s words reflect his responsibilities to the people 
of Florence.  Dante’s ethics of poetry, as represented in the god of Love, a sign of 
troubadour tradition, or the donne schermo, based on the ethical concept of morum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  See	  Critchley	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  p.	  18.	  
179	  See	  Ciaramelli	  in	  Re-­‐reading	  Levinas,	  p.	  85,	  and	  also	  Newton’s	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  p.	  12.	  
180	  Throughout	  this	  study	  I	  indicate	  how	  Dante’s	  ethos	  of	  love	  is	  communicated	  and	  shared	  with	  the	  entire	  civitas,	  
therefore	  as	  I	  recall	  Newton’s	  explanation	  regarding	  the	  ethics	  of	  hermeneutics	  I	  recognize	  my	  (private	  and	  public)	  
responsibilities	  	  to	  my	  reader,	  which	  come	  with	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Dante’s	  said,	  and	  ultimately	  transcending	  it	  as	  
saying	  	  to	  my	  reader.	  	  For	  as	  Newton	  writes,	  “textual	  interpretation	  comprises	  both	  private	  responsibilities	  
incurred	  in	  each	  singular	  act	  of	  reading	  and	  public	  responsibilities	  that	  follow	  from	  discussing,	  	  and	  teaching	  works	  
of	  fiction”	  (Newton	  19).	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probitas, emphasize his relationship with the civitas, through which, in the words of 
Wyschogrod, his saying remains clothed in the language of his said.181  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The Loss of Beatrice and the Ethics of Pilgrimage 
 
 At the very midpoint of the Vita Nuova is the death of Beatrice.  Strategically 
placing her death at the center of the work, Dante emphasizes her humanity, by 
confirming that death is a reality of life from which no one is spared.182  The poet never 
describes nor discusses the actual moment of her death, but through the words of the 
prophet Jeremiah, “Quomodo sedet sola civitas plena populo! facta est quasi vidua 
domina gentium” (VNXXVIII:1),183 he announces her passing to the entire city as well as 
to his reader.  The incipit of Chapter XXVIII prepares the reader for the solemn tone of 
the second half of the Vita Nuova, in which the loss of the beloved is the central focus.  
The theme of loss is emphasized by the description of the city’s desolation, once 
teaming with life, now vacant.   It refers to Florence which has lost its most blessed 
citizen, Beatrice beata, as Dante refers to her later in the chapter.  This theme of loss 
underscores the vital link between love and the civitas, as the poet exhorts the city to 
share in his sorrow.  Simultaneously, this theme is linked to the fundamental theme of 
pilgrimage of the second part of the work.   In this chapter, I examine these two themes 
and demonstrate how Dante, reaffirming and elaborating his ethics of poetry, employs 
them to emphasize the essential relationship between love and civitas.  How is Dante’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Beatrice’s	  death	  marks	  Dante’s	  divergence	  form	  the	  courtly	  love	  tradition,	  in	  which	  the	  domina	  or	  the	  	  
“idealized”	  lady	  does	  not	  die,	  but	  becomes	  angelicata	  (angel-­‐like),	  and	  is	  truly	  the	  final	  object	  of	  desire	  for	  her	  
lover.	  	  See	  Singleton,	  Essay,	  p.	  68,	  and	  De	  Robertis,	  Il	  Libro,	  p.	  56-­‐57.	  
183	  “How	  solitary	  lies	  the	  city,	  once	  full	  of	  people!	  	  Once	  great	  among	  the	  nations,	  she	  has	  become	  like	  a	  widow.”	  	  	  
This	  translation	  comes	  from	  Cervigni	  and	  Vasta’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Vita	  Nuova.	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narrative ethics manifested through the loss of Beatrice?  What is the link between the 
theme of pilgrimage, love, and civitas? 
   
The theme of Loss 
 Marking the beginning of Chapter II of the Vita Nuova, Dante’s words “la gloriosa 
donna de la mia mente” (VN II:1),184 clearly indicate, as Singleton demonstrated, that 
Beatrice has already attained the glory of paradise.185  These phrases are only the initial 
indications of the loss of the beloved and serve to prepare the reader for what is to be 
the climax of the libro della memoria (book of memory).  The loss or the disappearance 
of the beloved is essential to the protagonist’s continual refinement of his love.  If the 
beloved remains, the lover becomes fixed on the status quo, the here and now, unable 
to advance and grow, analogous to the Gospel episode in which Christ meets two of the 
apostles on the road to Emmaus.  While Christ walks and converses with them, their 
hearts burn and they beg him to stay for something to eat.  As soon as he gives the 
blessing, they recognize him, and he immediately vanishes from their sight.  Upon his 
disappearance, the two apostles are energized and reinvigorated, “et surgentes eadem 
hora regressi sunt in Hierusalem,” (Luke XXIV:33)186 to share this reinvigorated and 
increasing love with the entire community.  Dante, too, like the apostles in the Gospel 
account, benefits from the disappearance of the beloved, for at the end of the Vita 
Nuova, he proclaims: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  “the	  glorious	  lady	  of	  my	  mind”	  
185	  Later	  Dante	  speaks	  of	  Beatrice’s	  ineffable	  courtesy,	  “la	  quale	  è	  oggi	  meritata	  nel	  grande	  secolo”	  (VN	  III:1).	  
186	  “They	  got	  up	  immediately	  and	  returned	  to	  Jerusalem>”	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“E poi piaccia a colui che è sire de la cortesia, che la mia anima se ne possa gire 
a vedere la gloria de la sua donna, cioè di quella benedetta Beatice” (VN 
XLII:3).187  
 
Such a proclamation marks the lover’s arrival at the final stage in the development of his 
love (as demonstrated in the second chapter of this study).  Much like the apostles on 
the road to Emmaus, however, Dante’s journey was essential to his final goal, a journey 
in which loss and pilgrimage play a fundamental role. 
Dante’s first dream, in which the god of Love appears with Beatrice in his arms, 
gives the reader the first indication of Beatrice’s early demise.  In a preview of the grief 
which will permeate the second half of the Vita Nuova, the god’s mood quickly changes 
from happiness to bitter sadness:  
Apresso ciò poco dimorava che la sua letizia si convertia in amarissimo pianto; e 
così piangendo, si ricogliea questa donna ne le sue braccia, e con essa mi parea 
che si ne gisse verso lo cielo (VN III:7).188  
 
The poet juxtaposes the term letizia with pianto to underscore the contrast between his 
elation at the beginning of the book when Beatrice deigns to greet him, and his profound 
sadness which will be caused by her death.  The god of Love’s amarissimo pianto 
points to the despair of the solitary city of Chapter XXVIII which est quasi vidua (has 
become like a widow).   
 The next indication of the loss of the beloved is represented in the departure of 
the first donna schermo.  Having already discussed her departure in the previous 
chapter of this study, I mention it here solely to enhance my examination of how her 
departure prefigures the death of Beatrice.  It is important to understand how the events 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  “And	  then	  may	  it	  please	  him	  who	  is	  the	  Lord	  of	  courtesy	  that	  my	  soul	  may	  go	  to	  see	  the	  glory	  of	  his	  lady:	  
namely,	  that	  blessed	  Beatrice.”	  
188	  “After	  that	  he	  abided,	  but	  little	  before	  his	  happiness	  converted	  into	  most	  bitter	  weeping;	  and	  thus	  weeping	  he	  
gathered	  this	  lady	  into	  his	  arms,	  and	  with	  her	  he	  appeared	  to	  ascend	  toward	  heaven.”	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are parallel, and that each provides an opportunity for the poet to express his sadness 
and call upon the people of Florence to join him in his grief.  While the donna schermo 
cannot be seen as the city’s beatrix , her departure brings to light the movement from 
the said (the donna schermo) to the saying (Beatrice), imitating the vital link between 
the poet’s words and caritas.  Dante employs his poetry to prevent shaming the donna 
schermo and demeaning his love for Beatrice.  As he explains in the prose which 
precedes his sonnet, he decides to write a poem to lament his loss.  His writing is 
ethical in that the poet emphasizes the essential link which exists between love and 
poetry, as well as in the fact that he offers it to the entire city: 
E pensando che se de la sua partita io non parlasse alquanto dolorosamente, le 
persone sarebbero accorte più tosto de lo mio nascondere, propuosi di farne 
alcuna lamentanza in uno sonetto (VN VII:2).189 
 
While nascondere emphasizes the role of the donna schermo, dolorosamente and 
lamentanza allude to the sorrow the lover feels in his loss of both the screen and his 
beloved. 
 A comparison of two sonnets “O voi che per la via d’Amore passate” and “Venite 
e intender li sopiri miei” reveals parallels which support my argument that the departure 
of the donna schermo prepares the lover for the death of his beloved.  The theme of 
loss is intensified through the poet’s use of the motif of impoverishment, a fundamental 
element of both sonnets:     
 Or ho perduto tutta mia baldanza 
 che si movea d’amoroso tesoro; 
 ond’io povero dimoro, 
 in guisa che di dir mi ven dottanza. 
 Sì che volendo far come coloro 
 che per vergogna celan lor mancanza, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  “And	  thinking	  that	  if	  of	  her	  departure	  I	  did	  not	  write	  somewhat	  sorrowfully	  then	  people	  would	  soon	  become	  
aware	  of	  my	  concealment,	  I	  resolved	  to	  express	  a	  lamentation	  in	  a	  sonnet.”	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 di fuor mostro allegranza, 
 e dentro da lo core struggo e ploro (VN VII:5-6, vv. 13-20).190 
 
The juxtaposition of tesoro and povero strengthens the sense of loss which the lover is 
experiencing.191  Once content and emboldened (baldanza) in all that Love had to offer, 
the lover now suffers a miserable impoverishment caused by his loss.192 Dante revisits 
this theme of impoverishment in the sonnet Venite a intender: 
 Però che gli occhi mi sarebber rei, 
 molte fiate più ch’io non vorria, 
 lasso!, di pianger sì la donna mia, 
 che sfogasser lo cor, piangendo lei (VN XXXII:5, vv.5-8).193 
 
Cervigni and Vasta translate the term rei in this quatrain as “debtor”.  This translation 
takes up the impoverishment theme, while supporting the link between the two sonnets.  
It is important, however, to look at Barbi’s explanation of rei as “regge di piangere”194 
(crying non-stop), which Gorni interprets as the eyes being obligated to cry.  Dante, too, 
in the following line admits he cries more than he wants, revealing this sense of 
obligation, and reinforcing the link of povero in “O voi che per la via” to rei in “Venite a 
intender,” and thus underscoring the parallel of the sonnets. 
 The most telling portent which gives the lover, as well as the reader, an indication 
of Beatrice’s impending death is Dante’s delirious dream during his nine day illness.  
The poet discloses that during his compromised state, he contemplates the frailty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  “Now	  I	  have	  lost	  all	  my	  boldness	  /	  which	  quickened	  from	  Love’s	  treasure;	  /	  hence	  I	  abide	  impoverished,	  /	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  I	  fear	  to	  speak.	  /	  Thus,	  wishing	  to	  do	  as	  those	  /	  who	  out	  of	  shame	  conceal	  their	  want,	  /	  outwardly	  I	  
show	  joy	  /	  and	  inwardly	  at	  the	  heart	  I	  waste	  away	  and	  weep.”	  
191	  Foster	  and	  Boyde	  	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  term	  tesoro	  is	  “sustained	  in	  the	  following	  pover	  (15)	  and	  mancanza	  
(18).	  	  See	  Dante’s	  Lyric	  Poetry,	  Vol	  II,	  p.	  42.	  
192	  Gorni	  explains	  the	  phrase	  pover	  dimoro	  as	  “resto	  misero”	  (I	  remain	  miserable),	  which	  he	  notes	  is	  “in	  
opposizione	  al	  celebrato	  tesoro”.	  	  p.	  37.	  
193	  “Because	  my	  eyes	  would	  be	  my	  debtors,	  /	  many	  times	  more	  than	  I	  would	  desire,	  /	  alas,	  of	  weeping	  for	  my	  lady,	  
so	  /	  as	  to	  relieve	  my	  heart,	  weeping	  for	  her.”	  
194	  See	  Gorni’s	  note	  #5	  on	  p.	  186.	  	  Also	  Foster	  and	  Boyde	  provide	  an	  in	  depth	  explanation	  of	  the	  term	  reus	  as	  a	  
“debtor	  who	  fails	  to	  pay,”	  and	  its	  use	  in	  this	  passage.	  	  See	  Dante’s	  Lyric	  Poetry,	  Vol	  II,	  p.	  139.	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human life, and thus comes to realize that even “la gentilissima Beatrice alcuna volta si 
muoia” (VN XXIII:4).195  The sense of hopelessness in the face of loss overwhelms the 
lover and he becomes frantic in his delirium: 
E però mi giunse uno sì forte smarrimento, che chiusi li occhi e cominciai a 
travagliare sì come farnetica persona ed a imaginare in questo modo 
(VNXXIII:4).196 
 
The sense of loss is so powerful and so overbearing that the lover becomes delusional.  
His sorrow at imagined loss, though it will deepen causing him greater misery later in 
the work, serves to prepare the lover for the death of his beloved, an event he failed to 
contemplate before his illness, and of which he is now acutely aware.  Dante, however, 
confirms to his reader that death is a reality of human experience, and that we have no 
recourse but to accept it.  Dante initiates this argument earlier in the work, when he 
recalls the death of Beatrice’s father: 
Appresso ciò non molti dì passati, sì come piacque al glorioso sire lo quale non 
negoe la morte a sé, colui che era stato genitore di tanta maraviglia quanta si 
vedea ch’era questa nobillissima Beatrice, di questa vita uscendo, a la gloria 
etternale se ne gio veracemente (VNXXII:1).197 
 
Dante avers that death provokes a universal pathos, for just as God did not deny 
Himself death,198 neither does he deny it to Beatrice’s father, and ultimately, we all 
share the same destiny.  While the pathos of death and the deep sense of loss prepare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  “the	  most	  gentle	  Beatrice	  one	  day	  will	  die.”	  
196	  “And	  thus	  came	  over	  me	  so	  powerful	  a	  sense	  of	  loss	  that	  I	  closed	  my	  eyes	  and	  began	  to	  be	  agitated	  like	  a	  frantic	  
person	  and	  to	  imagine	  in	  this	  manner.”	  
197	  “After	  that,	  not	  many	  days	  later,	  as	  it	  pleased	  the	  Lord	  of	  Glory	  who	  did	  not	  negate	  death	  for	  himself,	  he	  who	  
had	  been	  the	  parent	  of	  so	  great	  a	  marvel	  as	  evidently	  was	  this	  most	  noble	  Beatrice,	  from	  this	  life	  issuing,	  to	  eternal	  
glory	  passed	  truly.”	  
198	  What	  does	  this	  say	  about	  God’s	  responsibility	  to	  the	  believer?	  	  God’s	  choice	  to	  experience	  death	  from	  a	  mortal	  
perspective,	  suggests	  that	  the	  Divine	  feels	  an	  “obligation”	  to	  the	  faithful	  to	  model	  the	  act	  of	  death.	  	  This	  example	  
demonstrates	  God’s	  love	  for	  His	  people,	  while	  providing	  an	  exemplum	  of	  how	  each	  believer	  has,	  in	  imitation	  of	  the	  
Divine,	  an	  obligation	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  each	  other.	  	  The	  love	  which	  God	  gives	  to	  the	  faithful	  must	  then	  be	  
reciprocated,	  and	  disseminated	  among	  all	  people.	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the reader for the death of Dante’s beloved, what are the ethical aspects of the poet’s 
words, and how do these ethical elements relate to the civitas?   
In my examination of the text, I find two instances in which Dante’s words reveal 
his ethos regarding love and civitas.   In the first case, a relative of the protagonist 
begins to weep, distressed by the sight of Dante praying for Death to take him: 
E dicendo io queste parole con doloroso singulto di pianto, e chiamando la Morte 
che venisse a me, una donna giovane e gentile, la quale era lungo lo mio letto, 
credendo che lo mio piangere e le mie parole fossero solamente per lo dolore de 
la mia infermitade, con grande paura cominciò a piangere (VN XXIII:11).199  
 
This relative, believing that Dante cries out to Death because he can no longer bear the 
pain of his illness, is moved to compassion.  Thus the text is ethical in that this donna 
giovane e gentile recognizes her responsibility to the other, and is obliged to respond.  
This compulsory responsibility holds her captive to the other, whose face commands a 
response, which comes in the form of pity.  It is precisely responsibility to the other 
which renders the episode ethical.  It is important to recall Levinas’s words regarding 
responsibility of the other which he claims “commands me and ordains me to the other” 
(OB 11).  Levinas points out that responsibility goes against one’s will, and that one 
must substitute oneself for the other.  “All my inwardness,” he writes, “is invested in the 
form of despite-me, for-another.  Despite-me, for-another is signification par excellence” 
(OB 11).  Applying Levinas’s concept of “despite-me, for-another” to Dante’s donna 
giovane e gentile, we understand the ethical element of her compassion, and see a 
connection, by analogy, to Beatrice, the “donna gentile” par exellence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  “And	  as	  I	  was	  uttering	  these	  words	  with	  painful	  convulsions	  of	  weeping,	  and	  calling	  on	  Death	  to	  come	  to	  me,	  a	  
lady	  young	  and	  gentle,	  who	  stood	  alongside	  my	  bed,	  believing	  that	  my	  weeping	  and	  my	  words	  came	  solely	  from	  
the	  pain	  of	  my	  infirmity,	  with	  great	  fear	  began	  to	  cry.”	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 The tears of Dante’s relative draw the attention of other women in the room who 
immediately respond to both the weeping lady and the crying infirm.  These women 
reaffirm ethics in their response to both situations; they remove the protagonist’s relative 
from the room, and they “wake” the lover, who they believe is dreaming.  Their 
response, however, is simultaneously ethical in that they act to relieve the suffering of 
both people.  It is their concern for the other in which the ethical aspect of their actions 
is most evident.  In the faces of the lover and the donna giovane e gentile, these women 
see raw humanity in all its corporality, and in it recognize the otherness which demands 
a response.  It is important to understand that otherness calls us to action, and that call 
comes through the face of the other.  To understand this concept, it is helpful to recall 
the words of Levinas, who asserts that the face commands and speaks to us, obligating 
us to meet the needs of the other.  “The face of the Other is destitute,” writes Levinas, “it 
is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all.  And me, whoever I may be, but 
as a ‘first person,’ I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call” (Ethics and 
Infinity 89).  Levinas reaffirms that all of us – as members of the civitas – are called to 
respond to the other through the call of the face, which ultimately serves as a path to 
God.  He states, “The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face” (TI 70).  
Indeed, it is through the face of the other, with its compelling impoverishment and 
emptiness, that one is ultimately led to the divine.   
How do Levinas’s teachings on the face of the other apply to the women who 
comfort Dante and his weeping relative?  Prompted by the destituteness of the face, 
these women find within themselves the resources to respond to the suffering which is 
before them.   The poet recounts that upon seeing him, they resolve to bring him some 
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comfort, respond to his needs, participate in ‘despite-me, for-another’: “E quando mi 
videro, cominciaro a dire: ‘Questo pare morto’, e a dire tra loro: ‘Proccuriamo di 
confortarlo’” (VN XXIII:14).200 The face of the other in all its suffering spurs them to 
action.   The women focus their attention on the lover, promptly addressing his needs.  
As Dante explains: “onde molte parole mi diceano da confortarmi, e talora mi 
domandavano di che io avesse avuto paura” (VN XXIII:14).201  These women are 
emblematic of the poet and his reader.  Just as the women recognize the lover’s need, 
and respond to him, so does the poet act in a reciprocal relationship with his reader.  
Dante’s appeal elicits judgment and interpretation from the reader, emphasizing the 
reciprocity between story teller and interlocutor.202  This reiterates his interaction with 
the fedeli d’Amore, the coro delle donne, and i più semplici, underscoring the ethical 
relationship between the author and reader. 
Dante’s decision to describe his vision to the women introduces the second 
canzone of the Vita Nuova, “Donna pietosa,” which he writes after having recovered 
from his illness.  The canzone treats his illness and the vision of Beatrice’s death, and 
has as its central theme the inevitability of death.  As Martinez observes, “Donna 
pietosa may also be situated in a larger structure of poems concerning the narrator-
protagonist’s vulnerability to death, as this proves to be both the occasion and content 
of the canzone”.203  The larger structure of poems of which Martinez speaks applies to 
two poems of the Vita Nuova (“Ciò che m’incontra” of Chapter XV, and “Quantunque 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  “And	  when	  they	  saw	  me,	  they	  began	  to	  say:	  ‘This	  on	  looks	  dead,’	  and	  to	  say	  among	  themselves,	  ‘Let’s	  try	  to	  
comfort	  him’”.	  	  
201	  “whereupon	  many	  things	  they	  said	  to	  comfort	  me,	  and	  at	  times	  they	  asked	  me	  what	  I	  had	  feared.”	  	  
202	  See	  Newton,	  Narrative	  Ethics,	  pp.	  10-­‐11.	  
203	  See	  Ronald	  Martinez,	  “Morning	  Beatrice:	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Threnody	  in	  the	  ‘Vita	  Nuova’,”	  MLN,	  Vol.	  113,	  No.1,	  
Jan.	  1998,	  pp.1-­‐29.	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volte, lasso” of Chapter XXXIII) in which the protagonist is either urged to die or calls 
upon death to take him out of this world.  These encounters with death, I argue, are a 
manifestation of his anxiety over the potential loss of his beloved which is central to this 
second canzone.  The tone of anguish in the canzone draws the reader into the poet’s 
deep sense of grief, and, like the women at his bedside, we too feel compassion for the 
protagonist.   The verses of the canzone parallel the prose which precedes it, 
intensifying the dynamic between them.204  The poet’s description, in the prosimetrum, 
of his vision of disheveled women announcing his death is later echoed in the verses of 
the canzone: “visi di donne m’apparver crucciati, / che mi dicean pur:  – Morra’ti, 
morra’ti – (VN XXIII:22, vv. 41-42).205  The parallels between prose and verse amplify 
the fear of death and the unknown; chaos looms.  The pathos of death is undeniable, 
underscoring the mournful aspect of the canzone: 
 ed essere mi parea non so in qual loco, 
 e veder donne andar per via disciolte, 
 qual lagrimando, e qual traendo guai, 
 che di tristizia saettavan foco. 
 Poi mi parve vedere a poco a poco 
 turbar lo sole e apparir la stella, 
 e pianger elli ed ella; 
 cader li augelli volando per l’are, 
 e la terra tremare (VN XXIII:23-24, vv. 45-53).206  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  On	  this	  poiont	  see	  Carrai,	  Dante	  Elegiaco,	  Una	  chiave	  di	  lettura	  per	  la	  Vita	  Nuova,	  Firenze:	  Leo	  S.	  Olschki	  
Editore,	  2006,	  p.	  87.	  
205	  “I	  seemed	  to	  see	  faces	  of	  women	  disconsolate,	  /	  who	  told	  me	  over	  and	  over	  again:-­‐-­‐	  You	  will	  die,	  you	  will	  die.	  –”	  
206	  “I	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  I	  don’t	  know	  which	  place,	  /	  and	  saw	  ladies	  go	  all	  disheveled,	  /	  some	  weeping,	  some	  crying	  
out	  their	  laments,	  /	  so	  that	  of	  grief	  they	  let	  fly	  the	  fire.	  /	  Then	  I	  seemed	  to	  see,	  little	  by	  little,	  /	  the	  sun	  grow	  dim	  
and	  stars	  appear	  /	  and	  the	  one	  and	  the	  others	  weep;	  /	  birds	  in	  flight	  fell	  from	  the	  air,	  /	  and	  the	  earth	  shook.”	  	  It	  
must	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  events	  recall	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Gospel	  account	  of	  Christ’s	  death	  (Matthew	  XXVII:	  51-­‐53),	  
reinforcing	  Beatrice	  as	  the	  figura	  Christi,	  and	  paralleling	  her	  death	  with	  the	  death	  of	  Christ.	  	  Martinez	  remarks,	  
“The	  parallel	  of	  Beatrice	  and	  Christ	  established	  by	  cosmic	  disturbances	  is	  placed	  on	  a	  theological	  footing	  when	  the	  
speaker	  sees	  the	  dead	  Beatrice	  as	  the	  ‘form	  of	  true	  humility,’	  which	  can	  result	  from	  nothing	  less	  than	  an	  imitation	  
of	  the	  death	  of	  Christ”.	  	  See	  Martinez,	  “Mourning	  Beatrice,”	  p.	  23.	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Out of this turbulence appears a man who announces to the lover that his lady has died.  
This man, in his act of friendship, symbolic of the entire civitas, brings to mind Levinas’s 
words on discourse and the authenticity of relationship: “It is discourse, and more 
exactly, response and responsibility which is this authentic relationship” (Ethics and 
Infinity 88).207   The man’s declaration is yet another link between the prose and the 
verse, serving as the solitary announcement of Beatrice’s death in the text.208  After 
Beatrice’s actual death, the poet doesn’t announce that she is dead, but instead, 
through the words of Jeremiah, invites the entire city to mourn with him.209  In “Donna 
pietosa,” however, through the delirium of his illness, he explores all the details of the 
beloved’s death: 
 Lo imaginar fallace 
 mi condusse a veder madonna morta; 
 e quand’io l’avea scorta, 
 vedea che donne la covrian d’un velo; 
 ed avea seco umiltà verace, 
 che parea che dicesse: -- Io sono in pace. – (VNXXIII:26, vv. 65-70)210 
  
Having witnessed Beatrice’s death through the protagonist’s vision, the reader has a 
clear understand of her actual death.  The words of Jeremiah not only confirm the death 
of the beloved, but also invite the reader to join the protagonist on his pilgrimage to an 
“intelligenza nova” (VN XLI:10, v. 3) – a new intelligence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  See	  also	  Levinas’s	  comments	  in	  Totality	  and	  Infinity,	  p.	  215.	  
208	  The	  text	  from	  the	  prose	  and	  the	  verse	  read	  respectfully:	  “…immaginai	  alcuno	  amico	  che	  mi	  venisse	  a	  dire:	  “Or	  
non	  sai?	  La	  tua	  mirabile	  donna	  è	  partita	  di	  questo	  secolo.”	  (“I	  imagined	  that	  a	  friend	  came	  to	  me	  to	  say:	  “Don’t	  you	  
know	  yet?	  Your	  wonderful	  lady	  has	  departed	  from	  this	  world.”	  VN	  XXIII:6).	  	  “…ed	  omo	  apparve	  scolorito	  e	  fioco,	  /	  
dicendomi:	  -­‐-­‐	  Che	  fai?	  non	  sai	  novella?	  /	  morta	  è	  la	  donna	  tua,	  ch’era	  sì	  bella.”	  (…and	  a	  man	  appeared,	  pale	  and	  
weak,	  /	  saying:	  -­‐-­‐	  What,	  have	  you	  not	  heard	  the	  news?	  /	  Dead	  is	  your	  lady,	  who	  was	  so	  lovely.-­‐-­‐”	  VNXXIII:24,	  vv.	  54-­‐
56).	  
209	  On	  this	  point	  see	  Singleton	  who	  writes,	  “Somehow,	  when	  Beatrice	  really	  dies,	  her	  death	  seems	  less	  like	  a	  death	  
than	  it	  does	  an	  ascension.	  Her	  lover	  will	  not	  write	  of	  it,	  he	  says,	  for	  reasons	  which	  point	  clearly	  to	  a	  miraculous	  
event.”	  	  An	  Essay,	  p.	  19.	  
210	  “My	  false	  imagining	  	  /	  took	  me	  to	  see	  my	  dead	  lady;	  /	  and	  after	  I	  had	  seen	  her,	  /	  I	  saw	  ladies	  cover	  her	  with	  a	  
veil;	  /	  and	  with	  her	  she	  had	  true	  humility,	  /	  that	  seemed	  to	  say:	  -­‐-­‐	  I	  rest	  in	  peace.	  -­‐-­‐”.	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 As I mentioned above, the words of the prophet call upon the civitas to join the 
lover in his loss.  While Dante’s sorrow is personal, he extends it to the entire civitas, 
rendering it public.  In so doing, he expands his audience from what started out as only 
the fedeli d’Amore, then the donne ch’avete intelligenza d’amore, and finally includes all 
the citizens of the city.211  Dante further expands his audience, as I discuss below, when 
he addresses the pilgrims who pass through Florence.  The city, now compared to a 
widow who has lost everything, is exhorted to suffer as the lover suffers: 
Poi che fue partita da questo secolo, rimase tutta la sopradetta cittade quasi 
vedova dispogliata da ogni dignitade; onde io, ancora lagrimando in questa 
desolata cittade, scrissi a li principi de la terra alquanto de la sua condizione, 
pigliando quello cominciamento di Geremia profeta che dice: Quomodo sedet 
solo civitas (VNXXX:1).212 
 
 De Robertis argues that Dante understands Beatrice’s death to be a result of 
God’s anger in retaliation for the city’s transgressions.  “Che poi, confortato dal profeta,” 
writes De Robertis, “Dante vedesse in quella morte il segno della collera divina per le 
colpe della città e che col cap. XXX egli riferisse appunto alla storia di Beatrice lo stato 
della sua patria, non farebbe che accentuare la scarsa rilevanza affetiva 
dell’avvenimento” (De Robertis 158).213  If we follow De Robertis’s argument, Dante 
admonishes the civitas, (especially the leaders) and holds Beatrice up as an exemplum, 
suggesting that the city has been unworthy of this beatrix.  The poet echoes his rebuke 
in the third and final canzone of the Vita Nuova: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  See	  Martinez,	  Mourning	  Beatrice,	  p.	  19	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  this	  point	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  words	  of	  Threni.	  
212	  “After	  she	  had	  departed	  from	  this	  century,	  the	  entire	  aforementioned	  city	  was	  left	  like	  a	  widow	  dispossessed	  of	  
every	  dignity;	  hence,	  still	  weeping	  in	  this	  desolate	  	  city,	  I	  wrote	  to	  the	  princes	  of	  the	  earth	  somewhat	  about	  its	  
condition,	  taking	  	  the	  beginning	  from	  Jeremiah	  the	  prophet,	  who	  says:	  Quomodo	  sedet	  sola	  civitas	  [How	  solitary	  
lies	  the	  city].”	  	  Dante’s	  address	  to	  the	  “princes”,	  those	  in	  power,	  highlights	  the	  link	  between	  ethics	  and	  politics.	  	  He	  
will	  later,	  in	  Purgatorio	  VI,	  rebuke	  	  the	  self-­‐serving,	  unethical	  leaders	  of	  Italy	  and	  specifically	  those	  of	  Florence.	  
213	  “Then	  comforted	  by	  the	  prophet,	  Dante	  sees	  in	  that	  death	  the	  sign	  of	  divine	  anger	  for	  the	  faults	  of	  the	  city,	  and	  
in	  Chapter	  XXX	  he	  indeed	  relates	  Beatrice’s	  story	  to	  the	  state	  of	  her	  country,	  which	  would	  only	  emphasize	  the	  




Chè luce de la sua umilitate 
 passò li cieli con tanta vertute, 
 che fé maravigliar l’etterno sire, 
 sì che dolce disire 
 lo giunse di chiamar tanta salute; 
 e fella di qua giù a sé venire, 
 perché vedea ch’esta vita noiosa 
 non era degna di sì gentil cosa (VNXXXI:10, vv. 21-28).214 
 
Finding this “vita noiosa” unworthy of Beatrice, God has called her to himself, leaving 
the city “dispogliata” (dispossessed) and “desolata” (desolate), a motif repeated by the 
poet at the end of the canzone: 
 Pietosa mia canzone, or va piangendo; 
 e ritruova le donne e le donzelle 
 a cui le tue sorelle 
 erano usate di portar letizia; 
 e tu, che se’ figliuola di tristizia, 
 vatten disconsolate a star con elle (VN XXXI:17, vv. 71-76).215   
The words “tristizia” and “disconsolate” are juxtaposed with the word “letizia,” 
intensifying the poet’s sense of grief and despair, while the final line underscores the 
emptiness of the city.  However, Dante mitigates this grief by writing poems on behalf of 
Beatrice’s brother, who shares in that grief. The brother’s request reveals the 
relationship between poetry and consolation, underscoring the ethical function of poetry.  
Hence the said of the fiction/poetry is transcended by the ethical responsibility of the 
poet.  Equally important is the friendship which exists between the poet and Beatrice’s 
brother, who Dante describes as “amico immediatamente dopo lo primo” (VN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  “For	  a	  ray	  of	  her	  humility	  /	  went	  beyond	  the	  heavens	  with	  such	  power	  /	  as	  to	  make	  the	  eternal	  Lord	  marvel	  /	  so	  
that	  sweet	  desire	  /	  came	  upon	  him	  to	  summon	  so	  much	  perfection;	  /	  and	  he	  made	  her,	  from	  here	  below,	  come	  to	  
him	  /	  because	  he	  saw	  that	  this	  abject	  life	  /	  was	  not	  worthy	  of	  so	  gentle	  a	  thing.”	  
215	  “My	  rueful	  canzone,	  now	  go,	  weeping;	  /	  and	  find	  again	  the	  ladies	  and	  the	  maidens	  /	  to	  whom	  your	  sisters	  /	  
were	  accustomed	  to	  offering	  delight;	  /	  and	  you,	  who	  are	  a	  child	  of	  sadness,	  /	  go	  disconsolate	  to	  stay	  with	  them.”	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XXXII:1).216  Writing on behalf of the brother/friend, Dante steps out of the conventional 
role of love poet, who writes on his own behalf. 
 
Peregrinatio 
 In the midst of his grieving, Dante encounters a group of pilgrims.  The lover is 
struck by their lack of knowledge of Beatrice’s death, and their ignorance of the recent 
events in the “città dolente.”  As pilgrims they are exiles – homines in statu viatoris – 217 
away from their homes and in search of a final destination.  Picone holds that we live a 
life of exile, that in our human existence we remain far from our true home, our 
quotidian struggle ever towards a destination which is outside of this world. However, it 
is important to remember that this earthly existence restores us during our long and 
tiresome journey, lest we risk losing sight of our final destination.218  What contributions 
do the pilgrims who cross Florence, on their way to Rome, make to the total economy of 
the Vita Nuova?  How are love and civitas linked to the theme of pilgrimage? 
Dante recognizes these strangers as pilgrims because since Beatrice’s death he, 
too, has become homo viator, in search of the one who will restore his happiness.219 
These pilgrims serve a dual function within the Vita Nuova: first, they extend Dante’s 
poetry to a larger audience; secondly they bring the ethics of Dante’s poetry to the 
civitas and beyond. The poet, imitating the prophet’s exhortation appeals to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  “a	  friend	  to	  me	  immediately	  after	  the	  first	  [Guido	  Cavalcanti]”.	  
217	  See	  G.Ladner,	  “Homo	  viator:mediaeval	  ideas	  on	  alienation	  and	  order,”	  Speculum,	  Vol.	  XVLII,	  No.	  2,	  April	  1967.	  
218	  See	  Picone,	  Vita	  nuova	  e	  tradizione	  romanza,	  p.	  139.	  
219	  The	  Confessions	  of	  St.	  Augustine	  are	  a	  fundamental	  source	  for	  the	  pilgrim	  motif	  among	  the	  medieval	  writers,	  
and	  especially	  Dante.	  	  In	  Book	  VII,	  Chapter	  XX,	  Augustine	  writes:	  “inter	  videntes,	  quo	  eundum	  sit,	  nec	  videntes,	  
qua,	  et	  viam	  ducentem	  ad	  beatificam	  patriam,	  non	  tantum	  cernendam	  sed	  et	  habitandam	  (Betwixt	  those	  that	  saw	  
whither	  they	  go	  ,	  but	  knew	  nothing	  of	  the	  way:	  and	  that	  path	  which	  leads	  unto	  that	  blessed	  country”).	  	  Also:	  “et	  
qui	  de	  longinquo	  videre	  non	  potest,	  viam	  tamen	  ambulet,	  qua	  veniat	  et	  videat	  teneat”	  (and	  that	  he	  who	  from	  afar	  
off	  is	  not	  able	  to	  see	  his	  way,	  whereby	  he	  may	  at	  least	  arrive,	  and	  see,	  and	  comprehend).	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stranger, and thus expands his audience.  “O voi” and “Deh peregrini” counterbalance 
each other,220 as the former is the second sonnet of the Vita Nuova, and the latter is the 
penultimate sonnet of the work.  In each, the poet invites a group of pilgrims to mourn 
his loss with him.  There is a dialectic in that his comments are no longer reserved for 
love’s elite – “i fedeli d’Amore” – but are now extended (as we saw at the beginning of 
the Vita Nuova, with “li più semplici” and the “donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore”) to the 
pilgrims/strangers who pass through Florence. 
In Chaper Three of this study, I commented on the god of Love, as he appears in 
the sonnet “Cavalcando l’altr’ier,” as a reflection of the lover’s mood.  In conjunction with 
“O voi” and “Deh peregrini,” however, the god of Love in the sonnet “Cavalcando” 
serves a different function.  Within the theme of peregrinatio, the god of Love anticipates 
the status of the lover at the end of the Vita Nuova, as a pilgrim,221 and thus links him to 
the pilgrims in the two sonnets here mentioned. In “Cavalcando,” the god travels “in 
mezzo de la via” (VN IX:9, v.3),222 an echo of the “via d’Amore” (VN VII:3, v.1) on which 
the travelers in “O voi” tread.  “Cavalcando l’altr’ier per un cammino pensoso” (VN IX:9, 
v.2) creates a link between the lover and the pilgrims in “Deh peregrini” who “pensosi 
andate” (VN LX:9 v.1).  The commonalities223 which the three sonnets share underscore 
the importance of the pilgrim theme within the economy of the Vita Nuova, as the 
“cammino” or the “via” becomes the essential path to caritas.   The reader experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	  Martinez	  notes	  the	  “linguistic	  parallelism	  between	  the	  two	  poems,”(Mourning	  Beatrice	  11)	  in	  his	  comparison	  of	  
them,	  while	  Gorni	  also	  notes	  phrasing	  similarities	  between	  these	  two	  sonnets	  (224).	  
221	  Appearing	  in	  humble	  attire,	  “E	  però	  lo	  dolicissimo	  senore…apparve	  come	  peregrine	  leggeramente	  vestito	  e	  di	  
vili	  drappi,”	  the	  god	  of	  Love	  reflects	  the	  peregrination	  of	  the	  lover.	  
222	  The	  translations	  of	  the	  four	  citations	  used	  in	  this	  paragraph	  appear	  in	  this	  note.	  	  They	  are	  as	  follows:	  “in	  the	  
middle	  of	  the	  way”	  (VN	  IX:9,	  v.	  3);	  “the	  way	  of	  Love”	  (VVVII:3,	  v.	  1);	  “musing”	  (VNIX:9,	  v.2);	  “go	  along	  in	  thought”	  
(VNLX:9,	  v.1).	  
223	  See	  Martinez	  on	  the	  “three	  contextualized	  sonnets”	  (Mourning	  Beatrice	  11-­‐12).	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movement in the transcendence of the saying from the said.  Dante provides us an 
example in the prose of Chapter XL, when, having observed the pilgrims as they pass 
through the city, he believes that if he could speak to them he would be able to elicit 
from them sympathy regarding the death of his lady.  What method would he employ to 
make them “piangere anzi ch’elli uscissero di questa cittade” (VN XL:4)?224 
Dante’s poetry – his said – is the very instrument which he uses to help these 
pilgrims understand the sorrow of his city, and their role in it.  “Se io li potesse tenere 
alquanto,” writes Dante, “io li pur farei piangere anzi ch’elli uscissero di questa cittade, 
però che io direi parole le quali farebbero piangere chiunque le intendesse” (VN XL: 4-
5).225  His statement reflects the ontological characteristics of language or, the ability to 
question the meaning of being.226   Dante’s desire to speak to the pilgrims is both 
ontological and ethical, as the said and the saying are united in it.  Dante believes that if 
he could just talk to the pilgrims he could provoke a response: 
Onde, passati costoro da la mia veduta, propuosi di fare uno sonetto, ne lo quale 
io manifestasse ciò che io avea detto fra me medesimo; e acciò che più paresse 
pietoso, propuosi di dire come se io avesse parlato a loro” (VNXL:5).227    
 
The poet’s use of the phrase come se io avesse parlato (as if I had spoken) 
underscores the poetic distance between the lover and the pilgrims. The reality of not 
being able to speak to them necessitates the ethics of fiction, through which the poet’s 
writing provokes pity, and thus deepens the experience of reality for the reader.  Dante’s 
use of three verbs in this excerpt, scrivere  – implied by fare uno sonetto – (to write), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  “…weep	  before	  they	  left	  this	  city.”	  
225	  “If	  I	  could	  detain	  them	  awhile,	  I	  would	  nevertheless	  make	  them	  weep	  before	  they	  left	  this	  city,	  because	  I	  would	  
speak	  words	  that	  would	  make	  anyone	  weep	  who	  heard	  them.”	  
226	  See	  J.	  Llewelyn	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  p.	  121	  
227	  “Therefore,	  after	  they	  had	  passed	  from	  sight,	  I	  resolved	  to	  write	  a	  sonnet	  in	  which	  I	  would	  manifest	  what	  I	  had	  
said	  within	  myself;	  and	  so	  that	  it	  would	  appear	  all	  the	  more	  moving,	  I	  resolved	  to	  write	  as	  if	  I	  had	  spoken	  to	  them.”	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dire (to say), and parlare (to speak), emphasize the importance of language, and the 
poet’s desire to communicate with others beyond the space of the civitas.  
We find another example of Dante’s interaction with other citizens comes in the 
espisode in which, after Beatrice’s death, Dante is drawing angels: 
In quello giorno nel qual si compiea l’anno che questa donna era fatta de li 
cittadini di vita eterna, io mi sedea in parte ne la quale, ricordandomi di lei, 
disegnava uno angelo sopra certe tavolette; e mentre io lo disegnava, volsi li 
occhi, e vidi lungo me uomini a li quali si convenia di fare onore.  E’ riguardavano 
quello che io facea; e secondo che me fu detto poi, elli erano stati già alquanto 
anzi che io me ne accorgesse. (VN XXXIV:1-2).228 
   
What does this episode reveal about Dante’s communication with his fellow citizens?  
Dante communicates with these on-lookers (at first unknowingly) through his drawings, 
which become his “said.”  The art creates a connection between the artist/poet and the 
gentlemen whereby words are unnecessary to provoke an exchange, which later will be 
expressed through poetry.  This brings to mind Levinas’s claim that “through art 
essence and temporality begin to resound with poetry or song” (OB 40). Just as the 
gentlemen look over Dante’s shoulder to admire his drawings, the reader, too, marvels 
at the words of his poetry, and thus shares in the relationship between Dante and the 
civitas.  Significantly, by drawing angels, Dante metonymically connects his beloved 
Beatrice with the cittadini di vita eterna (citizens of eternal life), but he also suggests a 
similar connection between these blessed citizens and his fellow Florentines. 
 Whether written or spoken, language gives one the ability to offer oneself to the 
neighbor, the other, in a completely ethical act.  This episode is analogous to Dante’s 
communication with the pilgrims.  Levinas notes language as “the first ethical gesture,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  “On	  that	  day	  when	  a	  year	  was	  completed	  since	  this	  lady	  had	  become	  a	  citizen	  of	  eternal	  life,	  I	  was	  sitting	  in	  a	  
place	  where,	  thinking	  of	  her,	  I	  was	  designing	  an	  angel	  on	  certain	  panels;	  and	  while	  I	  was	  drawing	  it,	  I	  turned	  my	  
eyes	  and	  saw	  beside	  me	  men	  to	  whom	  it	  was	  proper	  to	  pay	  respects.	  	  They	  were	  watching	  what	  I	  was	  doing;	  and	  
according	  to	  what	  I	  was	  later	  told,	  they	  had	  been	  there	  some	  time	  before	  I	  noticed	  them.”	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(TI 174) for it is through language –speaking and writing – that we respond to the other.  
For Levinas, predication is kerygmatic as it satisfies our desire to proclaim, to engage 
our interlocutors.  It is, as Llewelyn writes, “an engagement of will or desire as wanting 
to say” (Llewelyn 133).  The impetus which makes this desire to communicate so 
important is our obligation to the other.  Levinas holds that it is difficult to remain silent in 
the presence of the other.229  One must engage, one must speak about something, 
about anything, in response.  The face of the other requires a response.  The face 
commands me, orders me; “there is a commandment in the appearance of the face as if 
a master spoke to me,” (EI 89) writes Levinas.  My response comes out of obligation to 
address the other, to answer him, and to answer for him.230 For as Waldenfels states, 
“the face is not something seen, observed, registered, deciphered or understood, but 
rather somebody responded to” (Waldenfels 69).  The face of the other, therefore, calls 
us to action.  It obliges us to take an initiative,231 as members of a society in which I 
become part of a collective we,232 to which I am ethically bound.  
 Applying Levinas’s understanding of language, one sees that Dante’s desire to 
speak to the pilgrims, and his resolve to write a sonnet, is truly an ethical act which he 
offers, not only to his fellow citizens, but to strangers who cross his city. The poet’s said 
– “Deh peregrini” – anticipates the pilgrims’ saying in their weeping, a manifestation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  E.	  Levinas,	  Ethics	  and	  Infinity,	  p.	  88.	  	  See	  also	  Auerbach’s	  essay	  “Dante’s	  Addresses	  to	  the	  Reader”	  in	  Studi	  	  su	  
Dante,	  (Milano:	  Giangiacomo	  Feltrinelli	  Editore,	  2005).	  	  If	  the	  reader	  is	  the	  other,	  Dante’s	  inability	  to	  remain	  silent	  
in	  his/her	  presence	  foreshadows	  his	  frequent	  addresses	  to	  the	  reader	  in	  the	  Commedia.	  	  One	  example	  is	  Canto	  
XXXIV	  of	  the	  Inferno	  in	  which	  Dante	  addresses	  the	  reader	  directly	  with	  the	  words,	  “Com’io	  divenni	  allor	  gelato	  e	  
fioco,	  /	  nol	  dimandar,	  lettor,	  ch’i’	  non	  lo	  scrivo,	  /	  però	  ch’ogne	  parlar	  sarebbe	  poco”	  (Inferno	  XXXIV:	  22-­‐24).	  
230	  E.	  Levinas,	  Ethics	  and	  Infinity,	  p.	  88	  
231	  See	  B.	  Waldenfels,	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  p.	  71.	  
232	  See	  J.	  Llewelyn,	  The	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  Levinas,	  p.	  130.	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caritas.  The movement from said to saying is evident as he calls on them to take notice 
of the sorrow which surrounds them as they pass through the città dolente: 
 Deh peregrini che pensosi andate, 
 forse di cosa che non v’è presente, 
 venite voi da sì lontana gente, 
 com’a la vista voi ne dimostrate, 
 che non piangete quando voi passate 
 per lo suo mezzo la città dolente (VN XL:9, vv. 1-6).233  
 
While they proceed pensosi, focused on their destination, unaware of the recent events, 
the lover senses an obligation to engage them, and “instruct” them about the pain and 
suffering to which they are clearly oblivious.  Dante’s words bear out the circular 
characteristic of the said and the saying, for the poet’s appeal to the pilgrims is intended 
to prompt them to respond.  Consider the final sextet of the sonnet: 
 Se voi restate per volerlo audire, 
 certo lo cor de’ sospiri mi dice 
 che lagrimando n’uscireste pui. 
 Ell’ha perduta la sua beatrice; 
 e le parole ch’om di lei pò dire 
 hanno vertù di far piangere altrui (VN LX:10, vv. 9-14).234 
 
It is evident that Dante understands that his words (language) have the power to elicit a 
response from these pilgrims, and although the poet/lover does not speak to them 
directly, their anticipated response to his words emphasizes the importance of the ethics 
of fiction upon which the reality of human connectivity relies.   
 We would do well to recall Newton’s statement regarding narrative situations, 
which he claims forge “relations of provocation” (Newton 13) ultimately joining the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233	  “Oh	  pilgrims	  who	  go	  along	  in	  thought,	  /	  perhaps	  of	  something	  not	  present	  to	  you,	  /	  do	  you	  come	  from	  such	  
distant	  folk,	  /	  as	  by	  your	  appearance	  you	  show	  us,	  /	  that	  you	  weep	  not	  when	  you	  pass	  /	  through	  the	  center	  of	  the	  
sorrowing	  city.”	  
234	  “If	  you	  would	  linger	  to	  hear	  of	  it,	  /	  surely	  the	  heart	  of	  many	  sighs	  tells	  me	  /	  that	  in	  tears	  would	  you	  then	  depart	  




listener and narrator, or reader and text.  Similarly Newton’s assertion can also be 
applied to the relationship between Dante, the pilgrims, and Dante’s readers who are 
ethically bound through Dante’s verse.  While Dante is certainly the narrator, the 
pilgrims are his intended listeners, which the poet makes clear in the first line of the 
sextet, “se voi restate per vederlo audire,” thereby revealing the link which exists 
between the narrator and the listener, or better stated, between the said and the saying.  
In his imagined conversation with the pilgrims, Dante explains that they would certainly 
leave the city in tears (“che lagrimando n’uscireste pui”).  This line is reinforced in the 
last two lines of the sonnet in which Dante acknowledges the full potential of language 
when he states that words have the power to make one cry. (e le parole ch’om di lei pò 
dire / hanno vertù di far piangere altrui).  The text of the sextet underscores the 
diachronic relationship between the said and the saying, a relationship which 
experiences incremental changes over time.  More importantly, however, the text also 
reveals how the said and the saying are united in the act of speaking235 to the reader, 
who, in the realm of fiction is also called to pilgrimage.   
 Ultimately, it is responsibility, resulting from the saying transcending the said, 
which forges the link between love and civitas.  As previously demonstrated in this 
chapter, Dante’s words serve as the catalyst which summon his interlocutors – various 
members of the civitas – to responsibility for the other.  Whether the fedeli d’amore, the 
coro delle donne, the women by Dante’s sick bed, or the pilgrims passing through 
Florence, each is called to responsibility in response to the poet’s said.  As there can be 
no saying without a said, and every said is introduced by a saying, it is logical that 
Dante’s verse in his libello offers the civitas a fresh understanding of ethical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  Peperzak,	  “Presentation”	  in	  Re-­‐reading	  Levinas,	  p.	  63.	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responsibility, grounded in love, within the confines of an “intelligenza nova” (VN XLI:10, 
v.3).236 which he proclaims in the final sonnet of the Vita Nuova: 
 Oltre la spera che più larga gira 
 passa ‘l sospiro ch’esce del mio core: 
 intelligenza nova, che l’Amore 
piangendo mette in lui, pur su lo tira. (VN XLI:10, vv.1-4)237 
 
Dante explains that this sonnet is “una cosa nuova,” (VN XLI:1) written for two ladies 
who requested the poet send them some “parole rimate” (VN XLI:1).238 Dante’s 
responsibility – his saying – introduces his said, resulting in the final sonnet which points 
to the divine.  At the conclusion of the poet’s ethical journey, the reader is cognizant of 
Dante’s growth, for he has gained a new intelligence, an understanding that love – his 
love for Beatrice – enables him to offer his poetry, his language, his said to the other, 
extending the saying among the entire civitas and beyond, as he addresses the pilgrims 
who come from afar.   Correspondingly, at the end of the ‘little book,’ the reader too has 
grown in his or her comprehension and shared ethics of poetry.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236	  “a	  new	  intelligence”	  
237	  “Beyond	  the	  sphere	  that	  circles	  widest	  /	  penetrates	  the	  sigh	  that	  issues	  from	  my	  heart:	  	  /	  a	  new	  intelligence	  ,	  
which	  Love,	  /	  weeping,	  places	  in	  him,	  draws	  him	  ever	  upward.”	  




 Throughout this study I have argued that Dante’s experience and expression of 
love for Beatrice causes him to act in an ethical manner toward all with whom he comes 
into contact – familiar friends, fellow citizens and strangers.  I have demonstrated that 
his words allow him to share his ethics of poetry with the entire civitas as he ponders 
the meaning of natural love which extends to the eternal.  While the Vita Nuova is 
Dante’s first step in his exploration of love, he later links it (as I have shown earlier in 
this dissertation) to the Convivio, in which Dante philosophically expresses the ethics of 
poetry against the backdrop of Aristotelian thought and ultimately links it – as in the 
Commedia – to politics and history. I therefore wish to address three fundamental 
questions in my conclusion. First, how does the Aristotelian movement from potency to 
actuality correspond to the Levinasian movement from said to saying?  Second, what 
does the transcendence of the saying over the said mean for Dante’s readers?  Finally, 
what is the significance of my said and saying to my readers? 
  
When one understands potency as a force, and actuality as form (as described 
by Aristotle in the Metaphysics), it is clear that actuality is the terminus toward which all 
matter is directed.  Aristotle states that “because everything which is generated moves 
toward a principle, its end…and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that 
potency is acquired” (Metaphysics IX, viii, 9).239  Potency, then, assists matter in moving 
toward its goal.  Matter always has the potential to become form, and ultimately is form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  The	  citiations	  from	  Aristotle’s	  Metaphysics	  come	  from	  The	  Loeb	  Classical	  Library	  series,	  translation	  by	  Hugh	  
Tredennick,	  (Cambridege,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1975).	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when it actually exists.  “Further, matter exists in a potential state, because it may attain 
to its form” writes Aristotle, “but when it exists actually, it is then in the form” 
(Metaphysics IX, viii, 9-11).  In light of this definition, with pure form as the ultimate goal, 
potency is analogous to Bonaventure’s ladder which helps the believer reach the 
Summum Bonum.  Singer acknowledges this when he writes: “Aristotle’s ladder of being 
starts with pure matter and culminates in pure form.  At the top of the ladder, pure form 
– the form of perfection itself – draws everything toward it.  All things strive for their 
completion in pure form” (Singer 108).  This concept is evident in Capellanus’s concept 
of morum probitas, in which the lover develops his moral character and virtue in an 
effort to gain the affection of the beloved.  To address the present question, however, I 
draw comparisons between the movements from potency to actuality and, in Levinasian 
terms, from the said to the saying.  
The movement from the said to the saying is analogous to the movement from 
potency to actuality.  The saying eludes comprehension.  It is, as Critchley states, “the 
very enactment of the movement from the same to the other (Critchley 18).  Therefore, 
just as matter, according to Aristotle, moves toward actuality – its end – so does the 
ethical being – through responsibility – move toward the neighbor, the stranger, the 
Other.  For Levinas, words and language function as signs through which the saying is 
manifested.  The saying, however, transcends the said even as it remains cloaked in 
the language of ontology,240 prompting Newton to describe the narrative act as “Saying 
over and above the Said, or as Said called into account in the Saying” (Newton 7).  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  Levinas	  writes,	  “But	  the	  signification	  of	  the	  saying	  goes	  beyond	  the	  said.	  	  It	  is	  not	  ontology	  that	  raises	  up	  the	  
speaking	  subject;	  it	  is	  the	  signifyingness	  of	  saying	  going	  beyond	  the	  essence	  that	  can	  justify	  the	  exposedness	  of	  
being,	  ontology”	  (OB	  37-­‐38).	  	  Wyschogrod	  echoes	  Levinas,	  when	  she	  states,	  “Saying	  undoes	  the	  dissimulation	  of	  
the	  said,	  gives	  sign	  of	  itself,	  	  yet	  remains	  clothed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  said”	  (Wyschogrod	  202).	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transcendence of the said by the saying is the element which corresponds to the 
movement from potency to act, analogically linking the philosophies of Aristotle to 
Levinas.  
 
Through the use of the vernacular (as I have indicated throughout this study) 
Dante creates a link between himself and the entire civitas, for the vernacular connects 
him to all the citizens.  While the importance of language is evident throughout the Vita 
Nuova, the most salient example is li più semplici (the simple folk, the unschooled).  
While the elite group of learned poets are confounded by Dante’s poetry, li più semplici 
represent not only the entire civitas, but on a parallel level, his reader as well, 
underscoring Dante’s responsibility to all his interlocutors.  Newton’s description of the 
narrative act as relationship between teller and listener, author and reader is applicable 
to Dante’s dialectical relationship with his reader.   In the Vita Nuova, as he 
contemplates natural love, and investigates the link between poetry and ethics, Dante’s 
infinite responsibility – the saying – is expressed to his readers through the words of his 
said.  His sonnets, canzoni, and ballate, as well as the gloss through which he explains 
his poetry, is the “thematic statement” (Ciaramelli 96-97) which is transcended by the 
infinite saying, while retaining traces of that saying within it.241  This is the true meaning 
and importance of this first work of the young poet to his readers; the communication of 
his ethics of poetry. As we read Dante’s words of love we participate in the circularity of 
the saying and the said, for the saying opens the said, which we must read for the 
words to have any meaning.  We are then obliged to internalize their meaning, or they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  See	  Ciaramelli	  in	  Re-­‐reading	  Levinas,	  pp.	  95-­‐97.	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are nothing less than signs without signification; thus does the poet communicate to his 
readers.  The importance of Dante’s Vita Nuova to his readers may be summed up in 
the words of Levinas: “Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all 
communication, as exposure” (OB 48). 
 
If, as I claim, the importance of the Vita Nuova is found in Dante’s communication 
of his ethics of poetry to his readers, what is the meaning and importance of this 
dissertation to my readers?  How does my study contribute to the scholarship regarding 
Dante’s work, and what is my ethical responsibility to my readers? 
When I set out to study Dante’s Vita Nuova, I was very interested in Dante’s 
understanding of love and how it influenced his poetry, not only in the Vita Nuova, but in 
the Convivio and the Commedia as well.  My investigation began as an examination of 
Dante’s natural love for Beatrice, beginning with the erotic and developing into perfected 
love.  As my research continued, however, I noticed that Dante’s love had a strong 
ethical component, and while this love was certainly focused on Beatrice, it was also 
shared with the entire community. Dante’s ethics of poetry is manifested through the 
many visions, events, and interactions he experiences with Beatrice, the fedeli d’amore, 
le donne schermo, the coro delle donne, la donne gentile, the pilgrims who pass 
through Florence, and many others.  The episode in which Dante explains the effects of 
Beatrice’s greeting on him causes one to recognize the ethical dimension of Dante’s 
writing: “Dico che quando ella apparia, da parte alcuna, per la speranza de la mirabile 
salute nullo nemico mi rimanea, anzi mi giugnea una fiamma di caritate, la quale mi 
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facea perdonare a chiunque  m’avesse offeso” (VN XI:1).242  My reading of this line 
brings me to the realization that Dante’s natural love for Beatrice is extended beyond his 
lady to the other, the entire civitas, and the stranger, who become the recipients of the 
poet’s universal love. 
Dante’s ethics of poetry, expressed in the said, but manifested in the saying 
leads me to address with a deep sense of responsibility those who will read my 
dissertation.  While they may approach this study in an effort to learn about Dante’s Vita 
Nuova, they will (through the words of my said) discover an ethos which they may not 
have realized was so prevalent, nor expected to find.  They will learn of the philosophy 
of Emanuel Levinas, and come to understand ethics as our undeniable responsibility to 
the other, regardless of time or place, which I hope they will internalize, extending this 
ethos to all with whom they come into contact, and thus participating in the infinity of the 
saying. They will realize the importance of language, through which we communicate 
and respond to each other.  It is our written and spoken language which identifies the 
saying, and through the language of the said that we respond to the needs of the 
other.243  They will learn of Newton’s claim that the narrative act constitutes a 
relationship of responsibility between the author and the reader.  As my readers explore 
the said and the saying embedded in the Vita Nuova, we – my readers and I – gain an 
“intelligenza nova” conferred upon us through Dante’s ethics of poetry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  “I	  say	  that	  when	  she	  appeared	  from	  any	  direction,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  her	  miraculous	  greeting	  I	  was	  left	  with	  no	  
enemy,	  but	  rather	  there	  arose	  in	  me	  a	  flame	  of	  charity	  that	  made	  me	  forgive	  whoever	  might	  have	  offended	  me.”	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